Title
People vs. Barellano
Case
G.R. No. 121204
Decision Date
Dec 2, 1999
Pacifico Barellano convicted of murder for shooting Epifanio Cabales in 1993; alibi rejected, eyewitness testimony upheld, damages adjusted.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 121204)

Factual Background

The facts, as narrated from the prosecution’s witnesses, established that Epifanio Cabales and his acquaintances were drinking tuba in the evening of August 14, 1993 at the side of the auditorium in Barangay Tigbao, Matalom, Leyte. During the drinking, Cabales was approached from behind by Pacifico Barellano @ Junior, who fired a .38 (paltik) revolver at the right side of Cabales’ head. Cabales fell face up.

While Cabales lay on the ground, the assailant fired a second shot that struck Cabales at the right side of his upper lip. Afterward, the accused walked away and fired a third shot upward in the air. Cabales later died from the injuries inflicted by the gunshots.

The Information and Trial Court Judgment

For the fatal shooting of Cabales, the accused was indicted for Murder. The Information alleged that the accused killed the victim with treachery and evident premeditation, and that he acted with intent to kill by shooting Cabales with a handgun, resulting in a fatal gunshot wound and the victim’s immediate death.

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder as principal and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with no aggravating circumstance considered. The trial court also ordered the accused to pay P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim. It further awarded P6,300.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

Appellant’s Assigned Errors and Defense Theory

On appeal, the accused assigned two errors: first, that the trial court allegedly erred in not giving due course to the defense; and second, that the court allegedly erred in not acquitting him. The appeal essentially relied on defenses aimed at undermining the prosecution’s identification of the accused and evidentiary aspects of the case.

In his testimony, the accused claimed that he did not attend the incident. He asserted that he was the common law husband of Catalina Lucido, and that he was elsewhere on August 14, 1993. He also insisted that his defense was alibi, arguing that the prosecution witness Felix Timkang was not corroborated, that the autopsy report was a machine copy allegedly improperly admitted, that Jose Dayola was not presented as a witness, and that the trial court focused on the weakness of his defense rather than on weakness in the prosecution evidence.

Prosecution Evidence: Eyewitness Identification and Corroboration

The Supreme Court recounted that the prosecution’s principal witnesses testified consistently on the identity of the shooter and the manner of the assault. Felix Timkang testified that he saw the accused approach from behind and shoot Cabales at approximately 8:45 p.m. after they had been drinking tuba. Timkang described the victim’s fall and the second shot hitting Cabales, and he further stated that after walking away the accused fired a shot upward.

The Court highlighted that Timkang remained steadfast despite intense examination by the court itself, including detailed questions on distance, lighting, and the observable positions of the victim and assailant during the shooting. The Court treated Timkang as a credible eyewitness who directly observed the assailant shoot Cabales twice.

Medical Findings and Proof of Death

The prosecution also presented medical evidence through an autopsy conducted by Dra. Radegunda Uy on August 15, 1993, with the autopsy report prepared thereafter. The Court noted that the first gunshot wound penetrating the skull cavity was fatal. It further recorded that the second gunshot wound, located within the oral cavity and penetrating the cranial fossa with an exit wound, was also fatal. The cause of death was hypovolemic shock, attributed to severe blood loss and hemorrhage secondary to the gunshot wound on the head.

Evaluation of Alibi: Time and Place, Physical Impossibility

The Supreme Court treated alibi as the weakest of all defenses, consistent with established doctrine, especially where identity is supported by positive eyewitness identification. It also emphasized that alibi fails when the accused does not show that he was not only at another place at the relevant time but also at a location so distant as to make it physically impossible to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity.

The Court found that the accused’s explanation did not satisfy this requirement. The accused admitted that the alleged place where he was, Sitio Victory, was only one (1) kilometer away from Barangay Tigbao, and that it could be reached on foot. The Court further noted that a road connected Sitio Victory and Barangay Tigbao and could be negotiated by jeepneys and motorcycles. These circumstances supported the possibility that the accused could have been at the scene, rather than proving the physical impossibility required for alibi to prosper.

Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance

The Supreme Court upheld the qualification of the killing to murder through treachery. It reiterated that treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms of execution that tend directly and specially to insure the execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense the victim might make.

The Court defined treachery as a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation. It stressed that for treachery to qualify, it must be shown both that the means of execution afforded the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and that such means were deliberately or consciously adopted.

Applying these standards, the Court held that treachery was present because the accused stealthily approached the unarmed victim from behind, and the victim had no inkling of the impending danger. The assailant shot the victim in the head from behind, without warning and without provocation, rendering the victim defenseless against resistance or escape. Consequently, the Court agreed that treachery qualified the offense to murder.

Evidentiary Issues Raised on Appeal

The Court also addressed the accused’s claim regarding the autopsy report being a photocopy. The Supreme Court noted that even assuming arguendo that the document should not have been admitted, it would not affect the conviction because the judgment was grounded primarily on credible eyewitness testimony identifying the accused as the shooter. It further stressed that the accused did not make a timely objection when the document was offered and, through counsel, admitted its authenticity. Under the rules on evidence, unobjected evidence becomes part of the record and may be considered by the court.

The accused also argued that the prosecution’s failure to present Jose Dayola should give rise to an adverse presumption. The Court rejected this argument. It explained that the prosecution has discretion as to which witnesses to call, and the failure to call a witness does not automatically create a presumption of willful suppression adverse to the prosecution. Moreover, it observed that Dayola’s testimony would have been merely corroborative of the testimony of the eyewitnesses already presented. The Court held that no prejudicial inference arises where the unpresented testimony would only be cumulative or corroborative.

Credibility Findings and Appellate Deference to the Trial Court

The Supreme Court treated the case as turning on credibility. It reiterated that assigning weight to witness testimony is best performed by the trial judge who observed the witnesses’ demeanor during trial, an opportunity not available to the appellate court from the cold record. It held that the accused did not provide sufficient reason to depart from the doctrine that the trial court’s credibility findings are respected absent a clear showing of overlooked material facts or misapplication of law.

Penalty and Civil Awards

The Court addressed the penalty applicable to murder under the governing version of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code at the time of the offense. Since the penalty for murder at that time ranged from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the Court clarified that the imposition of death is not automatic even when treachery qualifies the

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