G.R. No. L-32042 - People vs. Benito y Restubog

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-32042)

Procedural Posture

The Regional Trial Court (Circuit, Criminal Court of Manila, Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-609) convicted appellant after he entered a plea of guilty to murder. The trial court imposed the death penalty and ordered multiple indemnities and damages. The conviction and sentence were subject to mandatory review by the Supreme Court.

Facts Found by the Trial Court and Admitted by the Accused

On December 12, 1969, at about 5:30 p.m., while the victim was driving, the accused followed him in a car. At the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets the accused fired eight shots with a .22 caliber revolver, causing the victim’s death. The accused pleaded guilty during re-arraignment, after being warned repeatedly of the consequences and the maximum possible penalty. The accused also presented evidence seeking mitigation; the prosecution contested those mitigating facts and introduced evidence of aggravating circumstances. The accused later admitted facts showing motive and conduct leading to the killing.

Plea and Trial Court Warnings

The accused initially pleaded not guilty but, through counsel de parte, sought to withdraw that plea and enter a plea of guilty without prejudice to proving mitigating circumstances. The trial court explained fully the nature and consequences of an unconditional guilty plea and warned the accused that the maximum penalty was death. The court noted that the accused reaffirmed an unconditional plea of guilty after those explanations.

Mitigating Circumstance: Voluntary Surrender — Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court credited voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. The Court relied on the sequence of conduct: immediately after the shooting the accused did not flee but called the Manila Police Department, approached police investigators at the scene without initially revealing his identity, later told investigators he was “voluntarily surrendering,” and surrendered the firearm used. The Court found those acts sufficiently indicative of an intent to surrender and therefore warranted credit as mitigation.

Mitigating Circumstance: Vindication of a Grave Offense — Court’s Ruling

The accused asserted he was vindicating a grave offense allegedly committed by the victim when the victim purportedly remarked around 11:00 a.m. on the day of the killing that the Civil Service Commission was “a hangout of thieves.” The Court rejected this as a mitigating circumstance. It held the remark was general, not specifically directed at the accused, and lacked the sufficiency and immediacy required for the statutory mitigation (i.e., it was not a sufficiently grave or immediate provocation). The remark occurred several hours before the killing, allowing time for reflection and removal of any heat of passion; the Court characterized the remark at most as mere provocation, insufficient to reduce moral guilt.

Mitigating Circumstance: Provocation or Threat from an Earlier Statement — Court’s Ruling

The accused also relied on an alleged Tagalog statement by the victim made almost 24 hours earlier (the preceding night), warning the accused to leave or “I might have you finished here.” The Court likewise rejected this as justification for mitigation because it was remote in time, unaccompanied by overt acts, and therefore could not have immediately excited the accused to retaliate. The Court emphasized that to constitute mitigation, provocation or threat must be “sufficient” and must immediately precede the wrongful act.

Aggravating Circumstance: Disregard of Rank — Court’s Ruling

The trial court treated “disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank” as a generic aggravating circumstance. The accused contended that he had been dismissed from the Civil Service some years earlier, so no superior-subordinate relation persisted. The Supreme Court rejected that contention: despite an executory dismissal that the accused appealed, the accused by his own conduct and statements recognized the victim as his superior and confronted him regarding the administrative case. The Court observed that the aggravating circumstance is generic (not a qualifying circumstance altering the nature of the crime) and may be proven even if not expressly alleged in the information. The Court therefore properly considered disregard of rank as an aggravating circumstance.

Aggravating Circumstance: Evident Premeditation — Court’s Ruling

Evident premeditation was included in the information. The accused later argued that the prosecution’s decision to present evidence after his unconditional plea effectively waived any right to prove premeditation and that the evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the prosecution successfully established evident premeditation, relying in significant part upon Exhibit “A,” the accused’s own declaration, which detailed repeated attempts to speak with the victim, rebuffs and insults, and the accused’s motive arising from job loss and perceived wrongs. The accused’s admission that he carried a revolver that afternoon, followed the victim, and fired eight times without warning supported the inference of a planned killing rather than an impulsive act. The Court also noted that the accused was specifically apprised, before re-arraignment, of the allegation of evident premeditation and that his unconditional plea therefore carried the consequences of admission to the charge as framed.

