Title
People vs. Abilong
Case
G.R. No. L-1960
Decision Date
Nov 26, 1948
Florentino Abilong violated *destierro* by entering Manila, leading to his conviction under Article 157. The Supreme Court ruled that *destierro* constitutes a deprivation of liberty, affirming guilt despite the dissent's narrower interpretation.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 232189)

Petitioner, Respondent, and Procedural Posture

The People prosecuted Abilong under an information alleging that, while under a final sentence of destierro prohibiting entry within 100 kilometers of the City of Manila, he wilfully and unlawfully evaded the service of that sentence by entering the prohibited area and committing vagrancy. Upon arraignment Abilong pleaded guilty and was sentenced to prision correccional (two years, four months, one day) with accessory penalties and costs. Abilong appealed, assigning error to the imposition of penalty under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.

Key Dates

Date of decision reviewed in the prompt: November 26, 1948. Applicable constitutional framework for analysis: 1935 Philippine Constitution (the decision predates the 1987 Constitution and thus the pre-1987 constitutional regime applies).

Applicable Law and Controlling Texts

Primary statutory provision at issue: Article 157, Revised Penal Code. The court treated the Spanish text as controlling, because the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted in Spanish. Quoted Spanish text: “ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; …” English translation in the official text referred to the accused “escaping during the term of his imprisonment,” which the majority found to be a mistranslation of “sufriendo privacion de libertad.”

Assignment of Error by Appellant

Appellant’s principal contention: Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code applies only to persons imprisoned in a penal institution and deprived completely of liberty; it does not cover evasion of a sentence of destierro because destierro is not “imprisonment” under the English text of Article 157.

Majority Court’s Interpretive Approach

The majority begins from the textual principle that the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code governs when doubt exists, citing People v. Manaba. It rejects reliance on the English translation where the Spanish original supplies the meaning. The majority read “sufriendo privacion de libertad” as a broader phrase meaning “suffering deprivation of liberty,” which it considered capable of encompassing partial deprivations of liberty such as destierro.

Majority’s Application to Destierro

Relying on precedent (People v. Samonte and People v. Jose de Jesus) and the meaning of the Spanish text, the majority concluded that a person under destierro is “suffering deprivation of liberty” because destierro imposes an enforceable restriction (in this case, prohibition from entering a specified area). Entry into the prohibited area therefore constitutes an evasion of the service of sentence under Article 157 as read in the Spanish text.

Precedents and Their Role

The majority relied on earlier decisions holding that destierro involves a deprivation of liberty and that entering the prohibited area constitutes evasion of the sentence. Those precedents were invoked to support the interpretation that Article 157 reaches violations of judicially imposed geographic exclusion, not merely escapes from physical confinement in a penal institution.

Holding and Disposition (Majority)

Holding: Under the controlling Spanish text of Article 157, evasion of service of sentence includes violation of a sentence of destierro by entering the prohibited area. Result: The trial court’s conviction and sentence of Abilong for evasion of service of sentence (Article 157) were affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Dissenting Opinion — Core Argument

The dissent (Justices Perfecto and Briones) argued that Article 157’s operative verb “fugándose” (to escape) necessarily connotes escape from a form of physical confinement or imprisonment, and that “privacion de libertad” should be understood in ordinary legal and grammatical usage as imprisonment. The dissent stressed that destierro, which bans entry to a specific place while leaving freedom elsewhere, does not impose the enclosure or confinement presupposed by “escape.”

Dissent’s Policy and Practical Concerns

The dissent warned against an expansive interpretation that would equate any restriction or limitation on freedom with the kind of deprivation that Article 157 punishes. It observed that adopting the prosecution’s broad view would yield absurd results (e.g., treating evasion of trivial restrictions as grounds for imprisonment under Article 157) and encroach on legislative prerogatives

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