C.A. No. 227 - People vs. Castillo

Case Summary (C.A. No. 227)

Petitioner / Respondent

Plaintiff/Appellee: The People of the Philippines (private prosecution by the injured party).
Defendant/Appellant: Nena Tanalega Raymundo.

Key Dates

Incident: February 18, 1941 (prescription filled; complainant ingested one capsule and became ill).
Analysis report of capsules by Institute of Hygiene (Bureau of Science): March 15, 1941 (found strychnine sulphate in capsules).
Information filed: September 12, 1941.
Trial court judgment (C.F.I., Laguna): October 12, 1942 (convicted of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence).
Court of Appeals (Southern Luzon) decision: June 10, 1944 (reduced conviction to slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence; fined P200).
Supreme Court decision (majority): affirmed conviction but under Administrative Code provisions (sec. 751 with sec. 2676 penalty), fine P200; motion for reconsideration denied.

Applicable Law and Rules Cited

Revised Administrative Code: Section 751 (responsibility for quality of drugs; unlawful to manufacture/prepare/sell/ administer prescription drug “under any fraudulent name, direction, pretense” or adulterate drugs); Section 2676 (penalty clause for Pharmacy Law violations: fine up to P500 or imprisonment up to 6 months, or both).
Revised Penal Code: provisions governing homicide/frustrated murder, reckless imprudence and physical injuries; Article 90 (prescription invoked by defense referencing two-month period for certain offenses).
Prescription/special statute: Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 — prescribes offenses under section 751 after four years.
Rules of Court: Rule 116, Section 4 — defendant may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the information and fully established by the evidence.
Due process and double jeopardy principles as invoked in the opinions (constitutional guarantees cited in dissent).

Factual Findings Established at Trial

Complainant presented a physician’s prescription calling for spartein sulphate (1.00), phenobarbital (0.50), carbromal (5.00), with instruction to divide and place in 15 capsules, sig: one capsule once a day.
Belarmino first obtained the correct mixture earlier in Manila; when symptoms recurred he copied the prescription and, on Feb. 18, 1941, had a 1/3 formula prepared at Escudero Drug Store for P1.00.
Manager Dr. Castillo wrote “1/3 f.” on the copy, checked the carbromal quantity, took bottles and a box to the dispensing table, and summoned Raymundo to compound the preparation; the licensed pharmacist was absent.
Raymundo computed the 1/3 reduction and compounded the formula using substances taken from the two bottles placed on the table; five capsules were produced and delivered to Belarmino in a box.
After taking one capsule, Belarmino developed symptoms consistent with poisoning (dizziness, breathing difficulty, leg stiffness, etc.), consulted physicians, refrained from taking remaining capsules.
Two of the remaining capsules were submitted to the Institute of Hygiene; chemical analysis found strychnine sulphate in the capsules (50.5 mg in one, 61.75 mg in the other) — evidence that, instead of spartein sulphate, strychnine sulphate had been used. Expert testimony established symptoms consistent with strychnine poisoning and that 50.5 mg could have been fatal but that phenobarbital and carbromal mixed as prescribed diminished the lethal effect.

Procedural History and Conflicting Lower-Court Rulings

Trial Court (Court of First Instance, Laguna): acquitted Dr. Leon Castillo on reasonable doubt; convicted Raymundo of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence; sentenced to four months arresto mayor and costs.
Court of Appeals (Southern Luzon): modified the verdict to slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence; imposed a fine of P200 and costs (declining to resolve prescription defense because it treated the offense as correctional in nature).
Supreme Court (majority): concluded frustrated homicide cannot be committed through reckless imprudence because frustrated homicide requires intent to kill and intent cannot coexist with mere recklessness; but found Raymundo guilty under Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code (preparation of one medicine for another under a false name) and, pursuant to Section 2676, imposed a fine of P200 and costs. Motion for reconsideration denied.

