Title
People vs. Constantino
Case
G.R. No. 111124
Decision Date
Jun 20, 1996
Enrique Constantino, a former driver, participated in a 1988 Makati robbery resulting in two deaths and an attempted homicide. Despite claiming duress, the Supreme Court convicted him of robbery with homicide, citing active involvement, conspiracy, and flight as evidence of guilt.
robbery with homicide
duress defense
real fear
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 111124)

Factual Background

The evidence presented at trial established that in the evening of May 15, 1988, five armed men robbed the residence at 1668 Baler Street, Makati, Metro Manila of Hichiro Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond. The robbery involved the taking of assorted jewelry and cash and foreign currency, and it resulted in the deaths of Hichiro Kubota and Hazel Arjona, both killed by fatal stab wounds. Another maid, Marilyn Juguilon, was attacked with a knife but survived. Elizabeth Hammond, her mother Epifania, and her sister Diosa escaped unhurt, as did the couple’s children. The trial record also showed that Enrique Constantino was a former driver of Kubota and Hammond, and thus was known to several prosecution eyewitnesses.

The Amended Information and the Charged Criminal Design

The prosecution filed an amended information dated August 11, 1988 charging Enrique Constantino, Agustin Trinidad, Willie Trinidad, Alvin Santos, and Juan Salvatierra with a version of the offense described as “Robbery in Band with Rape and Double Homicide and Attempted Homicide.” The information alleged that the accused, in conspiracy and while armed with handguns and knives, entered the victims’ home, took valuables by force and intimidation, and, during the same incident, sexually assaulted Hazel Arjona against her will. It further alleged that with intent to kill and with qualifying circumstances such as treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, the accused stabbed Hichiro Kubota and Hazel Arjona, both suffering mortal wounds causing death, and also attacked Marilyn Juguilon with a knife in a manner that commenced the commission of homicide but was not completed due to the victim’s injuries being allegedly insufficient to cause death. During trial, not all accused were proceeded against; only three—Juan Salvatierra, Enrique Constantino, and Agustin Trinidad—were tried after Willie Trinidad and Alvin Santos remained at large.

Trial Chronology and Result in the Regional Trial Court

The trial commenced in September 1988. Juan Salvatierra was arraigned on August 31, 1988, entered a plea of not guilty, and proceeded to trial with the prosecution presenting Elizabeth Hammond, Diosa Hammond, Marilyn Juguilon, Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, and Pfc. Leonardo Timtim, while Salvatierra testified and presented Fe Maderazo for alibi. Enrique Constantino and Agustin Trinidad were arrested later and arraigned on March 15, 1990 and May 30, 1990, respectively, both pleading not guilty. The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of Elizabeth Hammond, Epifania Hammond, Diosa Hammond, and Atty. Isidro Hildawa. The defense witnesses for Constantino and Agustin were similarly their own testimony.

On January 22, 1993, the trial court convicted Enrique Constantino and Juan Salvatierra of robbery with homicide under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing reclusion perpetua and awarding civil damages to the victims’ heirs. It acquitted Agustin Trinidad for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s Defense: Denial and Duress

On appeal, Enrique Constantino sought reversal of his conviction. His main defense invoked the supposed exempting circumstance that he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear because his co-accused allegedly coerced him into participation. He also attacked the trial court’s credibility findings.

In his own version of events, Constantino admitted being with the group of Salvatierra that robbed the Kubota residence on May 15, 1988. He described himself as working as a driver for a Japanese friend of Kubota, and he stated that Salvatierra invited him to a drinking spree. After he declined employment-related requests from Salvatierra, he claimed Salvatierra drew a knife and threatened him, forcing him to accompany the group to the victims’ home. Constantino alleged he tried to prevent the robbery but could not do so because of extreme fear, and he claimed he had heard threatening words from Salvatierra. After the robbery and the killings, he described seeking comfort to the victims, including removing cloth from Hammond’s mouth and eyes and later driving away. He asserted that he did not report to the authorities because of fear for his life.

The Court’s Appraisal of Duress as a Defense

The Supreme Court held that the evidence failed to meet the stringent requisites for duress. Duress, it emphasized, must rest on a real, imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. It must not be speculative, fanciful, or imagined, and it must be anchored in the accused’s complete lack of freedom of action. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense. The Court further noted that duress is unavailing where the accused had opportunities to run away or resist aggression, especially where the accused was also armed.

