G.R. No. 209330 - De Lima vs. Reyes

Case Summary (G.R. No. 209330)

Factual Background

The record, as adopted by the counsel de oficio and the Office of the Solicitor General, showed that on March 9, 1966, during the first period in the afternoon, the accused left St. Anthony’s Academy to buy a notebook from the store of Emil Andres. While there, he met his friend, Vidal Torrefranca, who offered him tuba. The accused drank two glasses and returned to his classes, where he was able to attend and remember the subjects taught. After classes, he stood by the flagpole, where he met and then stabbed with a knife Segundo Sarce, Jr., the acting principal teacher of St. Anthony’s Academy. The accused fled after the stabbing.

According to the autopsy report, the victim died minutes after the wound was inflicted. After learning of the incident, the Chief of Police and five policemen went to St. Anthony’s Academy but were informed that the accused had escaped. From the Carmen Extension Hospital, where the policemen saw the victim already dead, they went to the accused’s house. The accused’s father told them that he was going into town to look for his son and would surrender him. While the father was putting on his trousers, a knife fell from his trousers’ pocket. When asked by the Chief of Police, the father stated that it was the knife (Exh. “A”) that the accused had used in stabbing the victim.

The policemen and the father then went to the house of Teodorico Cabanag, the accused’s grandfather, where the policemen found the accused in a room. The accused was brought to the municipal jail and locked therein.

Procedural History in the Lower Courts

The accused was initially charged in the Municipal Court of Carmen, Bohol with direct assault with murder. He waived his right to a preliminary investigation and asked that his case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol at Tagbilaran. The remand was granted, and the accused was charged in the Court of First Instance with the same complex crime.

On arraignment on April 12, 1966, the accused pleaded not guilty. On the scheduled date for trial, however, he manifested through counsel his intention to plead guilty to the lesser offense of direct assault with homicide and to pay damages. With the Fiscal’s conformity and upon the accused’s petition, he was allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty. The information was amended accordingly, and the accused pleaded guilty to direct assault with homicide.

To mitigate his liability, the accused presented evidence that he was born in the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol, on May 27, 1948, so that on the date of the commission of the crime he was seventeen years, nine months, and twelve days old.

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court convicted the accused of the complex crime of direct assault upon a person in authority with homicide, as defined under Article 48 in relation with Articles 148 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciated in his favor: (1) a special or privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68, paragraph 2, and (2) a spontaneous plea of guilty under Article 13, paragraph 7. It imposed an indeterminate sentence of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, applying Article 27 in relation to Articles 76 and 77 of the Revised Penal Code and referencing People vs. Pao and People vs. Gayrama.

The court also ordered the accused to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased Segundo Sarce, Jr., in the amount of P7,500.00, including expenses for embalming, tomb, prayers, and wick, but without subsidiary personal liability in case of insolvency in view of the nature of the penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. It credited the accused with one-half of his preventive imprisonment from March 10, 1966 until the decision became final and ordered him to pay the costs. The knife used (Exh. “A”) was confiscated in favor of the Government of the Philippines.

Issue on Appeal and the Accused’s Theory

On appeal, the accused raised as the sole issue the determination of the correct penalty under the circumstances. He contended that because the conviction involved a complex crime, the penalty for the more serious offense should be imposed in its maximum period. Homicide, being the more serious offense, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal. He also maintained that two mitigating circumstances applied in his favor: the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

He further argued that under Article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. Under Article 71, the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal was prision mayor. Because of the complex nature of the crime, that prision mayor should be applied in its maximum period. However, since he had the ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty without any offsetting aggravating circumstance, Article 64, paragraph 2 required the imposition of prision mayor maximum but within the minimum range thereof.

The accused also asserted that the trial court committed a methodological error. Although the lower court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstances, it allegedly applied first the imposable penalty at its maximum degree and then imposed the next inferior penalty as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, but within the minimum range due to plea of guilty. The accused maintained that the proper method was to start from the penalty imposed by the Revised Penal Code (reclusion temporal), apply the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority to determine the penalty immediately inferior in degree (prision mayor), then apply that penalty in its maximum degree but within the minimum range due to plea of guilty. He added that, for purposes of the indeterminate sentence law, this would place the minimum of the indeterminate penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to prision mayor, which was prision correccional.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court addressed the penalty question by focusing on the interaction between the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, and on the correct sequencing in determining the proper indeterminate sentence range. The Court recognized the accused’s accepted mitigating circumstances and agreed with the analytical structure advocated by the appellant: starting from the penalty for the more serious offense in the complex crime, then applying the privileged mitigating circumstance to step down the penalty to the next inferior degree, and only thereafter applying the ordinary mitigating circumstance to confine the choice within the correct range.