Majority Court’s Legal Reasoning and Disposition

On attempted/frustrated homicide: the Court affirmed the legal principle that frustrated homicide (or frustrated murder) requires an intent to kill, which is incompatible with reckless imprudence; therefore conviction for frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence was untenable.
On an included offense: the Court relied on the doctrine that a defendant may be convicted of an offense necessarily included in the information and fully proved by the evidence (Rule 116, Sec. 4). The information contained sufficient allegations and evidence to sustain conviction under the Pharmacy Law provision (sec. 751), namely that one medicine had been prepared for another.
On proof and culpability under Section 751: the Court found the evidence — the prescription, the compounding, the chemical analysis showing strychnine substituted for spartein, and the victim’s clinical course — established that the dispensed medicine differed from the prescription. Given administrative-law provisions and prior jurisprudence holding pharmacists strictly responsible for substitution/delivery of wrong substances, the Court concluded Raymundo violated section 751.
On due process and notice: the Court held that conviction for a necessarily included offense did not violate due process, noting the accused had ample opportunity to defend and the information was detailed. The Court invoked general due process jurisprudence to justify the procedure.
On prescription/statute of limitations: because Section 751 violations, penalized under Section 2676, prescribe after four years (as provided by Act No. 3326, as amended), the filing within seven months of the incident rendered the prosecution timely; defense contention that the two-month period under Article 90 (Revised Penal Code) applied was rejected as inapplicable to the Administrative Code offense charged by the Court.
Sentence: the Court imposed a fine of P200 and costs under sec. 2676, with subsidiary imprisonment if insolvent, and thus upheld the Court of Appeals’ punishment though under the Administrative Code rather than as a Penal Code reckless-imprudence offense.

Evidence, Causation, and Medical Expert Findings

Physical and chemical evidence: Institute of Hygiene analysis identified strychnine sulphate in the examined capsules in quantities sufficient to cause death absent moderating substances.
Medical testimony: complainant’s symptoms consistent with strychnine poisoning; expert testimony indicated the presence of phenobarbital and carbromal in the mixture reduced the otherwise lethal effect, explaining survival.
Causal link: the Court accepted that ingestion of the prepared capsule caused Belarmino’s acute illness and that the substitution of strychnine for spartein was established by laboratory analysis and expert medical opinion.

Policy and Precedential Considerations Adopted by the Majority

The Court reiterated prior rulings and foreign authorities emphasizing that the profession of pharmacy demands the highest degree of care and that substitution of one drug for another is a grave error exposing consumers to life-threatening risk. The majority stressed that pharmacists and their agents cannot rely on mistake as a total defense where dangerous substitution occurs, and administrative penalties for such conduct are appropriate and enforceable.

Dissenting Opinions — Summary of Principal Arguments

Justice Paras (dissent): argued that prescription of the offense of slight physical injuries (if that were the applicable crime) may have run (defense appeared plausible); expressed concern about convicting the appellant under the Pharmacy Law after an acquittal or reduction under the Penal Code; emphasized that appellant’s participation may have been limited and mechanical — mixing ingredients placed on the table by the manager — and assigned blame instead to the absent licensed pharmacist and the manager who usurped pharmacist duties. Paras questioned the propriety of converting an acquittal under one law into conviction under another in the same criminal proceeding.
Justice Perfecto (dissent): raised two principal objections: (1) Section 751’s subsection targeted by the majority criminalizes conduct “under any fraudulent name, direction, pretense,” and the adjective “fraudulent” imports willfulness or malice; the facts did not show fraudulent intent by Raymundo — she acted in good faith under Dr. Cas

Case Syllabus (C.A. No. 227)

Procedural History

Information filed September 12, 1941, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, charging Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. Nena Tanalega Raymundo with "FRUSTRATED MURDER BY POISONING THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE."
Trial before the Court of First Instance of Laguna resulted in a judgment dated October 12, 1942: Nena Tanalega Raymundo found guilty of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence, sentenced to four months arresto mayor and costs; co-accused Dr. Leon Castillo acquitted.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals of Southern Luzon. On June 10, 1944, the Court of Appeals found Raymundo guilty of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, imposed a fine of P200 and costs; the Court of Appeals did not decide prescription defense, deeming the offense and penalty correctional in nature.
Raymundo filed a motion for reconsideration on June 21, 1944, raising multiple grounds including that the offense did not exist under law, prescription, insufficiency of proof of causation and injury, and lack of evidence that strychnine was dispensed by her.
The Supreme Court considered the case, reviewed evidence, applicable law and precedent, and issued a decision modifying the basis of conviction to a violation of section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code in relation to section 2676, imposing a fine of P200 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and costs; petition for reconsideration denied.

Title and Parties

Plaintiff and appellee: The People of the Philippines.
Accused and appellee/defendant: Dr. Leon Castillo and others.
Accused-appellant specifically named and appealed: Nena Tanalega Raymundo (pharmacy clerk, pharmacy graduate but not yet licensed).
Other relevant persons: Silvino Belarmino (complaining witness/purchaser of medicine), Dr. Antonio G. Sison (prescribing physician), Saturnino Gesmundo Cortes (pharmacist of Escudero Drug Store not present when prescription was compounded), manager of Escudero Drug Store: Dr. Leon Castillo.

