G.R. No. L-4447 - People vs. Marciano Almazan

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-4447)

Procedural History

Basilio Borinaga was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte for frustrated murder. The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment (reclusion temporal), with accessory penalties and costs. Borinaga appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by majority vote, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the correct classification was attempt to commit murder rather than frustrated murder.

Material Facts

Prior contractual dispute existed between Mooney and Juan Lawaan concerning construction of a fish corral; Borinaga was associated with Lawaan.
On the evening of March 4, 1929, Mooney sat in his neighbor Perpetua Najarro’s store with his back to a window.
Perpetua observed Borinaga strike toward Mooney with a knife; the knife point lodged in the back frame of the chair on which Mooney sat. Mooney fell but was uninjured. The knife point was subsequently found embedded in the chair.
Borinaga was heard before the attack saying, “I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute,” and after the failed blow he admitted he had missed and asserted he only struck the chair. Approximately ten minutes later he returned with a knife to renew the attack but was frightened away when a flashlight was turned on him. He also admitted he had missed his mark and could not strike again because of the flashlight.

Legal Issue Presented

Whether the acts of Borinaga, under the facts, constitute frustrated murder or only an attempt to commit murder within the meaning of Article 3 of the Penal Code.

Article 3 of the Penal Code (as applied)

Article 3, quoted by the Court, distinguishes: (a) frustrated felonies — when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator’s will; and (b) attempts — when the offender commences commission by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution because of some cause or accident other than voluntary desistance.

Majority Holding and Rationale

The majority held that the crime committed was frustrated murder and affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. The majority’s reasoning rests on the following points:

Homicidal intent was clearly established by extrajudicial declarations (“I will stab this Mooney…”) and by the assailant’s persistence in returning to strike again. The subjective phase (mens rea) of the criminal act was fully present.
The assailant performed acts of execution sufficient to constitute all that remained to produce murder: a stealthy, treacherous attack from behind, with a deadly weapon deliberately aimed toward the victim’s vital parts. The use of a knife in a stealth attack, directed toward vital organs and accompanied by expressed intent to kill, satisfied the character of acts of execution.
The failure of the attack to injure the victim resulted from causes independent of the assailant’s will (the knife lodging in the chair frame and later being frightened away by a flashlight), not from voluntary desistance. Because nothing further remained for the assailant to do to consummate the crime and the thwarting occurred due to extraneous circumstances, the majority concluded that the statutory conditions for a frustrated felony were met.
Treachery (which qualifies an unlawful killing as murder) was present because the assault was executed secretly from behind and directed at vital points; accordingly, the crime was properly characterized as murder in its frustrated degree.

Dissenting Opinion and Reasoning

The dissent concluded the proper classification is attempt to commit murder, not frustrated murder. Key points of the dissent:

Frustrated felony requires that the offender perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence. The dissent viewed the acts actually performed as not having reached that threshold because the knife did not contact the victim’s body or inflict a wound on a vital spot. The intervening chair frame prevented the knife from reaching Mooney’s body.
Because the blow struck the chair and did not inflict any wound, the dissent reasoned that the defendant had not completed “all the acts of execution which constitute the felony.” The failure to wound was not a result of a cause that prevented death after all acts of execution had been performed; rather, the acts performed were insufficient in themselves to produce the felony.
Under the statutory language, the situation fits the definition of an attempt: the offender commenced commission by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution because of a cause or accident (the chair frame) other than voluntary desistance.

Comparative Legal Analysis of Majority and Dissent

The crux of the disagreement concerns the point at which the “acts of execution” are deemed complete. The majority adopts a functional approach: if the assailant has taken all steps in immediate preparation and execution (stealth approach, use of deadly weapon directed at victim, physical strike) such that only extraneous forces prevent the fatal result, the felony is frustrated.
The dissent adopts a stricter physical-consequence approach: unless the perpetrator’s actions directly produce the wounding of the victim (i.e., the lethal instrument contacts the body at a vital point), the “acts of e

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-4447)

Case Citation and Procedural Posture

Reported at 55 Phil. 433; G.R. No. 33463; decision rendered December 18, 1930.
Appeal from the Court of First Instance of Leyte, where Basilio Borinaga was prosecuted, tried and convicted for the crime of frustrated murder.
Trial judge: Judge Ortiz (Court of First Instance of Leyte).
Appellant: Basilio Borinaga. Appellee/Plaintiff: The People of the Philippine Islands.
Final disposition by the court below was reviewed and affirmed in part by the majority of this Court; a dissenting opinion was also filed.

Facts of the Case

Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American named Harry H. Mooney, resident of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with Juan Lawaan to construct a fish corral; Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction.
Morning of March 4, 1929: Lawaan and some of his men went to Mooney’s shop and attempted to collect the entire contract price although only about two-thirds of the corral had been finished; Mooney refused to pay.
During the morning encounter Lawaan warned Mooney that “if he did not pay, something would happen to him”; Mooney replied that if they wanted to “do something to him they should wait until after breakfast” as he had not yet eaten.
Lawaan then left with his men; Mooney ate breakfast and returned to his shop.
Evening of March 4, 1929: Mooney was in the store of a neighbor, Perpetua Najarro, seated on a chair with his back to the window.
From the window Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga strike at Mooney with a knife; the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated.
The force of the blow caused Mooney to fall from the chair, but he sustained no injury.
After the first attack Borinaga ran away toward the market place.
Prior to the attack Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: “I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute.”
After the first attack Borinaga was heard to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of the chair.
About ten minutes later Borinaga returned with a knife to renew the attack but was prevented because Mooney and Perpetua turned a flashlight on him, frightening him away.
Later the same night Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight.
Examination revealed the point of the knife embedded in the chair.
These events led to prosecution for the crime of frustrated murder.

Charge, Defense and Trial Court Disposition

Formal charge: Frustrated murder (information alleging frustrated murder).
Defense offered: Alibi, which the trial court did not credit.
Trial court conviction: Defendant found guilty as charged by Judge Ortiz.
Sentence imposed by trial court: Fourteen years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with accessory penalties and costs.

Issue(s) Presented

Primary legal question considered by this Court (posed by majority): Do the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within the meaning of Article 3 of the Penal Code?
The issue is outcome-determinative for the degree of the offense and the appropriateness of the sentence.

Majority Opinion — Holding

Delivered by Justice Malcolm.
Holding: The crime committed was frustrated murder.
Judgment: The conviction and sentence of the trial court are affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Justices concurring in the majority: Avancena, C. J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.

Majority Opinion — Reasoning and Findings

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced by words and acts: prior threats (“I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute”), the use of a deadly weapon, and the assaultive acts.
Attendant circumstances “conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused.”
The accused went beyond mere menaces: he stated his purpose to kill and later apologized to friends for not accomplishing that purpose.
A deadly weapon was used and the blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs of the victim; the means used were suitable to accomplish the killing.
The crime should be qualified as murder because of the presence of treachery.
On the specific statutory distinction between frustrated and attempted felonies
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