Title
People vs. Abilong
Case
G.R. No. L-1960
Decision Date
Nov 26, 1948
Florentino Abilong violated destierro by entering Manila, leading to his conviction under Article 157. The Supreme Court ruled that destierro constitutes a deprivation of liberty, affirming guilt despite the dissent's narrower interpretation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-1960)

Factual Background

The Municipal Court rendered a final judgment on April 5, 1946, convicting Florentino Abilong in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery and sentencing him to two years, four months and one day of destierro, with a prohibition against entering any place within a radius of one hundred kilometers from the City of Manila. The information filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila charged that on or about September 17, 1947 Abilong wilfully and unlawfully evaded the service of that sentence by entering the prohibited area and committing vagrancy.

Information, Plea and Sentence in the Court of First Instance

Upon arraignment on the information for evasion of service of sentence, the accused pleaded guilty. The trial court sentenced him to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, imposed the accessory penalties of law, and awarded costs against him.

Assignment of Error on Appeal

The sole assignment of error urged by appellant was that the lower court erred in applying Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, because said article, as embodied in the English text, refers to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of liberty and therefore does not cover evasion of a sentence of destierro.

Appellant’s Argument

Appellant’s counsel contended that the English wording of Article 157 — which punishes “evading service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment” — confined the offense to persons serving a term of imprisonment in a penal institution and thus excluded persons sentenced to banishment or destierro where there is no physical confinement.

Prosecution and Solicitor General’s Position

The Solicitor General responded that the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted in Spanish and that the Spanish text controls in case of doubt, citing People v. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665. The Solicitor General relied upon the Spanish formulation of Article 157, which punishes the sentenciado who “fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme,” and argued that “privacion de libertad” includes the partial deprivation of liberty inherent in a sentence of destierro, such as the prohibition against entering a specified area. The Solicitor General also cited People v. Samonte (57 Phil. 968) and People v. Jose de Jesus (80 Phil. 746) as authority for the proposition that one under sentence of destierro suffers a deprivation of liberty and evades the sentence when he enters the prohibited area.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding

The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code governed and held that the English word “imprisonment” was an erroneous translation of the Spanish phrase “sufriendo privacion de libertad.” The Court reasoned that although destierro did not constitute imprisonment in the literal sense, it did impose a deprivation of liberty by forbidding the convict to enter a designated area, and that such deprivation fell within the meaning of the Spanish text of Article 157. The Court expressly relied on its prior rulings in People v. Samonte and People v. Jose de Jesus to support the conclusion that a person under sentence of destierro escapes the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area. The Court therefore found and held that appellant was guilty of evasion of service of sentence under Article 157 (Spanish text) because he entered the City of Manila during the term of his destierro.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and ordered costs against the appellant.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Perfecto dissented. He agreed that the English text of Article 157 would entitle appellant to acquittal but argued that the Spanish text must be read with attention to the verb “fugandose,” which denotes physical escape from confinement. He maintained that “privacion de libertad,” as used in the Spanish text, had come to be understood by Spanish jurists as equivalent to imprisonment and that the concept of escape presupposed some enclosure or confinement. Justice Perfecto considered it farfetched to treat destierro, which merely forbids entry into a specified area while leaving the convict free elsewhere, as a condition from which one “escapes.” He warned that stretching Article 157 to cover destierro would lead to absurd consequences and disproportionate penalties and suggested that the proper remedy for evasion of destierro is legislative correction rather than judicial extension of the statute; he observed that contempt proce

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.