Title
People vs. Cabuntog
Case
G.R. No. 136337
Decision Date
Oct 23, 2001
Nelson Cabuntog convicted of raping deaf-mute Edna Durero; alibi rejected, testimony via signs upheld, reclusion perpetua imposed, damages increased.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 136337)

Factual Background

The principal prosecution witnesses were Edna Durero, the deaf-mute complainant, and Vevencia Pareja, her employer. Durero worked as a househelper for Pareja, who operated a 24-hour sari-sari store and barbeque grill located at Luneta Park, Borromeo St., Surigao City. Pareja testified that on the evening of 05 May 1995, she tended her store while being assisted by her granddaughter Gingging Uyan and Durero.

At dawn of 06 May 1995, Nelson Cabuntog and three companions arrived. They ordered drinks and barbeque. Pareja prepared the “puso” and asked Durero to rekindle the charcoal for the grill. Pareja then noticed that Cabuntog went near Durero and brushed his body against hers. After some time, Pareja decided to check on Durero but found her missing. Cabuntog was also missing, together with one of the companions known as Bobbit. The charcoal was not rekindled. Pareja sent Gingging to look for Durero, first unsuccessfully, and later again with instructions to check the Arnoldus Pastoral Office. On the second attempt, Gingging returned reporting that the gate to the pastoral office was open and that she saw Durero, Cabuntog, and Bobbit getting out.

When Durero, Cabuntog, and Bobbit returned to the store, Pareja immediately asked Durero where she had been. Through signs, Durero communicated that Cabuntog pulled her and brought her to the pastoral office. At the pastoral office, Durero testified by signs that she was pushed against the wall and molested by Cabuntog. She described, in substance, that between approximately three to four o’clock in the morning, Cabuntog dragged and pulled her, pushed her against a wall, touched her private parts, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

Dr. Desiree Chong, the medical officer who examined Durero, testified that she did not find signs of abrasion or contusion on Durero’s body. However, a smear of vaginal fluid taken from Durero tested positive for spermatozoa.

In defense, Cabuntog testified that on 06 May 1995 at about four o’clock in the morning, he was at his house in Barangay Guadas, Dinagat, Surigao del Norte, preparing a pukot (fish net) he would use for fishing. He claimed he then went fishing and asserted he stayed fishing during the whole month of May. He also testified that he needed money because his wife had just given birth.

Samson Camposano, the Barangay Captain, corroborated Cabuntog. Camposano stated that around four o’clock in the morning of 06 May 1995, he saw Cabuntog first preparing the fishnet and later as the accused was about to leave for the sea. Camposano testified that he was about five meters away and was sure it was Cabuntog because the house was illuminated by a wick lamp.

Trial Court Proceedings

After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Cabuntog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty with seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua maximum as maximum, and imposed damages including moral damage of P40,000.00 and exemplary damage of P25,000.00, with accessory penalties and costs. The court also ordered that preventive detention would be deductible in full from the penalty imposed.

Appellate Proceedings and Modification

Cabuntog appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision promulgated on 21 October 1998, the appellate court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. It increased the moral damages awarded to Edna Durero from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00, and ordered elevation to the Supreme Court for review under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, consistent with People vs. Traya, 89 SCRA 274 (1979).

The Parties’ Contentions

Before the Supreme Court, Cabuntog argued that the trial court committed reversible error. He contended that it gravely erred in finding that he had carnal knowledge of the complainant by force and against her will and consent. He further contended that the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues Presented

The Supreme Court resolved whether the prosecution proved the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt, including the credibility and legal competence of the deaf-mute complainant’s testimony, the sufficiency of evidence of force or intimidation, and the weakness of the defense of alibi. It also addressed the proper penalty and the amounts of civil damages.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court sustained the conviction. It affirmed the factual findings of the trial court and upheld the appellate court’s determination on penalty and civil awards, while making further adjustments. The Court held that the testimony of the deaf-mute victim had been properly received and that the evidence established rape beyond reasonable doubt. The Court further ruled that alibi could not overcome the prosecution’s affirmative evidence and that absence of external injuries did not negate rape.

The Court disposed of the case by affirming the Regional Trial Court’s conviction with modification. It increased the penalty imposed upon Cabuntog to reclusion perpetua, ordered him to indemnify Edna Durero P50,000.00, and ordered additional P50,000.00 as moral damages. It taxed the costs against Cabuntog.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

On the complainant’s testimonial competence, the Court recognized that the capacity of a deaf-mute witness to testify had long been recognized. It cited People vs. Sasota for the principle that the former rule of incompetency for deaf and dumb persons had been dispelled. The Court explained that, upon presentation of such a witness, the trial court should ascertain the witness’s intelligence and allow the adoption of a mode of communicating ideas through signs or writing. It emphasized that the mode of examination lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, based on the necessity for an interpreter and the best method of arriving at the witness’s knowledge and imparting that knowledge to the court.

Applying this doctrine, the Court found that the complainant did not appear mentally deficient. Although she was unable to communicate like a normal person, she could testify through signs and signals. The records showed she could write her name and knew her age. The Court noted that, using signs, she recounted her ordeal before the trial court.

The Court also examined the transcript to assess the manner of questioning and the difficulties encountered during cross-examination. It observed that although defense counsel asked questions that were difficult to interpret at times, the complainant could readily answer questions when these questions were capable of being interpreted. The Court thus concluded that the victim’s competence was clearly established and that the trial court had no reason to discount her testimony.

On corroboration, the Court treated the testimony of Pareja as supporting the complainant’s account. Pareja testified that Cabuntog and his companions came to the store at around 4:00 a.m. on 06 May 1995 and ordered drinks. Pareja then noticed that Cabuntog, one companion, and Durero were no longer around. When Durero returned, she communicated through signs that she had been abused by Cabuntog. The Court found this consistent with the complainant’s testimony.

As to medical evidence, the Court credited Dr. Chong’s testimony. Even though the doctor found no abrasions or contusions on Durero’s body, the vaginal smear tested positive for spermatozoa. The Court treated the presence of spermatozoa as compelling evidence of sexual intercourse. It relied on Dr. Chong’s testimony that sperm could not enter the vaginal canal without sexual intercourse, thus confirming the fact of rape.

Concerning Cabuntog’s defense, the Court held that he had no credible defense other than alibi. It reiterated that alibi is inherently weak, easy to contrive and difficult to prove. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show not merely that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of commission. The Court further held that denial, especially when not corroborated by clear and convincing evidence, could not prevail over affirmative testimony. It also considered alibi practically worthless against positive identification, particularly where the complainant is the rape victim.

On the argument that no abrasion or contusion was found, the Court ruled that such absence did not negate rape. It emphasized that proof of physical injury is not an essential element of rape. The Court also held that the law does not require the victim to prove resistance. It reasoned that if resistance is futile because of intimidation, the absence of resistance does not imply consent. It stressed that

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