Legal Distinction: Generic Aggravating vs. Qualifying Circumstances

The Court reiterated the legal distinction that generic aggravating circumstances (such as disregard of rank) affect the degree of penalty but do not change the character of the crime and therefore may be proven even if not expressly charged in the information; by contrast, qualifying c

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-32042)

Case Citation and Procedural Posture

Reported at 159 Phil. 408, En Banc, G.R. No. L-32042, decided February 13, 1975.
Decision authored by Justice Esguerra.
This is a mandatory review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-609.
Trial court imposed the death penalty on defendant-appellant Alberto Benito y Restubog after his plea of guilty to murder, and ordered indemnities, exemplary and moral damages, interest and costs.
Appellant raised as issues alleged errors by the lower court in considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances to determine the proper penalty.

Parties and Official Roles

Plaintiff and appellee: The People of the Philippines.
Defendant and appellant: Alberto Benito y Restubog.
Victim: Pedro Moncayo, Jr., Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission.
Trial court: Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-609.

Facts as Found by the Record

Date and time of homicide: about 5:30 p.m., December 12, 1969.
Location: P. Paredes Street, in front of the Office of the Civil Service Commission, and at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets, Manila.
Sequence: Victim was driving his car on P. Paredes Street and was followed by the accused. When the car was about to turn at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets, the accused shot the victim eight times with a .22 caliber revolver.
Result: The victim died from the gunshot wounds.
Immediate post-shooting conduct of accused: accused did not flee; he called the Manila Police Department; when policemen investigated, the accused voluntarily approached them without revealing his identity and offered to help because he knew the suspect and motive; he was brought to the police station as a possible witness and then confided to investigators that he was “voluntarily surrendering” and surrendered the fatal gun (p. 9, t.s.n. December 26, 1969).

Charge, Plea and Trial Proceedings

Accused was charged with murder.
At trial, through counsel de parte, accused manifested desire to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and to substitute it with a plea of guilty, without prejudice to proving mitigating circumstances.
The prosecution declared it would controvert mitigating circumstances which the accused would prove and would also prove other aggravating circumstances, including some not mentioned in the information.
The trial court repeatedly explained to the accused the nature and consequences of a plea of guilty and warned him that the maximum penalty imposable was death; despite this, the accused, assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of guilty upon re-arraignment.
The accused presented evidence to prove mitigating circumstances; the prosecution subsequently introduced evidence to prove aggravating circumstances, some not alleged in the information.

Trial Court’s Findings and Sentence

The trial court found the accused guilty as principal in the crime of murder qualified by treachery, with aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank.
The trial court credited the mitigating circumstance of the accused’s plea of guilty.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death and ordered indemnities: P12,000 for death, P20,000 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity, P20,000 exemplary damages, P25,000 moral damages, all to bear interest until fully paid, and to pay costs.

Issue I — Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating Circumstance

Both appellant and the Solicitor General agreed that voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant’s favor.
The Court identified indicia of intent to surrender: accused had the opportunity to flee but did not; he called the Manila Police Department; he approached police investigators at the scene without revealing identity and offered assistance; at the police station he declared he was “voluntarily surrendering” and surrendered the fatal firearm (record citation: p. 9, t.s.n. December 26, 1969).
The Supreme Court fully subscribed to appellee’s observation that these acts strongly indicated an intent or desire to surrender voluntarily.
Conclusion: accused must be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Issue II — Claim of Mitigation by Vindication of a Grave Offense (Remark at ~11:00 a.m., Dec. 12, 1969)

Appellant claimed mitigation because victim allegedly remarked at about 11:00 a.m., December 12, 1969, that the Civil Service Commission is “a hangout of thieves,” which appellant felt referred to him amid pending criminal and administrative charges.
The Court held the remark, even if uttered in appellant’s presence, was general in nature and not specifically directed to appellant.
Other persons present could not have known the remark targeted appellant