G.R. No. 233774 - Pineda vs. De Vega

Case Summary (G.R. No. 233774)

Factual Background: The Killing and the Investigation

The prosecution established that Teofredo and Dominador Basalan, both construction workers, lived with their mother Silvina Basalan in Cebu City and worked at the construction site of Gaisano FCDC in Mandaue City. On September 9, 1993, laborers including Juanito Gutang and Apolonio Quilag retired early after work. Around 3:00 a.m. the following day, Juanito was awakened by a thudding sound similar to someone striking another person. Juanito then saw the appellant, from about three meters, hitting the victims with a lead pipe and striking them. Juanito alerted his co-workers, and Apolonio observed the victims already lying in a pool of blood. The incident was reported to security guards, who called the police.

The appellant reportedly left the job site hurriedly and brought his personal belongings. Police officer PO2 Alfredo Andales conducted an on-the-spot investigation. At the crime scene, he found the victims’ bloodied corpses with smashed heads and recovered a G.I. pipe, identified as the weapon used. The police investigation also showed that the night before the killing, there had been an acrimonious quarrel between the appellant and the victims regarding misplaced construction tools, which were later recovered. The incident was recorded in the police blotter naming the appellant as the prime suspect.

A post mortem examination was performed by Dr. Ladislao V. Diola, Jr., who signed a necropsy report stating that death resulted from cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to injuries to the head. By agreement, Dr. Diola’s testimony was dispensed with after the defense admitted the findings in the necropsy report.

Procedural History: Trial and the Appellant’s Objections

Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty. During trial, Juanito Gutang testified on direct examination on November 22, 1994, after which the defense began cross-examination but later sought resetting because he still had many questions. When trial continued on January 23, 1995, Juanito did not appear due to fever. The public prosecutor asked that further cross-examination be deferred until recovery and that the prosecution be allowed to present Apolonio Quilag. The appellant did not object. The court granted the motion and warned that if Juanito did not appear by the next date, his testimony would be stricken off the record; however, the warning was not stated in the court’s written order.

On March 2, 1995, PO2 Andales and then the victims’ mother Silvina were presented, and the prosecution evidence was completed. The defense later assented to dispensing with the testimony of Dr. Diola upon stipulation regarding the necropsy report. When the prosecution announced it would rest, the defense, on May 22, 1995, objected to the admission of Juanito’s affidavit offered as documentary evidence, specifically questioning its admission on the ground that cross-examination was not completed. The trial court nevertheless admitted the affidavit and the prosecution formally rested. The defense presented witnesses for alibi and denial.

After trial, the RTC found the appellant guilty of two counts of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count, ordering reimbursement of P17,000.00 for actual expenses and payment of P200,000.00 in damages plus costs.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The appellant challenged his conviction on three primary grounds. First, he argued that the RTC erred in not ordering the striking out of Juanito’s entire testimony due to the failure to complete cross-examination after the RTC’s order of January 23, 1995 and Juanito’s non-appearance. Second, he claimed the RTC erred in giving probative value to the unfinished testimony of Juanito and in disregarding the defense evidence that allegedly corroborated his position. Third, he argued that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling on Waiver of the Right to Confront and Cross-Examine

The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the prosecution’s witness should have been discredited and stricken off due to unfinished cross-examination. It recognized that under Art. III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the accused had the right to meet witnesses face to face. It likewise acknowledged Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the Rules of Court as recognizing confrontation and cross-examination as a due process right.

However, the Court emphasized that the right of confrontation and cross-examination was personal and waivable, either expressly or impliedly. It relied on the rule articulated in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, holding that where the accused was given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but did not avail himself of that opportunity, the accused effectively renounced the right, and the testimony on direct examination could remain in the record.

The Court further invoked Fulgado v. Court of Appeals, which stressed that the task of recalling a witness for further cross-examination falls on the party who desires to exercise the right. In that view, silence or failure to assert the right on time amounts to renunciation. Accordingly, it was not the responsibility of the court to manage the cross-examination of the opposing party’s witness at the accused’s behest after the accused had already proceeded in a manner inconsistent with insistence on continued cross-examination.

