Title
People vs. Belaje
Case
G.R. No. 125331
Decision Date
Nov 23, 2000
Belaje convicted of homicide, not murder, after stabbing Bonifacio Caysido in 1994. Claimed self-defense; court found insufficient evidence, recognized voluntary surrender, imposed reduced penalty, and awarded damages.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 125331)

Factual Background

At trial, the prosecution relied on two witnesses: Rogelio Caysido, the victim’s son, and Victoria Caysido, the victim’s wife. Rogelio testified that on the evening of 24 June 1994, appellant stabbed his father with a knife locally known as pisaw at their house in Barangay San Ricardo, Babatngon, Leyte. Rogelio knew appellant because they were neighbors. He stated that appellant was in their house drinking at the time and that the fatal stabbing occurred while Rogelio was about three to four meters away. After the stabbing, appellant fled to the house of his sister-in-law, while Rogelio cried for help and the victim was rushed to St. Paul’s Hospital, where Bonifacio died eleven (11) days later.

Victoria testified that on that date the Caysido family was at home celebrating the feast day of St. John. She asserted that appellant stabbed her husband in the yard of their house and that aside from herself and her husband, no other people were around when the incident happened. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she did not actually witness the stabbing. She explained that she was inside the house when someone informed her that Bonifacio had been stabbed in the yard. She testified to her suffering and claimed that her moral damages could be quantified at P50,000.00, while the hospital bills amounted to P80,000.00, with P15,000.00 still unpaid. She also stated that because of unpaid bills she was unable to secure the death certificate.

The prosecution submitted the medico-legal report issued by Dr. Florentino Merins. The defense did not object to its contents despite the absence of the medico-legal witness. The report indicated that Bonifacio sustained a stab wound penetrating the thoraco-abdominal cavity, diaphragm, parts including the “tail of the pancreas colon (splenic flexure),” and the stomach, with massive spillage of gastric and colonic contents. There was also an incised wound in his arm. The report further indicated death occurred during surgery on 5 July 1994, while he was undergoing procedures including exploratory laparotomy and gastrorrhaphy (sic).

Defense Version and the Claim of Self-Defense

Appellant took the stand and claimed self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 p.m. on 24 June 1994, he was on his way home and stopped by the Caysido household to ask Bonifacio to “tune their karaoke softly.” Bonifacio allegedly agreed. Appellant then went home. At around 11:00 p.m., he said the karaoke was again blaring. He instructed his son to ask the Caysidos to reduce the volume because he had to wake up early. Appellant testified that despite the request, the Caysidos turned the karaoke full blast. He claimed he also heard Victoria shout that appellant was envious because he did not have a karaoke.

Appellant stated that he went again to the Caysidos to request the volume reduction, but he allegedly did not reach their house because he saw Bonifacio and Danilo Josep by the road on their way to the fishpond. He approached Bonifacio and again asked that the volume be toned down. Appellant asserted that Bonifacio slapped both his ears and told him he did not have the right to do the same. Appellant claimed the assault caused his “sight [to] dim.” He then testified that Danilo tried to stab him using a knife called “sipol,” but appellant was able to take hold of the weapon. Appellant further testified that after Danilo ran away, Bonifacio attempted to stab him, and appellant claimed that he fatally stabbed Bonifacio in return after Bonifacio drew his own knife.

Appellant claimed that after the stabbing he ran to the house of Cirilo Aporto, about sixty (60) meters away, stood in front until members of the tanod told him to go inside, and surrendered to authorities that same night. He testified he was detained for four days and released because no complaint was filed. He thus admitted that he stabbed Bonifacio but maintained that the act was justified as self-defense.

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It rejected the claim of self-defense, holding that the justifying circumstance could not be appreciated because appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The court also convicted appellant of murder and appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. It sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua, imposed accessory penalties, and ordered payment to the widow of Bonifacio of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P80,000.00 as reimbursement of hospital expenses, and P50,000.00 as indemnity, plus costs.

Issues Raised on Appeal and Appellant’s Position

Appellant assigned that the court a quo erred: (i) in finding him guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt; and (ii) in holding that he failed to prove unlawful aggression, thereby disregarding self-defense. He argued that although he pleaded not guilty, he clearly and categorically admitted that he stabbed Bonifacio as an act of self-defense. Appellant maintained that his actions were defensive and therefore should not incur liability for murder.

The Court’s Evaluation of Self-Defense and Credibility

The Court stressed that where an accused admits killing but invokes self-defense, the burden shifted to the accused to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. It reiterated the elements that must be established: unlawful aggression by the victim; reasonable necessity of the means employed; and lack of sufficient provocation by the person invoking self-defense. Because appellant relied solely on his own testimony, the Court found that the resolution of guilt or innocence depended largely on his credibility.

On the merits of appellant’s narration, the Court found appellant’s version incredible. It pointed out the improbability of a scenario in which, during an alleged five-minute struggle between appellant and Danilo Josep over possession of the knife, the victim would simply stand by and not intervene. The Court reasoned that if the victim intended to harm appellant, the most opportune time would have been while appellant was weakest during the grappling. It also found it unlikely that appellant, being tubercular and physically smaller than the victim and his son-in-law, could repel their assault and remain unscathed.

The Court treated appellant’s failure to convincingly prove unlawful aggression as fatal to the self-defense claim. As self-defense was “extremely doubtful” and uncorroborated by competent evidence, the trial court properly discredited it. The Court also reaffirmed that it would not disturb the trial court’s credibility findings absent a showing of misappreciation of facts and circumstances of weight and substance.

Qualifying Circumstances for Murder Not Proven

The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstances needed to sustain a conviction for murder. Treachery could not be presumed; it had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Likewise, evident premeditation required clear proof beyond reasonable doubt based on external acts indicative of deliberate planning; it could not rest on mere suspicion.

Given the failure to show treachery and evident premeditation with the required certainty, the Court held that the evidence did not justify the murder conviction. Nonetheless, because appellant admitted inflicting the fatal wounds and failed to substantiate self-defense, he remained criminally liable, but for the lesser offense of homicide.

Modification of Liability, Penalty, and Voluntary Surrender

The Court modified the judgment accordingly. It held appellant liable for homicide instead of murder. The Court sustained the trial court’s appreciation of voluntary surrender. It referred to the criteria that voluntary surrender must show: the offender had not actually been arrested; the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or agent of a person in authority; and the surrender was voluntary.

Appellant testified he surrendered to authorities the same night as the crime. The Court found support in defense Exhibit 2, showing that appellant “voluntarily surrendered” to the Babatngon police station at 7:00 a.m. of July 1, 1994, before the warrant of arrest was issued and served. It applied Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal, and, considering voluntary surrender as mitigating, imposed the indeterminate sentence law formula: prision mayor minimum as minimum penalty and reclusion temporal minimum as maximum penalty. Consequently, appellant was sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum.

Civil Liability: Indemnity, Moral Damages, and Actual Damages

On damages, the Court upheld awards relevant to the wrongful death. It affirmed civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for death, stating it is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim upon proof of the commission of the crime. It also sustained moral damages of P50,000.00 under Art. 2219 (1) of the Civil Code, which the court may award in criminal cases as a matter of discretion. The Court found Victoria’s testimony regarding the pain and suffering attributable to the untimely death sufficient. It rejected any requirement that the victim’s spouse must undergo a “testimonial charade” to detail the extent of suffering.

However,

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