Case Summary (G.R. No. 177741)
Petitioner and Respondent
Petitioner advanced that the filing of the information on June 20, 2000 was timely because the prescriptive period, having been interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor, did not continue to be tolled indefinitely and had restarted by reason of the termination of prosecutorial proceedings. Respondent argued that the filing of the complaint with the City Prosecutor on August 16, 1999 interrupted the 60-day prescriptive period for slight physical injuries and that the period remained tolled until an information was actually filed and the accused was convicted or acquitted, so that the June 20, 2000 information was timely.
Key Dates
- June 12, 1999: Alleged commission of the offense (dispute between respondent and private complainant).
- August 11, 1999: Barangay chairman issued a Certification to file action.
- August 16, 1999: Private complainant filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP), Manila.
- November 8, 1999: Investigating prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution recommending filing of an Information.
- Date of City Prosecutor’s approval of that recommendation: not shown in records.
- June 20, 2000: Information filed with MeTC, Manila, Branch 28.
- June 22, 2005: Court of Appeals decision dismissed the case on prescription grounds.
- April 27, 2007 (decision date): Supreme Court rendered its decision reversing the CA.
Applicable Law
- Article 91, Revised Penal Code (computation of prescription of offenses): prescriptive period commences from discovery and is interrupted by filing of complaint or information; it commences to run again when such proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, or are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused.
- Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), Section 410(c): interruption of prescriptive periods while dispute is under barangay mediation, resume upon receipt of certification to file action, but such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from filing with the punong barangay.
- 1987 Constitution (as the applicable constitutional framework given the decision date), including recognition that the accused has a constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Factual Background
A quarrel occurred on June 12, 1999. The offended party sought barangay conciliation, obtained a certification to file action on August 11, 1999, and filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor on August 16, 1999. After a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution on November 8, 1999 recommending that an information be filed. The City Prosecutor’s approval of that recommendation (or acting authority’s approval) is recorded but undated in the record. The information itself was filed only on June 20, 2000.
Procedural History
MeTC held that the offense had not prescribed. RTC denied respondent’s petition for certiorari and agreed with the MeTC. CA reversed both lower courts, concluding that the prescriptive period had restarted and, by June 20, 2000, the offense had prescribed. The People filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Issue Presented
Whether the prescriptive period for the crime of slight physical injuries, once interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor, began to run anew upon the City Prosecutor’s approval of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file an information—such that the delay in the actual filing of the information by the prosecutor prejudiced the State and the offended party and resulted in prescription.
Court of Appeals’ Reasoning (as stated)
The CA reasoned that although the preliminary investigation’s approval effectively terminated proceedings at the OCP, the approval bore no date in the record; even if the maximum allotted time for the City Prosecutor or his delegate to act were extended, the date of approval should not have been as late as the last day of 1999, and certainly not as late as June 20, 2000 when the information was filed. The CA concluded that proceedings at the OCP had been “unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to” the accused for a time exceeding the two-month prescriptive period; thus the offense had prescribed when the information was filed.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA and held that the prescriptive period did not begin to run anew upon the City Prosecutor’s approval of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation. The Court reaffirmed the well-settled principle that filing of a complaint with the prosecutor’s office suspends (tolls) the running of the prescriptive period. The suspension remains in effect from filing of the complaint until such time as the accused is convicted or acquitted by a competent court, or until proceedings otherwise terminate. Consequently, prosecutorial delay in filing the information after approval should not prejudice the State or the offended party; the prescriptive period remains tolled and the subsequent filing on June 20, 2000 was timely.
Application of Article 91 and Related Precedent
Relying on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and on precedent (People v. Olarte and other cited authorities), the Court treated the filing of the complaint at the prosecutor’s office as the operative interruption of prescription that continued to toll the prescriptive period. The Court emphasized that Article 91 contemplates that prescription is interrupted by filing with the prosecutorial authority and only resumes when proceedings terminate without conviction/acquittal or are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused. Here, the delay in filing the infor
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 177741)
Facts
- On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent Clemente Bautista (and co-accused Leonida Bautista) and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr.
- The private complainant filed a complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila; no settlement was reached at barangay mediation.
- The barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action dated August 11, 1999.
- On August 16, 1999, the private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against respondent and his co-accused.
- The investigating prosecutor, Jessica Junsay-Ong, after preliminary investigation, issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against respondent.
- The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla; the date of such approval is not shown in the records.
- The Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28, only on June 20, 2000.
- Respondent sought dismissal on the ground that the 60-day prescriptive period under Article 91 had elapsed from the date of the commission of the crime (June 12, 1999).
Procedural History
- The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
- Respondent petitioned the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila, via a Petition for Certiorari; the RTC denied the petition and concurred with the MeTC.
- Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
- On June 22, 2005, the CA (in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784) reversed the lower courts, holding that although filing with the OCP interrupted the prescriptive period, the offense had prescribed by June 20, 2000 when the Information was filed; the CA dismissed Criminal Case No. 344030-CR and imposed costs de oficio.
- The People of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition notwithstanding the absence of a Motion for Reconsideration to the CA.
Issue Presented
- Whether the 60-day prescriptive period for the crime of slight physical injuries began to run anew upon the City Prosecutor’s approval of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file an Information.
Applicable Statutory Provisions Quoted in the Decision
- Article 91, Revised Penal Code (as quoted in the decision):
- "Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. a The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
- Section 410(c), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) as cited:
- While a dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration the prescriptive periods for offenses shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay; the prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary; provided, however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
Positions of the Parties (as reflected in the record)
- Respondent:
- Argued that by the time the Information was filed on June 20, 2000, the 60-day prescriptive period counted from June 12, 1999 had already elapsed and the offense had prescribed.
- The CA sided with the view that approval of the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation effectively terminated proceedings at the OCP and thus restarted the running of prescription.
- Petitioner (People of the Philippines):
- Sought reversal of the CA decision and reinstatement of the RTC ruling th