Applying those standards, the Court reasoned that Constantino’s narrative did not show the continuous, coercive circumstances required by law. It observed that when the group flagged down a taxicab, there appeared to be no threat directed at him at that moment. It was only later, according to his claim, that Salvatierra threatened him in the vehicle. It also found that at the victims’ residence, Constantino had opportunities to escape: he rang the doorbell, he was allowed into the house, and he continued to move in ways inconsistent with the claimed lack of freedom. The Court considered especially significant that among his four co-accused, only Salvatierra was shown as actually armed with a knife and exhibiting threatening behavior toward him. The Court therefore concluded that Constantino could have reacted or dissociated himself if fear truly left him no choice.

Credibility, Motive to Falsely Impute, and the Trial Court’s Findings

The Supreme Court rejected the attempt to discredit the prosecution’s witnesses. It held that Constantino’s version was not only contradicted and self-serving, but also inherently incredible. It found that the positive declarations of surviving eyewitnesses—particularly Elizabeth Hammond and Diosa Hammond—showed Constantino’s active role in the criminal incident and belied his duress claim.

The Court also invoked the principle that, absent proof of any intent on the part of witnesses to falsely impute such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity favors truthful testimony. It found no satisfactory showing that Elizabeth Hammond and Diosa Hammond were impelled by false motives. It further addressed specific matters affecting perceived plausibility, including Elizabeth Hammond’s conduct in answering her “comadre” at around four o’clock in the morning, taking out her children later at six o’clock in the morning, and then asking what had happened when Constantino drove away. The Court found these actions consistent with fear, concealment of the presence of Constantino within the house, and an attempt to avoid further harm to family members still inside. Most importantly, the Court held that Hammond’s identification of Constantino and the details of his participation were clear in her affidavit dated May 17, 1988 and in her testimony in court, and that there was no perceptible reversible error in the trial court’s assessment of credibility. Appellate review, it stressed, would deviate from the trial court only if facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked or misinterpreted.

Proven Circumstances Establishing Constantino’s Participation

The Supreme Court affirmed that Constantino’s guilt was supported by specific proven circumstances. As to Constantino, the trial court had found, among others, that he admitted being present in the victims’ home at the time of the incident, and that Elizabeth Hammond categorically described his participation. The Supreme Court reproduced the essential points of Hammond’s testimony, as follows: Constantino rang the doorbell, pretended to have a message from a Japanese contact, and falsely introduced the group as relatives so that Hammond would allow them inside. After Hammond went upstairs, Constantino’s companion poked her with a knife and Constantino told her not to make noise because they only needed money. Constantino and a companion dragged her out of her room, instructed her to sit beside her husband at the top of the stairs, and during the search Constantino held the bag from which money and valuables were taken. Later, Hammond heard Constantino speaking with co-accused, including instructions concerning the robbery. After Hammond freed herself, she met Constantino holding a knife and tied her again. When she saw Constantino driving the following morning, he allegedly said they had killed her husband and that the maid was also harmed.

Diosa Hammond’s testimony further supported the finding of coordinated action. She stated that she knew Constantino well enough to testify that he opened a drawer inside the room and placed something into his pocket. She also testified that Constantino ordered her to be quiet, blindfolded her again, and the next morning she saw him near the comfort room cleaning a knife.

On these facts, the Court held that Constantino’s acts, taken with his co-accused’s acts, showed concert and coordination in furtherance of a common criminal design.

Flight, Use of an Alias, and Conscious Evasion

The Supreme Court also relied on post-crime conduct. It noted that Constantino fled to Sorsogon and remained there for months after the incident. It added that he assumed a different identity as “Aeron A. Cortez” and even used a passport. These facts, the Court held, indicated resort to subterfuge to evade apprehension. Constantino’s explanation that he hid due to threats to his life by co-accused was deemed unsupported, as the Court observed he did not raise it during trial testimony and raised it only on appeal.

The Alleged Effect of Acquittal of Co-Accused

Constantino argued that the acquittal of Agustin Trinidad rendered the

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