Title
People vs. Carillo
Case
G.R. No. L-283
Decision Date
Oct 30, 1946
A soldier admitted to killing a man, claiming self-defense, but confessions revealed personal hatred. Court ruled voluntary confessions admissible, reduced charge to homicide.
homicide
indeterminate penalty
admissibility of confessions

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-283)

Factual Background

In Exhibit A, the accused stated that he killed Pastor Calma in the early evening of June 29, 1945, at the Philippine Independent Church cemetery by shooting him with a carbine. He stated that his reason for killing Calma was “because of my hatred against him when he tried to arrest and take me to the Jap kempetai, last year, 1944.” He added that Calma had held his neck and slapped him several times while asking why he was hanging around Calma’s place.

For corroboration, the prosecution presented the testimony of Jorge Dapat. Dapat testified that while speaking with friends, he heard shooting and then saw many people gathering at the Philippine Independent Church cemetery. He went to the place and saw Pastor Calma dead. About a minute later, he saw Silvestre Carillo with an American MP arrive. The American MP asked Carillo whether he was the one who shot Pastor Calma, and Carillo answered yes. Dapat did not hear the other questions asked by the American MP.

At trial, the accused took a markedly different position. He admitted that he was involved in the killing but explained the circumstances as follows. He claimed he was a soldier since 1943 and that Calma was an escaped prisoner who had run away from a stockade where he had been confined as a former Japanese-employed undercover. He asserted that he tried to arrest Calma but that Calma resisted and rushed him in an attempt to wrest his gun. He explained his participation in the procurement of Exhibit A by stating that he signed it because Capt. Palanca was a superior officer and the accused did “no more than obey Palanca is order.” He further claimed that while he was in the office of the American MP, he was told to make a statement and that an American had struck him in the head. He denied reading Exhibit B and claimed he signed it because he was unaware of its contents and that it was not translated to him. He also claimed that Fiscal Kintanar suggested he plead guilty so that he might be used as a government witness against Calma’s wife, whom the fiscal planned to prosecute.

The defense offered testimony from Jorge Dapat, now for the defense, that Calma was shot because he was an escaped prisoner and because, as the witness knew, Calma did not want to be brought back alive to jail; this was allegedly heard from Calma himself at Rosing’s house.

Trial Court Proceedings and Conviction

The Court of First Instance of Cebu convicted the accused of murder and imposed reclusion perpetua with the accessories of law. It also ordered the accused to pay P2,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased and to pay costs. The decision of the lower court treated evident premeditation as an aggravating qualifying circumstance, though treachery was not proved and was not urged on appeal.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The appeal required the Court to resolve several related questions. First, it had to determine whether the written confessions, Exhibit A and Exhibit B, were admissible despite the accused’s repudiation on grounds of alleged compulsion and lack of understanding. Second, the Court had to address the claim that the confessions should be excluded under statutory provisions invoked by the defense, particularly Art. 24 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and the evidentiary limitation purportedly found in Par. 2, Sec. 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 58. Third, it had to examine whether the evidence established evident premeditation beyond reasonable doubt so as to sustain the conviction for murder on the theory applied by the trial court. Finally, the Court considered counsel’s defamatory remarks against the trial judge and whether they bore relevance to the issues.

The Parties’ Contentions

The prosecution relied on the confessions in Exhibits A and B and on corroborative testimony. It argued that the confessions were voluntary and that, as transcribed, they established both the manner and the motive of killing. It further contended that even if the accused raised objections, these did not amount to constitutional or statutory grounds for exclusion.

