Title
Pascual vs. Del Saz Orozco
Case
G.R. No. L-5174
Decision Date
Mar 17, 1911
A stockholder sued Banco Español-Filipino directors for misappropriating funds by deducting compensation from gross income instead of net profits. The Supreme Court allowed recovery for the period he was a shareholder but dismissed claims for prior acts due to lack of standing.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-5174)

Factual Background

The complaint alleged that during the years 1903 through 1907 the defendants, as members of the board of directors and board of government of Banco Espanol-Filipino, unlawfully deducted their compensation from the bank's gross income instead of from net profits, thereby diverting approximately P20,000 per annum to themselves and defrauding the bank and its stockholders. The second cause of action alleged that similar misappropriations occurred during 1899–1902 by defendants' immediate predecessors, and that the present defendants, being the only officers who could investigate or act, neglected to do so and refused to reimburse the bank after demand. The plaintiff sued in his own right as a stockholder for the benefit of the bank and the other stockholders and prayed that judgment be entered for the bank.

Corporate Character and Governing Charter

The amended complaint described Banco Espanol-Filipino as a banking corporation created by royal decree in 1854, later modified by decree of July 14, 1897, and by Act No. 1790. The charter treated the bank as a quasi‑public institution with special privileges and governmental supervision. Article 30 of the reformed charter provided that of the profits remaining after administrative expenses and reserve, ten per cent was to be set aside for the directors and five per cent for the board of government, the distribution to be made as regulations provided, and the remaining eighty‑five per cent to belong to shareholders pro rata. Article 31 required dividends to be declared each semestre.

Procedural Posture and Grounds of Demurrer

The court a quo sustained a demurrer to the first and second causes of action of the amended complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts constituting a cause of action. The demurrer had been asserted on four grounds: lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of action, defect of parties plaintiff, and uncertainty. The demurrer to the third cause of action was overruled and is not before the Court on this appeal.

Nature of the Causes of Action and Plaintiff’s Standing

The first cause of action sought recovery for wrongful deductions made by the defendants during 1903–1907. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff became a stockholder on November 13, 1903, and that he had purchased ten shares; it alleged further that as a stockholder he had exhausted internal remedies and that the defendants, who constituted a majority of the present board, would not authorize suit in the corporate name. The second cause of action sought recovery for the earlier misappropriations of 1899–1902 by predecessors in office and alleged that the present defendants had neglected to redress or disclose those earlier wrongs and refused to reimburse the bank after demand.

Issue Presented

The principal legal question was whether a stockholder who was not a stockholder at the time of the challenged transactions could maintain a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to recover for wrongs that occurred prior to his acquisition of shares, and whether the first and second causes of action, as pleaded, stated causes of action sufficient to withstand demurrer.

Parties’ Contentions

The plaintiff contended that as a stockholder he could maintain a suit for and on behalf of the bank where the directors who perpetrated the wrongs controlled the corporation and prevented corporate action, and that he had exhausted internal remedies. The plaintiff argued that the doctrine which requires ownership of shares at the time of the complained‑of transactions should not bar his suit, or that in any event his acquisition date vested him with sufficient right to challenge the defendants’ compensation practices for the periods in question. The defendants relied upon the established rule, as construed by certain authorities, that a purchaser of shares after the occurrence of the complained‑of acts ordinarily could not maintain a derivative suit to challenge those prior acts.

Applicable Law and Precedents

The Court reviewed the doctrine of the derivative suit, citing early and authoritative authorities including Foss vs. Harbottle, Dodge vs. Woolsey, and the modern developments that permitted a minority stockholder to sue where the corporation was unable or unwilling to sue. The Court examined the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hawes vs. Oakland and Dimpfel vs. Ohio, and the procedural 94th Equity Rule, and considered the weight of state and text‑book authorities holding generally that a purchaser of stock after the transactions complained of could not attack antecedent management unless the transactions were continuing or otherwise specially injurious to the present stockholder.

Court’s Analysis of the First Cause of Action

The Court held that the matter in the first cause of action was divisible and that the plaintiff alleged that he became a stockholder during the period for which recovery was sought except for the first semestre of 1903. Applying Section 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court reasoned that where a single count or cause of action is divisible the demurrer should be confined to the defective parts and a general demurrer will not be sustained if some averments disclose a good cause of action. The Court concluded that the demurrer to the first cause of action had been improperly sustained insofar as it attempted to dismiss the whole cause of action despite the plaintiff’s averment of stock ownership for the periods

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