Applying those principles, the Court found that the appellant waived any objection to the continuation of the trial without completing cross-examination of Juanito. Juanito had testified on direct examination on November 22, 1994, and the defense cross-examined him on the corpus delicti. When Juanito failed to appear on January 23, 1995, the appellant did not object to deferring further cross-examination and did not object to the prosecution’s presentation of Apolonio Quilag. The trial was reset for continued cross-examination, and the Court observed that the appellant did not timely pursue striking Juanito’s testimony, nor did he object when other prosecution witnesses were presented. The Court also noted that there was no showing that subpoenas were issued for the later date, and, critically, that the appellant did not object to the prosecution’s rest or to the admission of Juanito’s affidavit as documentary evidence. Even when the appellant later testified, he presented alibi and denial, thereby showing, in the Court’s view, that he did not treat the inability to complete cross-examination as a decisive deprivation of a right at the time it could have been asserted.

The Court distinguished the appellant’s case from the authority cited by him, holding that the appellant’s conduct—acquiescing to deferral, failing to object to subsequent witnesses, not asking the court to strike the testimony, not objecting to the affidavit offered after the prosecution announced it would rest—amounted to implied waiver.

Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The Court held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant killed the victims. It found Juanito’s identification reliable. It characterized Juanito’s testimony as clear, straightforward, categorical, consistent, and free from any sign of fabrication. The Court regarded it as unlikely that Juanito could recount the detailed circumstances of the killing without having witnessed it. It also relied on the absence of any improper motive for Juanito to testify falsely against the appellant. The Court noted that the appellant admitted no bad blood existed between them and that Juanito’s testimony was therefore entitled to full faith and credit, consistent with the general rule applied where no evidence suggests improper motives.

The Court also reminded that appellate courts do not lightly disturb a trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility because trial courts are better positioned to observe demeanor and determine credibility from firsthand testimony, absent a clear showing of overlooked material facts.

Lack of Proof of Treachery and Evident Premeditation

While sustaining conviction, the Court modified the legal qualification. It noted that the RTC convicted the appellant of murder but did not make any finding of qualifying circumstances to support treachery and evident premeditation beyond reasonable doubt.

On treachery, the Court held that it could not be appreciated. It reasoned that Juanito, the lone eyewitness, was not able to see how the assault started. The incident occurred at around 3:00 a.m., but the Court held that this fact alone did not prove that the victims were sleeping when killed. It cited Juanito’s testimony that he was asleep when the appellant began the attack and that he was awakened only by the thudding sounds as the appellant struck the victims. The Court therefore refused to presume treachery and reiterated that treachery requires clear and convincing evidence and cannot be based on conjecture.

The Court explained the doctrine of treachery as requiring the concurrence of: (one) the employment of means of execution that provide the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (two) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. It further stated that treachery is the essence of a sudden, unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim that ensures execution without risk to the aggressor. Yet it concluded that because the prosecution witness did not see how the assault commenced, the trial court could not infer treachery from mere suppositions.

As to evident premeditation, the Court likewise held it was not proven. It reiterated that evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence of three elements: the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, acts manifestly indicating the clinging to that determination, and sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. It also held that t

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 233774)

The case stemmed from the appeal of Adones Abatayo, who assailed his conviction for double murder by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, in Criminal Case No. DU-4381.
The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the offense qualification and the penalty and civil awards.

Information and Charges

The appellant was charged by an Information dated January 31, 1994 with double murder for the killing of Dominador Basalan and Teofredo Basalan on or about September 10, 1993 in Mandaue City.
The Information alleged that the appellant acted with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and attacked the victims with a G.I. pipe, causing mortal wounds on their heads and instantaneous death.
The Supreme Court noted that only one Information for double murder was filed, and the records showed no timely objection to any asserted defect in the charge before trial.

