Case Summary (G.R. No. L-44640)
Procedural History
Information for simple seduction was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2258. Arraignment took place and the accused pleaded not guilty. The accused moved to quash the information for failure to allege lewd design and filed a formal motion to quash/dismiss. The Court of First Instance Judge Buissan denied the motion to quash but remanded the case to the City Court of Dapitan on the ground that the penalty for simple seduction is arresto mayor and thus within the inferior court’s jurisdiction. The People moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The City Judge Martinez assumed jurisdiction and set the case for trial on the merits. The People petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion by both judges in placing the case in the City Court, and sought preliminary injunction; all respondents filed answers.
Issue Presented
Whether a criminal case charging simple seduction, which under the penal provision carries a penalty of arresto mayor (imprisonment not exceeding six months), falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of a municipal or city (inferior) court, or whether it falls within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by reason of attendant accessory civil liabilities (acknowledgement and support of offspring, indemnification) that are beyond the competence of inferior courts.
Relevant Precedents and Doctrinal Basis
The Court relied principally on earlier rulings that addressed the same jurisdictional question. U.S. v. Bernardo (19 Phil. 265) established that a justice of the peace lacked jurisdiction over simple seduction where attendant civil recognition/support issues were involved. Luansing v. People (27 SCRA 308, 1969), by an undivided court, reaffirmed Bernardo and analyzed the interplay of RA 296 jurisdictional provisions: although Article 338’s penalty (arresto mayor) would ordinarily place simple seduction within municipal court jurisdiction, Article 345’s accessory civil liabilities (acknowledgment and support of offspring, indemnification) are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (Section 44(a) and (e), RA 296). The Luansing decision applied doctrines permitting a superior court to take cognizance of connected matters that would otherwise fall within inferior court jurisdiction to avoid fragmentation and duplicative proceedings (citing analogous precedents such as Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Cia. General de Tabacos de Filipinas). The Court also cited authorities emphasizing that jurisdiction is to be determined from the complaint or information’s recited facts and the penalties/obligations prescribed by law, not by evidence developed at trial or the ultimate sentence to be imposed (People v. Cuello; People v. Co Hiok; People v. Purisima; People v. Mission).
Court’s Analysis on Jurisdictional Principle
The Court reaffirmed the Bernardo/Luansing doctrine: where a penal statute prescribes both a specific criminal penalty within the competence of inferior courts and accessory civil obligations that lie exclusively within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, the latter court has original jurisdiction over the entire case to permit adjudication of all connected issues in one proceeding. The Court reasoned that it would be impractical and inefficient to have the principal criminal charge tried in a municipal or city court and then require subsequent proceedings in the Court of First Instance solely to resolve acknowledgment and support of offspring — a duplication of proceedings prejudicial to orderly administration of justice. The Court emphasized that the determination of jurisdiction depends on the nature of the offense as described in the information and the legal consequences attendant thereto, not on factual results that may emerge at trial or the length of punishment ultimately imposed.
Application to the Present Case
Applying the stated doctrine to the facts recited in the information — an allegation of simple seduction resulting in pregnanc
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-44640)
Title, Citation, and Court
- Reported as 192 Phil. 782, Second Division, G.R. No. 54419, decided July 15, 1981.
- Decision authored by Justice De Castro.
- Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by the People of the Philippines as petitioner.
- Respondents: Hon. Judge Dimalanes Buissan (Presiding Judge, CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III), Hon. Wilfredo C. Martinez (Presiding Judge, City Court of Dapitan), and private respondent Paterno Santiago.
Parties and Criminal Charge
- Private respondent: Paterno Santiago y Jamarolin, accused.
- Offended party/complainant: Araceli C. Medel y Calasang, described in the information as a 17-year-old unmarried woman of good reputation.
- Charge: Crime of simple seduction as alleged in an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte.
- Docket/reference: Criminal Case No. 2258 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte.
Allegations in the Information (substance of the offense)
- Time and place alleged: "On or about and during the month of March and April, 1979, in the City of Dapitan, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court."
- Conduct alleged: The accused, by means of deceit, promising to marry the offended party, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourses with Araceli Medel, causing her pregnancy.
- Penal characterization: The offense charged is simple seduction, alleged to be "contrary to law."
- Reference in record: The actual text of the Information is annexed as Annex A to the Petition (Rollo, p. 17).
Procedural History in Lower Courts
- June 26, 1979: Filing of the information following complaint by Araceli C. Medel.
- September 3, 1979: Arraignment of Paterno Santiago; plea of not guilty entered.
- October 22, 1979: On the day set for trial, respondent Santiago moved to quash the information for "failure to allege lewd design."
- October 24, 1979: Formal Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the Information filed by the accused on the ground of failure to allege lewd design.
- November 13, 1979: Opposition to the motion filed by the People of the Philippines.
- November 16, 1979: Judge Dimalanes Buissan denied the motion to quash but remanded the case to the City Court of Dapitan on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI because the penalty for simple seduction is only arresto mayor (Annex B to Petition, Rollo, p. 20).
- November 26, 1979: The People filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex C to Petition, Rollo, p. 21).
- Denial of reconsideration by Judge Buissan (Annex D to Petition, Rollo, p. 23).
- April 25, 1980: City Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez, assuming jurisdiction, set the hearing on the merits for May 28, 1980 (Annex E to Petition, Rollo, p. 25).
Relief Sought in the Supreme Court
- Petitioner (People of the Philippines) sought relief by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion by: (a) Judge Buissan in denying the motion to quash and remanding the case to the City Court; and (b) Judge Martinez in assuming jurisdiction and setting the case for trial on the merits.
- Petition requested preliminary injunction and other appropriate relief to correct the alleged illegal and void orders of the respondents.
- Filing and answers: Respondent Judge Buissan filed his answer on September 29, 1980 (Rollo, p. 28); respondent Judge Martinez filed his answer on September 27, 1980; private respondent Paterno Santiago filed his answer on October 25, 1980.
Central Issue Presented
- Whether a criminal case charging simple seduction, the penalty for which is arresto mayor (imprisonment not more than six months), falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of a municipal or city court, or whether the Court of First Instance (CFI) has original jurisdiction because the offense entails accessory civil liabilities (acknowledgment of offspring and support) that exceed inferior courts' jurisdiction.
Governing Statutory Provisions and Penal Consequences (as set forth in the decision)
- Article 338 (simple seduction) prescribes the penalty of arresto mayor, whose duration is from one day to six months.
- Article 345 (Revised Penal Code) imposes accessory civil liabilities on persons guilty of seduction: to indemnify the offended woman; to acknowledge the offspring (unless prevented by law); and to give support to such offspring.
- Republic Act No. 296 (as cited): Section 44(f) vests Courts of First Instance with original jurisdiction over "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fin