G.R. No. L-26789 - People vs. Arpa

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-26789)

Factual Background and Entry of Pleas

On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the accused, through counsel de oficio Atty. Bernardino Bolcan, Jr., manifested a desire to plead guilty only to the fact of “the killing of one of the persons mentioned in the information,” while denying the killings of the two others. The fiscal did not accept the qualified plea, stating that the State could not agree because the “two other persons were lost on the same occasion” when the passengers “jumped overboard after the firing at one of the victims.” The trial judge accordingly reset arraignment and informed the accused that they would have to enter trial because the prosecution was not agreeable to their qualified plea.

When the case was called the following day, the information was read to the accused in the dialect they understood. Both accused then pleaded guilty. Their counsel de oficio invoked as mitigating circumstances (i) plea of guilty and (ii) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The fiscal objected to the second mitigating circumstance, contending that there could be no lack of intent because the accused “immediately fired at one of the victims point blank with a pistol,” which was fatal. The trial court later rendered its judgment on March 11, 1966.

Trial Court Findings on Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

In sentencing, the trial court credited the accused with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. It rejected the claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, reasoning that the nature and gravity of the offense committed did not warrant the appreciation of that mitigating circumstance.

The trial court found two aggravating circumstances. First, it held that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place, treating the sea as satisfying the aggravating circumstance under People vs. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172. Second, it treated the engine trouble in the middle of the sea as an occurrence on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune under Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, concluding that engine trouble constituted a misfortune that created confusion and apprehension among passengers, and that the accused took advantage of that condition.

After weighing the circumstances, the trial court concluded that, notwithstanding the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, there remained one aggravating circumstance. It therefore imposed the death penalty on each accused and ordered them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of each deceased Villegas victim in the amount of P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify Epimaco Mola for P2,100.00, plus costs proportionately.

The Issues on Appeal

The Supreme Court noted that counsel for the accused, appointed de oficio as Atty. Antonio L. Africa, urged reversal of the death sentence. The Solicitor-General recommended affirmance. The accused assigned as errors, in substance: (1) that the lower court erred in holding the offense to be robbery with triple homicide; (2) that the offense was improperly attended by the aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and on the occasion of misfortune; (3) that the lower court erred in refusing the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong; and (4) that the court erred in imposing death.

The Supreme Court also treated the consequences of a voluntary plea of guilty: the accused were deemed to have admitted all material facts alleged in the information, including aggravating circumstances therein alleged.

Characterization of the Crime: Robbery with Triple Homicide

The accused argued that their “original criminal design” did not clearly comprehend homicide because the information’s allegation showed intent to steal the banca and that Dicto Arpa fired to scare passengers. They contended that homicide, occurring as an incident of the robbery, should have been viewed as separate offenses rather than the single special offense of robbery with homicide.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument. It invoked Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which establishes the special, single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when “by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.” It relied on People vs. Mangulabnan et al and explained that it was sufficient that homicide resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, without requiring that the death be planned or that the mode of killing fit a particular expectation. The Court underscored that the decisive element was the causal relationship between the robbery and the homicide, not whether death supervened by accident.

Applying that doctrine, the Court found that the accused carried out a criminal design to steal the banca and that one of them fired at a passenger to forestall resistance. The shootings prompted the passengers to jump into the sea, where they drowned. Even if the accused claimed they did not originally intend homicide, the deaths clearly resulted by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, and the trial court therefore correctly held them guilty of robbery with triple homicide.

Aggravating Circumstance of Uninhabited Place

On the issue of aggravation, the Supreme Court held that the crime was correctly attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place. It reasoned that the accused boarded the motor banca in Davao City with passengers bound for Talicud Island, and they executed the criminal design to steal the vessel once it was in the middle of the sea. By committing the robbery and firing to prevent resistance while on the sea, the accused effectively sought isolation to accomplish the crime without interference. The Court cited People vs. Rubia, emphasizing that when the deed is committed at sea, help is difficult to receive, the assailants could have escaped punishment, and the mere circumstance that another banca at sea existed near the vicinity without the assailants’ knowledge did not negate the aggravating circumstance.

Rejection of the Second Aggravating Circumstance: “Calamity or Misfortune”

The Supreme Court, however, disallowed the trial court’s second aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed “on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.” The trial court had treated engine trouble as a misfortune because it allegedly created confusion and apprehension among passengers and the accused allegedly took advantage of that condition.

The Supreme Court held that while engine trouble at sea was indeed a misfortune, it did not fall within the statutory phrase “other calamity or misfortune” in Article 14, paragraph 7. The Court explained that the provision contemplated distress conditions similar to the enumerated examples—conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic—which involve large-scale calamities producing the kind of debased opportunism that the aggravation aims to capture. It found that the record did not show any serious condition of great distress akin to those examples. It further observed that there was nothing in the record indicating that the engine trouble was so severe as to create confusion and apprehension, and that the information itself alleged that the accused succeeded in stealing the motor banca at sea.

On that basis, the Court ruled that no such statutory aggravating circumstance existed.

Lack of Intent Mitigating Circumstance Properly Refused

The Supreme Court also rejected the accused’s attempt to secure a second mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. It affirmed the trial court’s application of the legal character of this mitigating circumstance as focusing on the offender’s intention at the moment of executing the criminal act rather than the intention during the planning stage. In reliance on People vs. Boyles, it reasoned that although the original plan was to rob, the resistance offered by the victim compounded the criminal act into robbery with homicide. Therefore, the plea of lack of intent could not properly be granted.

