People vs. Acuram

G.R. No. 117954
A policeman fired from a jeepney, killing a man after a verbal altercation; convicted of homicide, not murder, due to lack of treachery and voluntary surrender.
homicide shooting killing

Case Summary (G.R. No. 117954)

Factual Background

On the evening of June 29, 1991, Rolando Manabat and companions stood on the national highway in Poblacion, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, waiting for a ride. A passing jeepney allegedly swerved toward them after which the victim shouted at its occupants. Two gunshots were immediately heard and sparks were observed from the front right side of the jeepney. Rolando cried that he had been shot and was later transported to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center and subsequently to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital where he underwent surgery and died the following day from massive blood loss due to a gunshot wound that traversed the right knee.

Investigation and Arrest

Police investigation identified Orlando Acuram, a policeman then assigned to the 421st PNP Company, as among the passengers seated at the front right side of the jeepney and as the only passenger carrying a firearm. Shells consistent with an armalite rifle were recovered at the scene. Appellant was restricted to camp by his commanding officer pending investigation and was later surrendered to the custody of the court pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.

Trial Court Proceedings and Verdict

At arraignment Orlando Acuram pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial with counsel. The trial court found the prosecution had convincingly proven guilt beyond reasonable doubt, convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua with an award of indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased and costs of suit. The trial court rejected appellant’s defense as weak, self-serving, and unreliable.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

In his appeal, appellant challenged the judgment on four principal grounds: that he did not flee and was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; that the killing was not attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that he was not properly and conclusively identified and the weapon was not positively tested; and that alleged delay or inadequacy in medical treatment constituted an efficient intervening cause absolving him of criminal responsibility.

Voluntary Surrender and Flight

The Court addressed appellant’s claim to voluntary surrender and concluded that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to authorities. The Court found that appellant, a policeman present at the scene, failed to inquire about or report the incident and did not present himself to the El Salvador police once he learned he was a suspect. Appellant’s confinement to camp by his superior and his eventual surrender by that superior did not satisfy the legal concept of spontaneous voluntary surrender.

Treachery Finding

On the issue of qualification by treachery, the Court reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court explained that treachery requires proof that the accused consciously adopted a method of attack that ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. The Court found the shooting was a sudden response to the victim’s cursing and arose from a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate and calculated mode of attack; therefore, treachery was not proved.

Sufficiency of Identification and Circumstantial Evidence

The Court rejected appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to identify him as the shooter. It reiterated that conviction may be sustained by circumstantial evidence if three requisites concur: first, there must be more than one circumstance; second, the facts from which inferences are drawn must be proven; and third, the combination of circumstances must produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found a chain of circumstances sufficient to exclude others as perpetrators: first, appellant’s former service and firearm skill set; second, appellant’s possession of a command-issued armalite rifle before, during, and after the incident; third, appellant’s seating at the extreme front-right side of the jeepney where sparks of gunbursts were seen and heard; fourth, that no other passenger had a rifle; fifth, recovery of empty armalite shells at the scene; and sixth, appellant’s failure to present himself to authorities until after a warrant and arrest. These facts, taken together, produced proof beyond reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt.

Paraffin and Ballistics Tests

The Court considered appellant’s emphasis on the absence of positive identification through paraffin and ballistic tests and found such absence unavailing. The Court observed that negative paraffin results do not conclusively show a person did not fire a gun and that ballistics or paraffin tests are not indispensable where circumstantial evidence otherwise produces moral certainty of guilt.

Alleged Medical Negligence and Causation

Appellant’s assertion that inadequate or delayed medical treatment constituted an efficient intervening cause was also rejected. The Court reviewed medical testimony, particularly that of Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., who described prompt efforts to control hemorrhage and to transfuse and operate on the victim. The Court found no proof of negligent treatment and held that any perceived delay did not break the causal chain between the gunshot inflicted by appellant and the victim’s death. The Court affirmed the settled rule that the wrongdoer is responsible for all consequences that naturally and probably flow from his criminal act, including death resulting from inflicted injuries.

Disposition and Penalty

Because treachery was not established, the Court modified the conviction from murder to homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court fixed the penalty in the medium period of reclusion temporal and, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, set the imposable range from the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court ultimately sentenced appellant to suffer a prison term of ten years of the medium

...continue reading