Title
People vs. Atento
Case
G.R. No. 84728
Decision Date
Apr 26, 1991
A mentally retarded 16-year-old girl was raped by a 39-year-old man; her incapacity to consent rendered the act rape, affirmed by the Supreme Court.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 84728)

Petitioner

People of the Philippines.

Respondent

Cesar Atento (accused-appellant).

Key Dates

First alleged rape: April 1986 (approximate).
Childbirth: December 27, 1987 (establishes a nine-month interval consistent with pregnancy from the first alleged rape).

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Primary statutory provision applied: Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (definition of rape and the circumstances in which it is committed).
Constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable as the controlling constitution for decisions rendered in or after 1990).

Facts of the Offense (Prosecution Version)

Glenda testified that the accused raped her on five separate occasions, the first occurring in April 1986 when she was about sixteen years old. She said she entered Atento’s store to buy bread; Atento, alone with his three-year-old daughter, invited her inside, took her downstairs, and deflowered her. She reported subsequent rapes on four other occasions. She stated she did not disclose the assaults earlier because the accused threatened her life. After five months she acknowledged her pregnancy and identified Atento as the father. The child was later born and named Hubert Buendia Aringo.

Accused’s Denial and Defense

Atento denied the accusations, asserting they were fabricated as part of a harassment campaign by a relative of the complainant who sought to evict him from the land where his house stood. He also alleged that Glenda was of loose morals, claiming he had observed her in sexual relations with other men and alleging an instance in which she purportedly offered sexual services to his thirteen-year-old son for payment.

Psychological and Expert Evidence on Mental Capacity

A clinical psychologist, Ascendo Belmonte, administered multiple intelligence and perceptual tests (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Revised Beta Exam, Standard Progressive Matrices, Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test). The expert opinion concluded that Glenda’s intellectual capacity corresponded to an age between nine and twelve years, placing her within the mentally defective level. The report stated deficiencies in fund of information, judgment, thinking and working capacity, vocabulary, and higher perceptual processes; she lacked capacity for abstraction and synthesis and was unable to distinguish essential from non-essential details. Notably, the expert concluded that Glenda was nevertheless capable of telling the truth.

Corroborative Family and Lay Testimony

Glenda’s mother, Benita Aringo, testified that Glenda only reached third grade and preferred playing with much younger children, even during pregnancy; after delivery she often left the infant’s care to her mother and played games instead of attending to the baby. A relative, Caridad Aringo, testified that Glenda had the mentality of a twelve-year-old and displayed childish interests (e.g., rubber bands, playing cards). These lay observations supported the expert’s assessment of diminished mental capacity and provided behavioral corroboration.

Significance of Victim’s Description of the Sexual Acts

Glenda described the sensation of intercourse as “masarap” (pleasurable) and “tickling.” The court recognized that such descriptions might, in isolation, undermine credibility in a typical adult victim. However, the trial court and the Supreme Court explained that due to Glenda’s mental retardation and childlike perception, these descriptions were consistent with her limited understanding and capacity to articulate pain or trauma. Her mental condition could account for a naively positive description of the physical sensation despite the criminality of the acts.

Physical and Circumstantial Corroboration: Pregnancy and Paternity

The timing of childbirth—December 27, 1987, roughly nine months after the first alleged rape in April 1986—was considered significant corroborative evidence of sexual intercourse with the accused. The trial judge also observed a notable resemblance between the accused and the child, a circumstance the court found supportive, though not conclusive, of paternity.

Legal Standard Under Article 335, Revised Penal Code

Article 335 defines rape as carnal knowledge of a woman under any of three circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even if neither force nor deprivation of reason is shown. The provision encompasses situations where the victim lacks the capacity to consent due to mental deficiency or unconsciousness, as well as statutory incapacity based on age.

Application of Article 335 to the Case

The record did not establish the use of force or intimidation beyond reasonable doubt. However, the evidence compellingly demonstrated that Glenda was “deprived of reason” within the meaning of Article 335(2), because her intellectual functioning was demonstrably below the level necessary to give legally valid consent. The court further held, in the alternative, that the accused was liable under Article 335(3) because Glenda’s mental functioning placed her in the class of a child under twelve years of age for purposes of consent—even though her chronological age exceeded twelve—thereby rendering any sexual intercourse rape per se.

Precedents and Doctrinal Support

The Court relied on prior jurisprudence establishing that Article 335(2) applies not only where a victim is rendered unconscious or is actively deprived of reason by the offender, but also where the victim is congenitally or otherwise mentally deficient so as to lack the capacity to consent. People v. Atutubo, People v. Palma, and People v. Sunga were cited to support the proposition that a woman known to be mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent may be raped absent proof of physical force or intimidation. The Court quoted doctrinal authority to the effect that absence of will (stemming from mental deficiency) suffices to constitute rape under Article 335(2), and that the deprivation of reason need not be total; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.

Trial Court’s Credibility Determination

The trial judge, Judge Gregorio A. Consult

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