Case Summary (G.R. No. 171863)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
Alleged incidents occurred on January 27, 1997. Three informations were filed in Taguig and Pasig RTCs and consolidated for joint trial: Criminal Case Nos. 112571 and 112572 (sexual intercourse and lewd acts under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610) and Criminal Case No. 116350 (acts of lasciviousness). After trial, the RTC (Branch 158, Pasig City) acquitted respondent in Criminal Case No. 116350 but convicted him in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72 under Section 10(a) and imposed prision mayor in its minimum period for each count. The respondent appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed and acquitted him in a January 13, 2006 decision. The People filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ acquittal.
Allegations and Charges
The informations alleged that on January 27, 1997 at specified times and locations in Taguig, the accused “with lewd designs” willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with and committed lewd and lascivious acts upon AAA, a minor of fourteen years. The Pasig prosecutor’s office had earlier determined that the acts did not amount to rape because they were done with the victim’s consent, but nonetheless filed charges for violations of R.A. 7610.
Trial Court Findings and Reasoning
The trial court found that the respondent admitted the sexual liaisons with AAA and that the events at the house of Duke Espiritu showed that AAA went with Olayon voluntarily. The trial court nonetheless held that consent was not a valid defense under the special law and convicted the respondent under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. The trial court emphasized that the respondent “took advantage of [AAA’s] minority to have these sexual liaisons, even if they were with her consent,” concluding that such conduct fell within “other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or . . . conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” punishable under Section 10(a).
Court of Appeals’ Rationale for Acquittal
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Section 10(a) addresses “other acts of child abuse” distinct from the specific sexual exploitation provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 7610. The CA read Section 10(a) as referring to acts other than those enumerated in Section 5 (child prostitution and other sexual abuse). The CA further held that, under Section 5, consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct involving a minor who is not exploited in prostitution falls within Section 5(b) only if it occurred “for money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,” and thus requires an element of coercion, persuasion, inducement, enticement or influence. Because the informations and proofs did not allege or establish coercion, intimidation or influence, the CA concluded that the sexual acts did not constitute “sexual abuse” under Section 5 and therefore did not fit within Section 10(a)’s residual proscription as interpreted by the CA. Accordingly, the CA found no grave abuse in acquitting respondent.
Statutory Texts and Their Interaction
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 penalizes “any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code.” Section 5 treats “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” and specifies that children who engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence are deemed exploited in prostitution and sexual abuse; Section 5(b) imposes penalties on those who commit sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with such exploited children. The Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. 7610 define “sexual abuse” to include “the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in . . . sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.” The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court’s analysis treated these provisions as delineating separate categories: Section 5 for exploitative or coerced sexual abuse, and Section 10(a) for other acts prejudicial to development excluding those already covered by Section 5.
Precedents and Interpretive Guides Relied Upon
The courts referred to People v. Larin (1998) and Malto v. People (2007). In Larin, the element of psychological coercion (taking advantage of authority and influence) was found to constitute coercion sufficient for a conviction under R.A. 7610. In Malto, the accused, a professor, obtained consent by exploiting his relationship and moral ascendancy over the minor, which the Court found constituted influence and sustained conviction under Section 5(b). The decisions establish that coercion can be psychological and that influence or moral ascendancy can satisfy the coercion/inducement element required for Section 5 liability.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Supreme Court denied the petition. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Section 10(a) refers to acts of child abuse “other” than those enumerated in Section 5 and that “sexual abuse” as defined under Section 5 is a distinct offense. The Court emphasized that consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor who is twelve years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) only if persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion (including psychological coercion or influence arising from relationship or authority) is present. Because neither the information nor the proof alleged such coercion, the Supreme Court held that, even if charged under Section 5(b) instead of Section 10(a), respondent would still have been acquitted. Thus the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals
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Court and Citation
- Decision promulgated by the Supreme Court, Second Division, reported at 584 Phil. 594, G.R. No. 171863, dated August 20, 2008.
- Opinion authored by Justice Carpio Morales; concurrence by Justices Quisumbing (Chairperson), Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion.
Parties
- Petitioner: People of the Philippines.
- Respondents: The Honorable Court of Appeals (Second Division) and Gaspar Olayon (also referred to as Gaspar Olayon y Matubis a.k.a. Eric Ramirez).
- Alleged victim: A minor identified in the record as AAA, age fourteen (14) at relevant time.
Relevant Statutory Provisions Quoted in the Record
- Republic Act No. 7610, Section 10(a) (as quoted): "Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
- Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5 (as quoted): "Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. ... (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, ..."
Rules and Regulations Definition Cited
- Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (implementing R.A. No. 7610) defines "sexual abuse" to include: "the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children."
Facts (as stated in the record)
- The respondent, then 22 years old, was alleged to have engaged in sexual intercourse and committed lewd and lascivious acts upon AAA, a minor of 14 years, on January 27, 1997 at two times and places alleged in two separate informations (Criminal Case Nos. 112571 and 112572), both alleging sexual intercourse and lewd and lascivious acts "with lewd designs."
- A separate information (Criminal Case No. 116350) charged respondent with acts of lasciviousness against the same minor; this case was transferred and consolidated with the other two cases and the three were jointly tried.
- The Pasig City Prosecutor's Office found that the acts did not amount to rape because they were done with the consent of AAA, yet it filed Informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610, Section 10(a).
Charges / Informations (as pleaded)
- Criminal Case No. 112571 alleged: On or about 10:00 a.m. of January 27, 1997 in Taguig, Metro Manila, the accused, "with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with and commit lewd and lascivious acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age."
- Criminal Case No. 112572 alleged: On or about 2:00 p.m. of January 27, 1997 in Taguig, Metro Manila, substantially the same allegation as above.
- Criminal Case No. 116350 charged acts of lasciviousness against the same minor (details of the allegation appear in the record and the case was consolidated with the two informations above).
Trial Court Proceedings and Findings (Pasig City RTC, Branch 158)
- The three consolidated cases were tried jointly before Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC.
- The RTC acquitted respondent in Criminal Case No. 116350 (acts of lasciviousness) by Decision dated January 15, 2002.
- The RTC convicted respondent in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72 for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, based on the following findings and reasoning:
- The accused admitted sexual liaisons with AAA; his defenses were that AAA was his sweetheart and that the sexual liaisons occurred with AAA's consent.
- Although AAA denied consent, the RTC found the evidence did not support absence of consent: AAA went voluntarily with respondent from a tricycle stand to the house of one Duke Espiritu; if forced to board the tricycle, she could have resisted and shouted for help given the presence of people; at the house of Espiritu she could have shouted for help as it was near a road and pathway.
- Despite finding the sexual liaisons to be with AAA's consent, the RTC held respondent nonetheless liable because he "took advantage of [AAA's] minority to have these sexual liaisons," and concluded that consent is not an accepted defense under the special law (R.A. No. 7610).
- The RTC explicitly relied on Section 10(a) as the violated provision.
Trial Court Disposition and Sentence
- The RTC found Gaspar Olayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating R.A. No. 7610, Section 10(a) in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72.
- Sentence imposed: Six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor for each count.
- The RTC acquitted respondent in Criminal Case No. 116350.
- Costs were assessed against the accused.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals
- Respondent appealed the RTC conviction to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals considered whether consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is classified as child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Court of Appeals Decision (Decision dated January 13, 2006) — Holding and Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and acquitted respondent of the two counts of child abuse under Section 10(a).
- Reasoning inc