Title
Papa vs. A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 105188
Decision Date
Jan 23, 1998
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 105188)

Complaint for Specific Performance and Third‑Party/Intervenor Claims

Valencia and PeAarroyo sued for specific performance, seeking delivery of TCT No. 28993 to PeAarroyo, accrued and continuing rentals (P72,000 plus P800 monthly), attorney’s fees of P20,000, and costs. Delfin Jao intervened, asserting that PeAarroyo had sold the same property to him on 20 August 1973 for P71,500 (with a P5,000 earnest payment) and prayed for enforcement of his claimed rights or damages if transfer could not be made. Petitioner filed a third‑party complaint against the Reyes spouses who had acquired the property at a tax sale on 21 January 1980 (for P14,000), seeking cancellation of the tax sale or the right to redeem and reimbursement.

Petitioner's Defenses at Trial

Petitioner admitted the mortgage to the bank but contended the complaint failed to state a cause of action, arguing the Testate Estate of Angela M. Butte should have been joined and that the matter belonged in probate/special proceedings. He asserted he signed the deed as attorney‑in‑fact and could not be held personally liable, claimed he could not recall transaction details, and alleged he did not have the owner’s duplicate title in his possession. He also contended that if respondents had not paid the full purchase price, their claim was defective.

Trial Court Findings and Decree

After trial, with only PeAarroyo testifying and other parties submitting documentary evidence, the RTC (29 June 1987) ordered: (1) petitioner could redeem from third‑party defendants by paying P14,000 plus legal interest and the Reyes spouses must allow redemption; (2) defendant (petitioner) to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale to PeAarroyo and deliver peaceful possession free of liens and encumbrances, or if impossible through no fault of plaintiff, pay P45,000 plus legal interest from 15 June 1973; (3) PeAarroyo to execute a deed to intervenor Jao upon payment of the balance (or pay P5,000 plus interest); and (4) defendant to pay P5,000 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Court of Appeals’ Modification and Rationale

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (27 January 1992) affirmed the RTC decision but modified the remedy: it ordered petitioner to deliver the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 28993 to PeAarroyo or to authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the existing certificate and issue a certificate in PeAarroyo’s name. The CA reasoned that the sale had been consummated because respondents had delivered payment (P5,000 cash and a P40,000 check), petitioner admitted receipt and issued receipts, and PeAarroyo testified that petitioner received P45,000. The CA treated the absence of a denial that the check was cashed and petitioner’s failure to recall events after a decade as supporting a presumption that the check was encashed. The CA also held that the estate of Angela M. Butte and the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr. were not indispensable parties to the specific performance action.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner raised three principal issues: (I) that the CA’s finding of a consummated sale was speculative and legally erroneous because payment by check is effective only upon encashment under Article 1249; (II) that the CA improperly nullified or disregarded an assignment of mortgage rights in favor of the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr., which was not a party; and (III) that the CA erred in not holding the estates of Angela M. Butte and Ramon Papa, Jr. to be indispensable parties.

Supreme Court Analysis on Payment by Check and Presumption of Payment

The Supreme Court confirmed that respondents paid P5,000 in cash and delivered a P40,000 PCIB check and that petitioner admitted receipt and issued receipts. The Court applied Article 1249 of the Civil Code, which provides that delivery of negotiable instruments produces the effect of payment only when cashed, except when, through the creditor’s fault, the instrument is impaired. The Court held petitioner’s unsubstantiated assertion that he never encashed the check was inconsistent with his pleading that he could not recall the transaction. Given the long lapse of more than ten years and petitioner’s failure to present oral evidence or documentation proving non‑encashment, the Court found the presumption favors encashment. The Court reiterated the established principle that acceptance of a check carries with it an obligation of due diligence in presenting it for payment; unreasonable delay by the payee that results in impairment of the instrument operates as payment, discharging the conditional obligation. Conversely, if no presentment is made at all, the drawer may not be held liable unless presentment is excused; but that is not the situation presented here because the record supported payment through the check and receipts.

Supreme Court Reasoning on Assignment, Mortgage Rights, and Indispensable Parties

On the claimed assignment of the bank’s mortgage rights to the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr., the Court noted the record was silent as to conditions or the effect of that assignment and that the title remained registered in the name of the late Angela M. Butte. The Court emphasized that contractual rights bind only parties to the contract; hence any obligation or lien the estate of Ramon Papa, Jr. might have is enforceable by that estate by separate action and does not defeat the specific performance claim of respondents who are parties to the sale. Regarding indispensability, the Supreme Court applied Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court (as it then read) to hold that an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended; thus, the estate of Angela M. Butte was not an indispensable party. The Court likewise concluded

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