G.R. No. 230299 - Penalosa vs. Ocampo, Jr.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 230299)

Petitioner, Respondent, Key Dates and Applicable Law

Key dates and legal sources as relied upon in the decision: alleged libelous Facebook post on August 3, 2011; Information filed September 25, 2012; Cybercrime Prevention Act (Republic Act No. 10175) enacted in 2012; DOJ resolution of September 16, 2014 directing withdrawal; RTC dismissal order dated January 26, 2015; Court of Appeals decision dated April 27, 2016 reversing RTC; Supreme Court decision (appeal) resolving remedies and authority to assail withdrawal. Applicable laws and rules considered: Article 355, Revised Penal Code (libel by writing or similar means); RA 10175 Section 4(c)(4) (cybercrime libel); Rules of Court (Rule 122 on appeals; Rule 65 on certiorari); Administrative Code provisions governing representation on appeal (Office of the Solicitor General).

Factual Background and Charged Offense

PeAalosa allegedly posted a derogatory message about Ocampo, Jr. on her Facebook account on August 3, 2011. An Information for libel was filed in RTC Mandaluyong (Criminal Case No. MC12-14668), alleging the Facebook post imputed vices or defects to Ocampo, Jr., exposed him to public ridicule, and cast dishonor or contempt upon him, thereby constituting libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pretrial Proceedings — Prosecutorial and DOJ Actions

PeAalosa filed motions before the City Prosecutor and sought suspension/deferment of proceedings pending those administrative remedies. The City Prosecutor denied reconsideration; PeAalosa petitioned the DOJ. The DOJ granted her Petition for Review on September 16, 2014 and ordered the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information, reasoning: (a) at the time of the Facebook post (2011) there was no statutory penalization of “Internet libel,” and (b) the language used was mere insult and not necessarily libelous.

RTC Action — Motion to Quash and Motion to Withdraw; Dismissal

Following the DOJ resolution and the prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw Information, PeAalosa filed a Motion to Quash. The RTC, after an independent four-page assessment, concluded: (a) the statements constituted internet libel as a matter of character, but (b) on the crucial point of criminal liability, the Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA 10175) that penalized internet libel became effective only in 2012, after the alleged act in 2011; therefore, there was no law then punishing “internet libel.” Applying the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, the RTC dismissed the Information as the conduct was not criminally punishable at the time of commission.

Court of Appeals Decision and Rationale

The Court of Appeals granted Ocampo, Jr.’s petition for certiorari and annulled the RTC’s dismissal. The CA held that online or Facebook libel is punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code because Article 355 punishes libel “by means of writing … or any similar means,” and Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 merely confirms that online libel is an example of libel by writing. The CA remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed and resolved three central issues: (1) whether Ocampo, Jr. properly invoked certiorari to assail the RTC’s order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information; (2) whether Ocampo, Jr., as private offended party, had the legal personality to file the petition to question the withdrawal of the Information; and (3) whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information, including whether allegedly libelous Facebook posts made in 2011 are punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

Remedy Against Final Orders — Appeal Versus Certiorari (Part I)

The Supreme Court held that an order granting a motion to withdraw information is a final order disposing of the case and thus falls within the remedy of appeal under Rule 122, not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is available only where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court reiterated prior precedent (e.g., Santos v. Orda, Jr.) that orders dismissing or disposing of cases are final and appealable. The exception in Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. (where certiorari was allowed against a prosecutor-driven exclusion of an accused due to an egregious reliance on DOJ resolution without independent judicial assessment) was distinguished on the facts: in this case the RTC conducted an independent and substantial evaluation of the merits, so Perez’s exceptional grant of certiorari did not apply.

Legal Personality of Private Complainant (Part II)

The Court reaffirmed the established principle that in criminal cases the State is the offended party; the private complainant’s interests are generally limited to civil liability arising from the criminal act. Appeals on the criminal aspect of the case, including assailing dismissals, must be undertaken by the State through the Solicitor General. The private offended party cannot prosecute an appeal on the criminal aspect. The Court distinguished prior decisions where private complainants were permitted to invoke certiorari — those concerned interlocutory orders (leaving something to be done by the trial court) or involved concurrence by the prosecution. Here, because the challenged order was a final dismissal by reason of withdrawal of the Information, the private complainant lacked legal personality to file certiorari to continue criminal prosecution. Allowing him to do so despite an available appeal would subvert Rule 65 and prior doctrine.

Whether the RTC Gravely Abused Its Discretion (Part III)

The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty. A grant of a prosecutor’s motion to withdraw information constitutes grave abuse only where the trial court fails to make an independent assessment of the evidence or otherwise abdicates its duty. The Supreme Court found no such abdication here: the RTC judge made an independent and reasoned analysis, explicitly recognizing that while the Facebook statements could be characterized as internet libel, the law penalizing cyber libel (RA 10175) was not yet in effect on August 3, 2011. The RTC applied the nullum crimen doctrine and an opinion of a former Secretary of Justice indicating that Article 355 (RPC) did not, as originally drafted, encompass Internet communication. The Supreme Court concluded that the RTC did not commit grave abuse in granting withdrawal and dismissal.