Facts Established by Evidence

Prescribing physician Dr. Antonio G. Sison issued a prescription calling for: Spartein sulphate 1.00; Phenobarbital 0.50; Carbromal 5.00; direction: Mix, divide and put in capsule No. XV; sig: one capsule once a day (Exhibits C and 2).
Complainant Silvino Belarmino first obtained the whole formula from Universal Drug Store in Manila; later, when symptoms recurred, he copied the prescription (Exhibit 2) and on the morning of February 18, 1941 went to Escudero Drug Store in San Pablo, Laguna, to have a 1/3 formula prepared.
Dr. Leon Castillo, manager, wrote "1/3 f." on Exhibit 2 and corrected the figure after "carbromal" from 6 to 5; agreed to prepare the 1/3 formula for P1.
Pharmacist Saturnino Gesmundo Cortes was at home and not present in the drug store when the prescription was compounded; it was customary for the pharmacist to be present when prescriptions are compounded.
Dr. Castillo gathered two bottles from the shelves and a cardboard box and placed them on the dispensation table; he sent for Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was employed as a pharmacy clerk and a pharmacy graduate but had not passed the Board examination.
Raymundo computed the formula to reduce it to one-third and proceeded to compound the medicine using substances contained in the two bottles placed on the table; the compounded medicine was placed in five (5) capsules and delivered by Dr. Castillo to Belarmino in a cardboard box (Exhibit B) for which Belarmino paid P1.
Belarmino took one capsule about 5 p.m. on February 18, 1941. Within about 20–25 minutes he experienced dizziness, difficulty breathing, shakiness of knees; he consulted Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes; symptoms worsened (stiffening legs, hardening stomach, drawn lips, tongue retracted, inability to speak) about two hours later; Dr. Reyes advised rubbing with hot water which produced some relief; the following day Dr. Reyes advised Belarmino not to take the remaining capsules after Belarmino showed the remaining four capsules (Exhibit B).
On February 24, 1941 Belarmino sent two of the remaining capsules (Exhibits E-2 and E-3) to the Bureau of Science for analysis; chemist Eusebio Gutierrez of the Institute of Hygiene submitted a report dated March 15, 1941 (Exhibit D).
Chemical analysis (Exhibit D) showed that the capsule contents contained strychnine sulphate (50.5 mg in one, 61.75 mg in the other) instead of spartein sulphate as called for in Exhibits C and 2.
Expert testimony (physician Dr. Sison and other experts) established that Belarmino was a victim of strychnine poisoning, and that 50.5 mg of strychnine sulphate in one capsule would have been sufficient to cause death but for the presence, in the compounded prescription, of phenobarbital and carbromal in the quantities specified in the prescription which diminished the lethal effect of strychnine sulphate.

Charge and Pleadings (Information)

Information accused Dr. Leon Castillo and Mrs. Nena Tanalega Raymundo of "FRUSTRATED MURDER BY POISONING THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE" for allegedly mixing and compounding strychnine sulphate instead of spartein sulphate, resulting in Belarmino’s poisoning and near-death; if intentional it would constitute frustrated murder.
Private prosecution reserved the right to file a separate civil action; complainant did not present evidence of pecuniary damages in the criminal trial.

Defenses and Appellant’s Assignments of Error on Appeal

Appellant asserted the trial court erred:
- 1. In holding that a frustrated felony can be committed through reckless imprudence.
- 1. In holding that a felony committed through reckless imprudence can exist when no material damage has been caused.
- 1. In holding that a felony through reckless imprudence can exist when the relation of proximate cause to effect has not been proved.
- 1. In holding that the complaining witness had taken strychnine sulphate.
- 1. In holding that defendant-appellant had dispensed strychnine sulphate.
In the motion for reconsideration to the Court of Appeals she further argued multiple points, including: no such thing as a correctional offense; the alleged light offense prescribed; penalty not correctional; benefit of doubt in case of law uncertainty; the offense and penalty prescription are distinct; offense found does not exist under law; she was sentenced for an offense not specified in the information; no proof beyond reasonable doubt that ailments were due to the purchased capsules; best evidence not secured; pecuniary interest of the offended party; and lack of proof she had given strychnine.

Trial Court Findings and Rationale

Court of First Instance of Laguna found reasonable doubt as to some matters and acquitted Dr. Leon Castillo; convicted Raymundo of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence, sentencing her to four months arresto mayor and costs.
Trial court’s conviction reflected a view that the operation and result of the compounding constituted reckless imprudence causing a grave criminal outcome (frustrated homicide).

Court of Appeals Holding and Rationale

Court of Appeals modified the conviction: found Raymundo guilty of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence and imposed a fine of P200 plus costs.
The Court of Appeals considered the offense correctional in nature and therefore did not find it necessary to pass upon the defense of prescription.
The Court of Appeals apparently treated the established facts as sufficient to sustain a conviction for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, rather than the higher-grade charges below.

Supreme Court Majority Holdings and Reasoning

The Supreme Court hel