Title
People vs. Concepcion y Perez
Case
G.R. No. 169060
Decision Date
Feb 6, 2007
Appellant convicted of homicide, not murder, after stabbing victim during altercation; self-defense and treachery claims unproven. Damages awarded to victim’s heirs.
homicide
murder
fatally stabbing
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 169060)

Events Leading to the Charges

The record showed that appellant was initially charged under an Information filed on 19 March 1998 before the RTC, Branch 77 of Malolos, Bulacan for homicide. Subsequently, after Balina, the eyewitness and common-law wife of Nicolas, executed a Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a motion for reinvestigation, the RTC granted the motion. After reinvestigation, an Amended Information for murder was filed on 1 December 1998 and the case was re-raffled to RTC Branch 12.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. At pre-trial, appellant manifested that although he stabbed Nicolas once, he did so in self-defense. The trial court, by agreement of the parties, ordered reverse proceedings so that the defense would present its evidence first on the claimed self-defense.

Pre-Trial Stipulations and Nature of the Incident

The pre-trial order issued by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion incorporated the parties’ stipulations, including: the identities of appellant and Nicolas; the material time and place of the offense; that the cause of death was the single stab wound to the stomach; and that the police statements and medico-legal testimony could be dispensed with because key prosecution witnesses had provided statements.

The defense case proceeded to show that appellant admitted the stabbing but insisted that it was legally justified, and it relied on its witnesses, namely appellant, his father, his mother, and SPO4 Eduardo Cuison, the arresting officer.

Appellant’s Version: Alleged Self-Defense and Lack of Intent to Kill

Appellant’s testimony placed the incident in the context of a drinking session and holiday festivities at the house of his aunt, Precy Baldoza, on the evening of December 25, 1997. Appellant narrated that he and a friend, Jeffrey Lopez, joined Nicolas, Balina, and companions including Gilbert de Guzman and Lenin Baldazo.

According to appellant, trouble erupted when appellant allegedly attempted to flirt with Balina by touching her hand while she passed a videoke microphone. Appellant claimed that Nicolas became angered and uttered a remark in a loud voice. Appellant asserted that Balina asked him to leave to avoid further problems. He then claimed he left but returned to retrieve his mother during their argument.

Appellant further stated that while he was about two meters from his aunt’s house, Nicolas suddenly appeared and pulled out a knife. Appellant claimed he approached and asked what the problem was, and that during their confrontation he tried to wrest the knife away. Appellant insisted that both fell to the ground and that the knife pierced Nicolas’s stomach in the course of the struggle. He claimed that he fled, returned home, informed his wife and father, and that his father went to the police station and returned with two police officers.

Prosecution Version: Eyewitness Account of a Sudden Attack

To refute appellant’s self-defense theory, the prosecution presented Balina, who claimed she witnessed the stabbing. Balina testified that appellant and Lopez joined the festivities at Baldazo’s house and that the group drank beer and sang through the night. She stated that at some point appellant left surreptitiously and disappeared for a considerable time. Balina believed appellant went home to get the weapon and returned when his mother later asked whether he had a fight.

Balina testified that around 11:45 in the evening, after the festivities ended, appellant—described as first to leave—sat in the veranda outside the house. She stated that Nicolas, Balina, and the others followed. As Nicolas stooped slightly to light a cigarette, Balina testified that appellant suddenly stood up, rushed toward Nicolas, and stabbed him. Appellant fled afterward. Nicolas, Balina said, was stunned, managed to utter the words, “Why, Joey?”, and collapsed. He was brought to a nearby hospital, where he expired.

The Autopsy Report confirmed that the cause of death was the stab wound to the abdomen and described the wound as a gaping stab wound with dimensions and trajectory that severed internal tissues and hit the liver.

Findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

The RTC found Balina’s testimony more credible than appellant’s claim of self-defense. It convicted appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also awarded damages to the heirs, including P75,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the civil aspect by reducing the civil indemnity to P50,000.00. The appellate decision thus left the conviction for murder intact, subject to the adjustment in civil liability.

Issues Raised by Appellant

Appellant’s arguments before the Court assailed the lower courts’ determinations on three fronts: first, that they wrongly gave full credence to Balina and disregarded appellant’s self-defense; second, that they improperly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery; and third, that they erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

The Court’s Ruling on Self-Defense and the Burden of Proof

The Court held that appellant failed to establish self-defense beyond the threshold required by law. It reiterated the rule that when self-defense is invoked, the onus probandi shifts to the accused to prove the concurrence of the elements of the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. These elements were identified as: unlawful aggression by the victim; reasonable necessity of the means employed; and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The Court emphasized that appellant admitted the stabbing that caused the death of Nicolas. It stressed that one who admits inflicting fatal injuries bears the burden of proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, and that self-defense, like alibi, is easily fabricated. In the Court’s view, appellant’s evidence did not clearly and convincingly show the presence of the first and primordial element: unlawful aggression.

Accordingly, the Court found no incident that amounted to actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of such attack, that would imperil appellant’s life or limb. It noted that while many persons were present during the incident, appellant did not present corroborative evidence from those other witnesses, although they could have testified. The Court also found appellant’s theory internally inconsistent, since appellant asserted self-defense but also suggested that Nicolas’s death was accidental, a combination the Court found implausible.

Treachery Not Properly Proven

Having rejected self-defense, the Court then addressed whether treachery had been properly appreciated to qualify the killing as murder. The Court explained the concept of treachery under Article 14 (No. 16, par. 2) as requiring the offender to employ means, methods, or forms in the execution that tend to insure execution without risk arising from defenses the offended party might make. The Court ruled that treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.

In this case, the Court held that the only evidence relating to treachery came from Balina’s bare testimony that Nicolas’s head was bent while lighting a cigarette when appellant launched his attack. The Court observed that Balina’s statement about the bent head appeared for the first time in her Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay, after she failed to mention it in her earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The Court considered the amendment to be a mere afterthought made to upgrade the charge to murder. It further noted that two companions of Nicolas during the festivities had made statements to the police authorities, but the prosecution did not present those companions as witnesses; therefore, their statements could not be considered evidence.

Because the prosecution failed to establish conclusive proof of the manner in which aggression commenced, the Court held that treachery could not be appreciated. It ruled that the killing could not be treated as murder and that, absent treachery, appellant could be held liable only for homicide, not murder.

Voluntary Surrender Rejected

The Court also examined appellant’s claimed mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. It reiterated that voluntary surrender requires the offender not to have been actually arrested; surrender to a person in authority or agent; and a voluntary, unconditional act, supported by spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to authorities, typically with an acknowledgment of guilt or an intention to spare authorities the trouble and expense of capture.

The Court found that appellant did not surrender. It found that he was arrested at his residence by SPO4 Cuison, and that the arresting officer had to go twice because appellant refused to come out during the first attempt and appellan

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