Statutory Interpretation — Article 355, RA 10175, and Retroactivity

The Court examined Article 355 (libel by writing or similar means) and Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 (which specifically makes libel committed through a computer system punishable under RA 10175). Applying the statutory construction principle noscitur a sociis, the Court observed that the enumerated means in Article 355 (writing, printing, lithography, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical, cinematographic exhibition) suggest that “similar means” does not naturally include computer systems. The Court reasoned that if Article 355 already covered online libel, Congress would not have needed to add Section 4(c)(4) in RA 10175. Treating cyber libel as already punishable under Article 355 would amount to retroactive application of a penal law to the accused in violation of the rule against retroactive penal laws; penal laws must be strictly construed for the benefit of the accused (Article 22, RPC). Because the alleged act occurred in 2011 before RA 10175’s enactment, the conduct could not be criminally punished under RA 10175 and, by the Court’s interpretation, was not properly punishable under Article 355 as it stood for that period.

Reconciliation with Disini and Nature of Error

The Supreme Court ac

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 230299)

Title and Case Identification

Supreme Court, Second Division, G.R. No. 230299, Decision dated April 26, 2023, authored by Justice Leonen, Special Associate Justice (LEONEN, SAJ.).
Parties: Jannece C. PeAalosa (petitioner) and Jose A. Ocampo, Jr. (respondent).
Case concerns petition for review on certiorari from the Court of Appeals Decision (April 27, 2016) and Resolution (November 25, 2016) which reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Order dismissing an Information for libel.

Factual Background

On August 3, 2011, petitioner allegedly composed, prepared and posted a Facebook message directed at Jose A. Ocampo, Jr.
The Facebook message quoted in the Information contained insulting and disparaging statements imputing vices or defects to Ocampo, Jr., and purportedly exposing him to public ridicule and contempt.
The Information charged that these statements imputed that Ocampo, Jr. was "brainless," disrespectful of his deceased father, lazy, a vagabond, a coward, uncircumcised, a beggar and envious, thereby damaging his reputation.

Criminal Information and Docketing

The Information for libel was filed and the case was raffled to Branch 212 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City and docketed as Criminal Case No. MC12-14668.
The Information alleged libel "by means of writing" under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, based on the Facebook post.

Pre-trial and Prosecutorial Actions

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor, asserting lack of probable cause to charge her with libel.
Petitioner also filed motions to defer or suspend proceedings in the trial court, pending resolution of prosecutorial and Department of Justice (DOJ) review.
The Office of the City Prosecutor denied the Motion for Reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

Trial Court Proceedings and Warrant

On June 24, 2014, the trial court denied the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, found probable cause, and issued a warrant for petitioner’s arrest.
Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the DOJ remained pending while parallel motions were filed in the RTC.

Department of Justice Resolution

On September 16, 2014, the Department of Justice granted petitioner’s Petition for Review and ordered the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information filed before the trial court.
DOJ reasoning as recorded: at the time of the Facebook post (2011) there was no specific law penalizing "Internet Libel" and that mere insulting words are not necessarily libelous.

Motions to Quash and to Withdraw Information

Following the DOJ Resolution, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information with the RTC.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong filed a corresponding Motion to Withdraw Information dated September 25, 2014.

RTC Order Dismissing the Information (January 26, 2015)

The RTC, through Presiding Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, issued a four-page Order.
The RTC independently assessed the Motion to Quash and the Motion to Withdraw Information rather than mechanically following DOJ/Secretary of Justice recommendations.
The RTC concluded that:
- Petitioner’s Facebook statements could constitute internet libel if evaluated under Article 353/355-type libel definitions.
- However, on the date of the alleged acts (August 3, 2011), Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) had not yet been enacted; therefore, "internet libel" was not yet defined or penalized by law at that time.
- Under the principle Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, the alleged acts could not be penalized criminally in 2011.
Consequently, the RTC dismissed the Information and declared the Motion to Quash and Motion to Withdraw Information moot and academic.

Court of Appeals Decision (April 27, 2016)

The Court of Appeals granted respondent Ocampo, Jr.’s Petition for Certiorari and annulled the RTC’s January 26, 2015 Order, holding that:
- The Facebook post maligning respondent was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (“by means of writing … or any similar means”).
- Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA 10175) was interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean that the libel provision in the Revised Penal Code covers libelous internet or Facebook posts as examples of libel by means of writing.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The dispositive portion: petition granted; RTC Order annulled and set aside; case remanded for further proceedings.

Procedural Posture before the Supreme Court

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court (April 11, 2017).
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 25, 2016 (Resolution).
Supreme Court issued temporary restraining order (TRO) on July 4, 2018, enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the criminal case; later made the TRO permanent in the final disposition.
The Supreme Court directed respondent to comment; respondent filed a Comment; petitioner filed a Reply.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Whether respondent properly availed of a petition for certiorari to assail the RTC Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information.
Whether respondent, as private offended party, had legal personality and authority to file the petition for certiorari against the withdrawal of the Information.
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information.
Subsumed: whether an allegedly libelous Facebook post made in 2011 (before RA 10175) is punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner’s (PeAalosa’s) Contentions

Respondent used the wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari; the proper remedy against the RTC’s final order dismissing the case was appeal under Rule 122, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent lacked legal standing to file the petition for certiorari because only the Office of the Solicitor General may represent the State in appeals of criminal cases; private offended parties are limited to civil remedies and lack authority to appeal criminal dismissals.
On the merits, RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the libel case; allegedly libelous Facebook posts are governed by RA 10175 and could not be prosecuted in 2011 before RA 10175 took effect.
DOJ’s finding that the Facebook words were not necessarily libelous supports dismissal; the words were at best offensive but not actionable criminally.

Respondent’s (Ocampo, Jr.) Contentions

An appeal to the President/Secretary of