Arraignment and Plea

Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

Trial Timeline and Witness Issues

The prosecution began with Juanito Gutang as first witness, whose direct examination was terminated on November 22, 1994, after which the appellant’s counsel proceeded with cross-examination.
During a continuation, the defense counsel sought a resetting because he had more questions, and the court granted the motion.
On January 23, 1995, Juanito failed to appear due to fever, and the prosecutor requested deferment of further cross-examination and presentation of the second witness, Apolonio Quilag, which the appellant did not object to.
The trial court warned that if Juanito did not appear to continue testimony by the next trial date, his testimony would be stricken off, but the warning was not contained in the court order issued on that date.
On March 2, 1995, the prosecution presented PO2 Alfredo Andales and thereafter the victims’ mother, Silvina Basalan, completing their testimonies.
On April 17, 1995, the parties dispensed with the testimony of Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr. after admitting the authenticity of the necropsy report.
The prosecutor announced readiness to rest, and on May 22, 1995, the prosecutor offered in evidence Juanito’s affidavit as documentary evidence, over the appellant’s objection; the trial court nevertheless admitted the affidavit and the prosecution rested.
The defense presented its witnesses after setting for defense presentation, and the trial concluded with conviction based primarily on Juanito’s testimony and corroboration.

Prosecution Evidence

The victims, Teofredo and Dominador Basalan, lived with their mother Silvina Basalan and were stay-in construction workers at the Gaisano FCDC construction site in Mandaue City.
At about 7:00 p.m. on September 9, 1993, laborers including Juanito Gutang, Apolonio Quilag, and Pedro Esconia, along with an unidentified co-worker, retired early in their quarters.
At about 3:00 a.m. the following day, Juanito was awakened by a sound likened to someone striking a person.
Juanito testified that from a distance of about three (3) meters, he saw the appellant hitting both victims with a lead pipe and the victims were later found bloodied with smashed heads.
Juanito woke co-workers, reported the incident to security guards, and police were contacted.
The appellant allegedly hurriedly left the job site and brought his personal belongings.
PO2 Alfredo Andales conducted an on-the-spot investigation, found the bloodied corpses with smashed heads, and recovered a G.I. pipe as the weapon.
PO2 Andales testified that investigation indicated an acrimonious quarrel between the appellant and the victims the night before the killing over misplaced construction tools which were later recovered.
The police recorded the incident in the police blotter with the appellant as prime suspect.
Dr. Diola conducted a post mortem examination, and the necropsy report stated that the victims died due to cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to injuries to the head.
The victims’ mother, Silvina Basalan, testified to the expenses for the wake and funeral and to the emotional suffering caused by the death of her sons.

Defense Evidence

The appellant testified that he worked as a construction worker, left the job site at about 7:00 p.m. on September 9, 1993, arrived home around 9:00 p.m., and took leave to attend a fiesta in Carcar, Cebu with an uncle the following morning.
The appellant claimed that after the fiesta he went to Bohol, returned home in December 1993, and was surprised at being arrested in August 1994 for the killings.
Bernabe Hinario, a neighbor, corroborated the appellant’s claimed presence at around 9:00 p.m. on September 9, 1993, testifying that he saw the appellant arrive from work and invite him to the fiesta.
Leonora Abatayo, the appellant’s mother, corroborated the appellant’s arrival home at about 9:00 p.m. and testified that the appellant slept and left with his uncle after breakfast for the fiesta.

Trial Court Findings

The trial court relied on Juanito Gutang’s positive identification and eyewitness account of the killings.
It also found that the prosecution’s account was corroborated by the nature and location of the victims’ wounds as shown by the medical findings.
The trial court rejected the appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi as dubious and weak, and it held that such defenses could not prevail over Juanito’s positive identification.

Appellant’s Assignments of Error

The appellant argued that the trial court erred in failing to order the striking out of the entire testimony of Juanito for unjustified failure to complete cross-examination despite an order dated January 23, 1995.
The appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving probative value to Juanito’s unfinished testimony despite alleged implausibility and in disregarding the evidence supporting his alibi.
The appellant argued that the trial court erred in rendering a conviction despite failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Right to Confront and Cross-Examine

The Supreme Court recognized that Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution grants the accused the right to meet witnesses face to face.
The Court likewise recognized that under Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court, the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at trial as part of due process.
The Court held that the right is personal and therefore waivable, whether expressly or impliedly.
The Court reiterated that