Case Summary (G.R. No. 41423)
Procedural History
Tamayo was convicted in the justice of the peace court for violating section 2 of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 (series 1932). He appealed to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, which affirmed the conviction and imposed a fine. Tamayo then appealed further. While the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the municipal council repealed the challenged section, and the repeal was approved by the provincial board. Tamayo moved for dismissal of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the repeal had rendered the previously prohibited act lawful in the municipality.
Legal Issue
Whether the absolute repeal of a municipal ordinance that formerly created a criminal offense, without any saving clause and not constituting reenactment, extinguishes criminal liability for acts that occurred prior to repeal and requires dismissal of ongoing prosecution.
Applicable Law and Precedents
The Court considered prior authorities referenced in the record: United States v. Cuna (12 Phil. 241) and Wing v. United States (218 U.S. 272), which held that repeal by reenactment, even without a saving clause, does not necessarily destroy criminal liability. The Court contrasted the local approach with common-law and American practice (which are said to be more favorable to the accused) and noted affinity with the Spanish doctrine. The Court also referred to Pacheco’s Commentaries (section 96) to illustrate that, under Spanish doctrine, where an offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be maintained. The distinction between repeal by reenactment (or reenactment followed by repeal by implication) and an absolute repeal without reenactment or saving clause was central.
Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The Court emphasized the distinction between legislative repeal that is effectively a reenactment (which prior authorities addressed) and an absolute repeal that plainly removes criminality from previously proscribed conduct. The precedents (Cuna and Wing) do not indicate any intention to permit punishment for conduct that, at the time of decision, is no longer criminal. The repeal in this case was absolute, not a reenactment or repeal by implication, and contained no saving clause preserving prior prosecutions or penalties. The municipal council’s action manifested legislative intent that the conduct
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 41423)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 61 Phil. 225, G.R. No. 41423, decided March 19, 1935.
- Decision authored by Justice Hull.
- Appellant (Crisant o Tamayo) was convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, for a violation of section 2, Municipal Ordinance No. 5, series of 1932.
- On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur affirmed the conviction and imposed a fine.
- Appellant brought a further appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
- While the appeal was pending, the municipal council of Magsingal repealed section 2 in question; the repeal was duly approved by the provincial board.
- Following the repeal, the conduct previously denounced by the ordinance became legal in the municipality.
- Appellant moved in the Supreme Court for dismissal of the proceedings against him on account of the repeal.
Facts of the Case
- The original conviction arose under section 2 of Municipal Ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur.
- The municipal council subsequently enacted an absolute repeal of that section; the repeal was not a reenactment and was not accompanied by a saving clause.
- The repeal was approved by the provincial board, rendering the previously prohibited act lawful in the municipality at the time of the Supreme Court proceedings.
- The record reflects an express legislative intent, as manifested by the municipal council’s action, that the conduct formerly penalized is no longer to be treated as criminal.
Legal Issue Presented
- Whether the absolute repeal of a municipal ordinance (section 2 of Ordinance No. 5, series of 1932), without a saving clause and effected while an appeal from conviction was pending, requires dismissal of the criminal proceedings and prevents conviction and punishment for conduct that is no longer criminal.
Applicable Precedents and Comparative Doctrines Cited
- The Court references two leading cases: United States v. Cuna (12 Phil., 241) and Wing v. United States (218 U.S., 272), noting the doctrine in those cases that repeal by reenactment, even without a saving clause