Title
People vs. Almendras
Case
G.R. No. 145915
Decision Date
Apr 24, 2003
Appellants arrested in 1998 for selling shabu in a buy-bust operation; convicted, but Supreme Court remanded case for defense evidence due to procedural fairness concerns.
conviction
defendants
reckless negligence
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 145915)

Trial Court Case and Charge

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed an information dated August 4, 1998 charging the appellants with violation of Sec. 21 (b) in relation to Sec. 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7925. The information alleged that on or about June 19, 1998, at Barangay Pansol, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, the appellants—without authority of law, and conspiring with one another—sold and delivered one (1) kilogram of shabu to a poseur buyer for Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), with the remainder arranged in boodle money in bundles appearing as genuine payment of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Arrest and Buy-Bust Operation

The prosecution’s evidence traced the operation to a tip received around 5:00 p.m. on June 18, 1998 by the PNP NARCOM, Region IV, from a confidential informer that a shabu supplier had arrived from Manila and was seeking a buyer. The police team was organized upon instruction of P/Supt. Emelito T. Sarmiento, with P/Insp. Mauricio M. Cadano heading the team and SPO3 Rico Atienza designated as poseur buyer. The informer arranged via mobile phone a meeting with “Apple” the following morning between three o’clock and six o’clock, at Mountain View Resort Restaurant in Pansol, Calamba.

The marked money consisted of ten P1,000 bills, and additional boodle money was prepared to simulate that SPO3 Atienza carried P1,000,000 in cash. During the meeting on June 19, 1998, SPO3 Atienza parked within the resort premises while other team members acted as a blocking force outside. SPO3 Atienza and the informer entered, ordered coffee, and the informer introduced SPO3 Atienza to the woman who identified herself as Apple. Apple asked if Atienza had money for the drug, and Atienza replied that it was in his vehicle. Apple then introduced her male companion as Scout. The four proceeded to the parking lot where SPO3 Atienza displayed the bag containing the buy-bust money. Scout retrieved a black box from his vehicle’s trunk and showed to Atienza a white crystalline powder wrapped in a transparent plastic bag. SPO3 Atienza handed over the marked money to Apple, received the box, and upon delivery issued the pre-arranged signal. The backup team arrested Apple and Scout; the marked money was recovered from Apple, and the suspected shabu was turned over to P/Insp. Cadano.

Subsequent investigation identified Apple as Vilma Almendras y Zapata and Scout as Arsenio Almendras y Locsin. The confiscated bag containing the white substance was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, where PNP Forensic Chemical Officer P/Insp. Lorna R. Tria tested the substance and found it positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The seized quantity was stated as 990.97 grams.

Pre-Trial Admissions and Issues for Trial

At pre-trial, the defense admitted matters that narrowed the issues: (1) appellants were not residents of Calamba, Laguna; (2) they were the persons charged in the information; (3) the arrest occurred at 4:00 a.m. on June 19, 1998 in Pansol, Calamba; (4) there were two photos of a Mercedes Benz car allegedly connected to the discovery of the shabu; (5) the existence of a Police Arrest Investigation Report and related documentary items (including photocopies of alleged buy-bust money, Receipt of Items Confiscated, Request for Laboratory Examination, and Examination Report) were subject to cross-examination. The parties agreed to limit trial to whether there was in fact a buy-bust operation, whether the prohibited drugs were found inside the car of the accused, and whether the quantity of prohibited drugs was 990.97 grams. It was also admitted that only one qualitative laboratory examination was conducted on the alleged shabu, with the results embodied in the report marked as Exhibit F for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for the defense.

Demurrer to Evidence and Trial Court’s Denial

After the prosecution rested, the defense moved on May 10, 1999 for a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence with alternative prayer for bail. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to establish the element of lack of authority to sell and deliver the shabu and failed to present concrete evidence establishing that the substance tested by the laboratory was the same substance seized from appellants. The trial court denied the demurrer on June 8, 1999, ruling that in a prosecution for illegal drug sale, the material matter was proof that the transaction occurred, and that the marked money and shabu were presented in open court. It further reasoned that the poseur buyer, police investigator, and forensic chemist identified in court the shabu seized from the appellants and had placed their initials on the bag, thereby establishing identity.

The trial court also denied bail, considering the quantity involved and the corresponding imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, rendering the offense non-bailable.

Appellants’ Interventions in the Proceedings and Waiver of Defense Evidence

Following the denial of demurrer, the defense manifested on June 21, 1999 an intention to seek relief from the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, appellants filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54343, challenging the trial court’s denial of demurrer and denial of bail. During this period, the trial court rescheduled hearings multiple times.

Defense counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, repeatedly failed to appear on several dates. After counsel’s continued non-attendance, the trial court on September 28, 2000 appointed Atty. Vicente Carambas of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de oficio for appellants, expressly warning that failure by the defense to adduce evidence on October 26, 2000 would be treated as waiver and submission of the case for decision. At subsequent hearings, counsel de oficio appeared, but appellants refused to testify unless assisted by Atty. Jimenez. After further non-presentation of defense evidence, the prosecution moved for waiver and submission, and the trial court granted the motion, setting promulgation for November 23, 2000. On that date, the trial court promulgated judgment convicting appellants of violation of Sec. 15 of the amended Dangerous Drugs Act and imposed the death penalty on both appellants.

Issues Raised on Appeal

In the Supreme Court, appellants challenged the trial court’s procedural handling and evidentiary sufficiency. Vilma Almendras assigned errors that the trial court gravely erred in declaring waiver of the right to present evidence, resulting in denial of due process; gravely erred in proceeding without awaiting the Court of Appeals’ resolution of the pending petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343; and erred in finding the prosecution evidence sufficient beyond reasonable doubt. Arsenio Almendras similarly argued that the trial court erred in denying the demurrer and in waiving the right to present evidence and convicting the appellants despite the certiorari petition pending in the Court of Appeals.

The Court’s Focus on Procedural Irregularity and Due Process

The Court noted that appellants’ contentions in the Supreme Court were identical to those raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 54343, which centered on whether the denial of demurrer involved grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized, however, that the case turned on whether appellants were deprived of due process when the trial court treated their defense evidence as waived after repeated absences by counsel.

The Court held that postponements of trial hearings remain within the trial court’s discretion but must be exercised wisely under the peculiar circumstances of each case. It found that appellants lost their chance to present evidence due to the delaying tactics of Atty. Jimenez. It recounted that after the prosecution rested and demurrer was denied, the defense had been given time (until September 1999) to resume defense evidence. Although the trial court postponed resumption in anticipation of the Court of Appeals’ disposition on the pending application for relief, the defense counsel still failed to appear on multiple scheduled dates and instead filed motions that, according to the Court, relied on incorrect or misapplied procedural assumptions.

The Court further ruled that filing certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Court of Appeals did not interrupt the course of the principal action unless a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction directed to the lower court was issued. It found that no such injunction was present. It also observed that counsel’s reliance on Factoran, Jr. v. Hon. Judge Capulong was misdirected because, as stated in the decision’s discussion, the relevant procedural doctrine was settled in People v. Mercado, and the applicable rules on demurrer denials prevented review before judgment. The Court characterized counsel’s conduct as dilatory and asserted that counsel’s pleadings revealed a disregard of elementary procedural principles.

Intervention of “Interest of Justice” Despite Defense Counsel’s Misconduct

Despite condemning the defense counsel’s delaying behavior and acknowledging that the trial court’s warning and decision to treat the defense as having waived evidence were not, in principle, an abuse attributable to the court, the Supreme Court still found a compelling reason to reopen the trial at least for defense presentation. The Court held that, given the impositio

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