The Court thus rejected the trial court’s alleged approach that first fixed the penalty at a higher degree and then stepped down in a manner inconsistent with the proper application of the mitigating circumstances to the degrees and ranges contemplated by the Revised Penal Code. The Court held that the correct method required the sequence described by the accused: begin with the penalty of reclusion temporal; apply minority to move to the next inferior penalty, prision mayor; apply prision mayor in its maximum degree but confined to the minimum range due to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. Because prision mayor would be the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the Court determined that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should fall within the range of the penalty next lower to prision mayor, namely prision correccional, as prescribed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Ruling of the Court

Applying these principles, the Court modified the personal penalty imposed by the trial court. It sentenced the acc

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 209330)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal by Wilforiano Cesar alias Junior from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol in Criminal Case No. 4258.
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with and adopted the trial court’s findings of fact.
The accused-appellant raised as his sole issue the correct penalty under the circumstances.
The accused-appellant pleaded guilty after initially entering a plea of not guilty, and the trial court rendered conviction on the amended information.
The Supreme Court modified the judgment as to the personal penalty and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

Key Factual Allegations

The accused was a student of St. Anthony’s Academy in Carmen, Bohol.
On March 9, 1966, during the first afternoon period, the accused went out to buy a notebook and met his friend, Vidal Torrefranca, who offered him tuba.
The accused drank two glasses of tuba and returned to classes, during which he was able to attend and remember the subjects.
After classes, the accused stood by the flagpole where he met and stabbed with a knife Segundo Sarce, Jr., the Acting Principal Teacher.
The accused fled after the stabbing.
The autopsy report showed the victim died minutes after the wound was inflicted.
Upon being informed, the Chief of Police and five policemen went to St. Anthony’s Academy but were told the accused had escaped.
The policemen proceeded to Carmen Extension Hospital, where they saw the victim already dead.
The policemen then went to the house of the accused, where the accused’s father stated that he was going to town to look for his son so that he could surrender.
While the father was putting on his trousers to go with the policemen, a knife fell from his trousers’ pocket.
When asked, the father stated that the knife (Exh. “A”) was the knife the accused used in stabbing the victim.
The policemen and the accused’s father went to the house of the accused’s grandfather, Teodorico Cabanag, where they found the accused in a room.
The accused was brought to the municipal jail and locked therein.

Charging History and Plea Events

The accused was originally charged with direct assault with murder in the Municipal Court of Carmen, Bohol.
The accused waived his right to preliminary investigation and moved that his case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol at Tagbilaran, which the court granted.
In the Court of First Instance, the accused was charged with the same complex crime.
At arraignment on April 12, 1966, the accused pleaded not guilty.
On the trial date set for the merits, the accused manifested through counsel his intention to plead guilty to the lesser offense of direct assault with homicide and to pay damages.
With the Fiscal’s conformity and upon petition of the accused, the accused was allowed to withdraw his not guilty plea.
The information was amended accordingly, and the accused pleaded guilty to direct assault with homicide.

Determination of Criminal Liability

The trial court convicted the accused of the complex crime of direct assault upon a person in authority with homicide as defined under Article 48 in relation to Articles 148 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court appreciated a special or privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court also appreciated spontaneous plea of guilty under Article 13, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code.
For mitigation, the accused proved he was born in Carmen, Bohol on May 27, 1948 (Exhibits 1 and 1-A).
On the date of commission, the accused was found to be seventeen years, nine months, and twelve days old.
The Supreme Court accepted the findings of fact relied upon by the trial court.

Statutory Framework

The complex crime was anchored on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, with the component offenses being direct assault and homicide.
The penalty selection in complex crimes was governed by the rule that the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed.
Homicide carried the penalty of reclusion temporal under the Revised Penal Code framework applied.
Article 68, paragraph 2 provided the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The trial court also relied on Article 13, paragraph 7 for spontaneous plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance.
The accused’s plea of guilty and the privileged minority were treated as mitigating circumstances for penalty adjustment under the Revised Penal Code provisions cited.
Article 64, par. 5 controlled the reduction method when a privileged mitigating circumstance is present in addition to others, as applied by the trial court and corrected by the Supreme Court.
Article 71 and the rules on the maximum degree of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal guided the stage of penal