Case Summary (G.R. No. 183486)
Procedural Background
The Court previously modified the Sandiganbayan’s judgment and had held the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, imposing an indeterminate prison term and a fine. The petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration arguing that his acquittal for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 (a special law) precluded conviction for attempted estafa under the Revised Penal Code (a general law) because both offenses arose from the same overt act, raising a double jeopardy concern. The Office of the Solicitor General initially disagreed with the petitioner’s double jeopardy argument but ultimately recommended acquittal on the alternative ground of insufficiency of evidence. The Court framed and required memoranda on two issues: (a) sufficiency of evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents; and (b) whether conviction for that complex crime under an information charging violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, violated the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Issue as to Right to Be Informed and Variance Between Allegation and Proof
The Court addressed first the constitutional claim under Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution (right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation). It reaffirmed that the real nature of an accusation is determined by the factual recital in the information, not merely by the caption or the statutory label. Under Section 4, Rule 120, Rules of Court, an accused may be convicted of an offense necessarily included in the one charged when the proof establishes the included offense. The Court found no merit in the petitioner’s contention that conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa would violate his right to be informed because the information, as pleaded, contained the factual allegations sufficient to establish that the complex crime was included in or charged by the information. The Court noted that the accused failed to object to duplicity before trial (Section 3(e), Rule 117), so the information could be considered as charging both offenses and conviction for either, if proved, would be permissible.
Issue as to Sufficiency of the Evidence; Solicitor General’s Position
The Solicitor General, after reviewing the Court’s earlier decision, expressly recommended acquittal for insufficiency of evidence. The Solicitor General emphasized that the conviction in the earlier decision was grounded on circumstantial evidence and queried whether the requisite conditions for reliance on circumstantial evidence were satisfied: (1) existence of more than one circumstance; (2) proof of the facts from which inferences are drawn; and (3) the combination of circumstances producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Section 3, Rule 133). The Solicitor General pointed out gaps in the proof linking petitioner to possession, delivery, processing, or approval of falsified documents and highlighted the absence of an overt act by petitioner in furtherance of any alleged conspiracy.
Legal Standards on Conspiracy, Principals, and Circumstantial Evidence
The Court reiterated governing principles applicable to conspiracy and coconspirator liability: conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony (Article 8, Revised Penal Code), and each conspirator’s acts in furtherance of the common design are attributable to all. However, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, with the same degree of proof required to establish the substantive offense. Direct proof of agreement is not necessary; conspiracy may be inferred from mode, manner, or conduct evidencing concerted action. Critically, except for the mastermind, a conspirator must ordinarily have performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; proof of such overt acts is essential. On circumstantial evidence generally, the Court applied Section 4, Rule 133 and the jurisprudential test that circumstantial facts must form an unbroken chain leading to one reasonable conclusion of guilt and excluding all other hypotheses.
Application of Standards to the Evidence Presented
The Court re-evaluated the prosecution’s evidence as to petitioner. The proven facts against petitioner were limited: common regional origin with Catre (Surigao del Norte), petitioner’s accompaniment of Catre when Catre engaged broker Calica, and petitioner’s mere presence during visits to the port. Witness testimony established that Catre alone introduced himself as the agent of the purported importer, transacted with Calica, delivered the documents to Calica, and handled the case throughout. There was no evidence tha
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 183486)
Procedural Posture and Relief Sought
- The case arises from Criminal Case No. 14844 tried before the Sandiganbayan; the Sandiganbayan rendered a challenged decision dated 28 June 1993 and a resolution dated 12 August 1993.
- On 14 November 1994, the Supreme Court modified the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan by holding petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents and imposing an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
- Petitioner Odon Pecho filed a timely motion for reconsideration asserting, inter alia, that his acquittal of the offense charged (violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended) precluded conviction for attempted estafa under the Revised Penal Code on double jeopardy grounds because both offenses allegedly arose from the same overt act in the single information filed.
- The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, in a Comment disagreed with the double jeopardy argument but ultimately joined the petitioner’s plea for acquittal on the alternative ground of insufficiency of evidence.
- The Solicitor General, in a Manifestation of 14 September 1995 responding to the Court’s directive (resolution of 22 August 1995), concurred fully with the OSG recommendation for acquittal and added detailed observations on the nature and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence relied upon in the November 1994 decision.
- The Court required memoranda from the parties on (a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, and (b) the validity of a conviction for that crime under an information alleging violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, in relation to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Facts as Adduced at Trial (as Presented in the Record)
- The information charged petitioner Odon Pecho and co-accused Joe Catre as principals, alleging that they "conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one another" and that Catre represented himself to be a representative of a non-existent or fictitious entity, Eversun Commercial Trading of Cotabato City.
- The prosecution’s principal witnesses included customs broker Constantino Calica (and testimony referencing his son Dennis Calica). The record excerpts of Calica’s testimony indicate:
- Calica was contracted by the persons presenting themselves as representatives of the importer; the persons who transacted with and introduced themselves to him were Joe Catre and his companion, but the witness repeatedly identified Joe Catre as the one who did all the talking, made the introduction, and delivered the documents (bill of lading, commercial invoices, packing list, importer’s sworn statement) to him.
- The witness testified that he was not introduced to petitioner by name during the initial meeting and that petitioner did not conduct the negotiations or deliver the documents; petitioner was described as the companion of Catre.
- Two days after the initial contact, Catre called the broker’s office to request assistance with preparation of the cargo at the arrastre operator; the broker’s office and son later assisted in the preparation when the shipment went for examination.
- The prosecution evidence established that Catre possessed the falsified documents, contracted Calica’s services, and delivered the documents to Calica for processing; in the absence of explanation and given possession, Catre is prima facie presumed to be the forger.
- Only petitioner was actually tried; Joe Catre’s address was stated as “unknown,” the record does not show that a warrant for Catre’s arrest was issued, and the only arrest warrant issued in the record was for petitioner.
Issues Presented to the Court
- Primary issues identified and ordered addressed by the Court:
- Whether the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents.
- Whether, assuming sufficiency of evidence, conviction for that complex crime under an information alleging violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, offended the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution) or otherwise violated double jeopardy principles.
- Ancillary but controlling questions implicit in the record:
- Whether the conviction in the November 1994 decision properly rested on proof of conspiracy between petitioner and Catre.
- Whether the circumstantial evidence presented against petitioner satisfied the requisites of the Rules of Court and jurisprudential standards for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.
Solicitor General’s Observations and Position (Manifestation of 14 September 1995)
- The Solicitor General acknowledged that the conviction in the November 1994 decision was based on circumstantial evidence.
- He recited the established rule: circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which inferences are drawn are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt (citing Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
- He noted an evidentiary infirmity: the inference that petitioner falsified documents appears to rest on another inference (that petitioner possessed the documents because he accompanied Catre), but there is no evidence showing actual custody by petitioner beyond mere accompaniment.
- He emphasized absence of proof that petitioner interceded for Catre, processed the import entry declaration, or was instrumental in its approval; evidence shows Catre, not petitioner, handled Calica and the documents.
- The Solicitor General stressed that elements of conspiracy and the requisite overt acts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and, applying the above, recommended that petitioner be acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Court’s Analysis: Right to Be Informed and the Validity of Conviction under the Information Filed
- The Court first addressed the constitutional right of an