The Court further emphasized the factual circumstances: the accused embarked on a reprehensible design of pirating a motor banca at sea and fired repeatedly at passengers, forcing them to jump overboard as an act of self-preservation, followed by drowning. The accused could not disclaim lack of criminal intent or responsibility for the direct, logical, and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.

Adjustment of Penalty and Civil Indemnities

With the second aggravating circumstance disallowed, the Supreme Court held that the offense remained Robbery with Triple Homicide attended by only one aggravating circumstance: commission in an uninhabited place, offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. Under Article 294, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court determined that the proper penalty was the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court modified the compensatory damages. It increased the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Villegas victims to P12,000.00 for each. It retained the indemnity to Epimaco Mola in the amount of P2,100.00, and ordered payment of costs proportionately.

Effect of the Accused’s Claims Regarding the Deaths of Other Victims

The Supreme Court addressed the question whether the fact of death of two other passengers was established, noting that the accused denied knowledge of their death and that trial testimony had allegedly been sparse on proof. It observed, however, that the record showed a judicial admission by the accused-appellants of the killing (death) of one person named in the information, and that such admission did not affect the nature of the single and indivisible crime of ro

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-26789)

The case involved automatic review by the Court of a death penalty imposed for Robbery with Triple Homicide.
The defendants-appellants were Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, charged under Criminal Case No. 9694.
The Court modified the conviction and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, while adjusting the civil indemnities.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The People of the Philippines acted as plaintiff-appellee through the trial prosecution.
Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa acted as defendants-appellants, initially represented by counsel de oficio.
The trial court imposed the death penalty after accepting the accused’s guilty plea and rendering judgment on March 11, 1966.
On review, the Court appointed Atty. Antonio L. Africa as counsel de oficio upon the accused’s request.
The Solicitor-General recommended affirmance of the death sentence, while counsel for the accused sought reversal.

Information and Charge

The information alleged that on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, the accused boarded the motor banca “MAMI I”, owned by Epimaco Mola, bound for Talicud Island.
The information alleged that the banca developed engine trouble in the middle of the sea.
The information charged that the accused, conspiring together and helping one another, had intent to steal the motor banca.
The information alleged that Dicto Arpa fired a .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers and fired at a passenger, hitting the passenger at the right shoulder.
The information alleged that, because all passengers jumped into the sea, three named passengers—Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas, and Lourdes Villegas—were drowned and died.
The information alleged the value of the banca as P2,100.00, with corresponding damage and prejudice to Epimaco Mola in the same amount.

Arraignment and Guilty Plea Events

On the scheduled arraignment date of March 7, 1966, the accused, through counsel de oficio Atty. Bernardino Bolcan, Jr., manifested a desire to plead guilty only to the killing of one of the persons mentioned in the information.
The accused, as manifested, denied the killing of the other two persons.
The fiscal objected, stating the State could not accept the qualified guilty plea because the other two persons were lost on the same occasion and the passengers jumped after the firing at one victim.
The trial judge Hon. Manses G. Reyes rejected the qualified plea and reset arraignment for the next day, instructing the accused they would have to proceed to trial.
On the next day, the information was read to the accused in the dialect they understood.
Both accused pleaded guilty, with counsel de oficio invoking in mitigation (a) plea of guilty and (b) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
The fiscal objected to the second claimed mitigating circumstance, arguing that there could be no lack of intent because the accused fired point blank with a pistol, which was fatal.

Trial Court’s Findings

The trial court credited the mitigating circumstance of the accused’s voluntary plea of guilty.
The trial court rejected lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong on the ground of “the nature and gravity of the offense committed.”
The trial court found two aggravating circumstances based on the allegations and circumstances in the information.
The first aggravating circumstance was that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place, citing People vs. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172.
The trial court treated the “development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea” as creating a misfortune that tended to create confusions and apprehensions of the passengers.
The trial court found the second aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code, characterizing the engine trouble at sea as fitting within “other calamity or misfortune.”
The trial court concluded that after offsetting one mitigating circumstance against the two aggravating circumstances, there remained one aggravating circumstance, thereby supporting the capital penalty.

Penalty and Civil Liability Imposed

The trial court sentenced each accused to the penalty of death.
The trial court ordered the accused, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas, and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P6,000.00 for each of them.
The trial court ordered indemnity to Epimaco Mola of P2,100.00.
The trial court ordered proportionate payment of costs.
The trial court did not impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because the penalty imposed was death.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The accused assigned error on the trial court’s finding that the crime committed was robbery with triple homicide.
The accused assigned error on the trial court’s appreciation of aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and “on the occasion of a misfortune.”
The accused assigned error on the trial court’s refusal to consider the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
The accused assigned error on the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

Effect of Voluntary Guilty Plea

The Court applied the doctrine that a defendant who voluntarily pleaded guilty was deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information, including aggravating circumstances alleged therein.
The Court treated this admission as binding in evaluating the nature of the offense and the attendant circumstances.

Single and Indivisible Crime Theory

The Court rejected the argument that the case involved two separate offenses rather than a single special offense.
The Court relied on Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, which defines the special, single, and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide by violence or intimidation.
The Court held that the penalty for robbery with homicide by reason of the robbery was reclusion perpetua to death, when homicide was committed “by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.”
The Court cited People vs. Mangulabnan et al to emphasize that the homicide element depended on whether death resulted by reason or on the o