The defense argued, first, that the accused did not freely and voluntarily execute the confessions, asserting instead that signing was compelled by obedience to a superior officer and that he had been struck in the head. Second, the defense invoked the prohibition on self-incrimination under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, and on statutory grounds, asserted that the confessions were barred by Art. 24 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 and by Par. 2, Sec. 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 58, which, in the accused’s view, prevented use of sworn statements made before the city fiscal in eventual prosecution. The defense also presented a justification theory at trial, seeking to shift the narrative toward an armed confrontation with an escaped prisoner and toward self-defense.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court held that the accused’s confession, as transcribed in Exhibit A, had been freely made, and that no violence, intimidation, or duress was alleged to have been employed by Capt. Palanca to wring the confession against the accused’s will. The Court found it telling that the accused’s explanation for repudiating Exhibit A—that he could not refuse Capt. Palanca’s order because Palanca was his superior—failed to answer the “all-important question” why the accused nevertheless made the statements themselves as set forth in Exhibit A. The Court also observed that, even if the accused’s account that an American MP hit him in the head were accepted, the incident did not appear to have a direct relation to Capt. Palanca’s examination when the statements were taken down.

The Court further reasoned that the accused admitted Capt. Palanca and the accused were alone at Palanca’s office when the statements in Exhibit A were taken down, even though another officer had actually been present and had written the statements on a typewriter. As for Exhibit B, the Court held that the document likewise stood “unimpeached.” The accused’s claim that he signed Exhibit B because he did not know what it contained did not allege that Fiscal Kintanar used improper means during the examination to force declarations. The Court treated the accused’s testimony that Fiscal Kintanar promised to use him as a government witness against Calma’s wife as lacking sense and apparent earnestness.

On these premises, the Court concluded that if Exhibit A was voluntary, the killing must be understood to have occurred “in the manner and for the reason” stated in that document. The Court also expressed the evidentiary improbability of a person convicting himself through fabrication of a highly self-damaging story while suppressing truth that would absolve him.

The Court then addressed the constitutional objection. It held that Art. III, Sec. 1, providing that “no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,” did not support the proposition that a confession is inadmissible. The Court reasoned that conviction on a voluntary extrajudicial statement does not violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It explained that the constitutional inhibition sought to protect against compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts, not to exclude all confessions that might be challenged on trustworthiness grounds. The Court stated that a voluntary confession is a universal, time-honored practice grounded on common law and expressly sanctioned by statutes. It therefore treated the constitutional argument as insufficient to bar the confessions.

Next, the Court confronted the statutory evidentiary arguments. It held that Art. 24 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 referred to court martial proceedings and proceedings connected with military tribunals and investigations, rather than to the ordinary civil courts of justice. It further characterized Art. 24 as protecting a witness from being compelled to incriminate himself or to answer degrading questions not material to the issue, but not as prohibiting the taking and use of incriminating or degrading statements when given voluntarily without fear of punishment or induced by promises of leniency or reward. The Court likened this to the general rule of evidence reflected in sections 14 and 96, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which allow the use of an acknowledgment of guilt as evidence, subject to the indispensable condition that it be free from compulsion sufficient to vitiate its voluntary character.

As to the argument anchored on Par. 2, Sec. 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 (Charter of the City of Cebu), which the defense invoked to support exclusion of sworn statements made before the city fiscal, the Court noted the prosecution’s position that the Rules of Court promulgated in 1940 and adopted under Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the Constitution had repealed provisions inconsistent with the Rules. The Court considered the earlier holding in Ruges vs. Dosdos (69 Phil., 158), which involved the abrogation of a Cebu City Charter appeal provision due to conflict with new rules, and it acknowledged the similar argument that Sec. 37 should give way to sections 14 and 96, Rule 123. The Court declined to decide the objection because it found the need absent. It ruled that the statements in Exhibit B were merely confirmatory of Exhibit A, and that Exhibit A independently sufficed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, the Court examined the qualifying circumstance applied by the trial court. It noted that treachery had not been proved and was not urged. It then expressed doubt on whether evident premeditation, as a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. While the confession included that on the morning of June 29 the accused, upon hearing Calma was at large, proposed to kill him, the Court found an absence of evidence showing that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was perpetrated. The C

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