Title
Pangili vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 117363
Decision Date
Dec 17, 1999
Mila Pangilinan charged with Estafa; RTC convicted her, but SC ruled RTC lacked jurisdiction as offense fell under MTC, nullifying all prior decisions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 206310-11)

Factual background alleged in the information

The information accused petitioner of inducing a 15‑year‑old girl, Luzviminda SJ Elnar, by false pretenses and misrepresentations, to surrender certain stereo components and accessories, allegedly by claiming she was instructed by the minor’s father to test the stereo component in EDSA, Mandaluyong. The information alleges that the accused was not authorized by the parents to take the items and that she removed them to the prejudice of Rolando and Soledad Elnar to the amount of P17,450.00.

Trial and intermediate appellate proceedings

Petitioner was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal, on March 12, 1991, and pleaded not guilty. After trial the RTC rendered a decision dated October 7, 1992, convicting petitioner of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing a term of prisión correccional and an award of P17,000.00 as damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on August 13, 1993, but modified the penalty to four (4) months arresto mayor and a fine of P17,450.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Motions for reconsideration and for new trial filed in the Court of Appeals were denied, and petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues presented to the Supreme Court

The petition raised two principal grounds: (1) the RTC’s conviction is null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the information alleged an offense within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); and (2) in the alternative, that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The jurisdictional question was treated as determinative by the Supreme Court.

Defect in the information: generic charging of "Estafa" without specification

The information employed only the generic label "Estafa" without identifying which specific provision of the Revised Penal Code was alleged to have been violated. The RTC treated the charge as estafa under Article 315 and assumed jurisdiction on that basis. The Supreme Court examined whether the allegations in the information in fact pleaded the elements of the particular form of estafa under Article 315 relied upon by the RTC.

Elements required under Article 315(1)(b) (estafa with abuse of confidence)

The Court reiterated the elements of estafa under subdivision No. 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 as: (1) the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, on commission, for administration or under other obligation involving the duty to make delivery or to return the same; (2) there was misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial of receipt; (3) such misappropriation or conversion or denial caused prejudice to another; and (4) there was a demand made by the offended party upon the offender.

The information failed to allege an essential element of Article 315(1)(b)

On close examination, the information did not allege that a demand was made by the offended party upon the accused — an essential element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b). Because of this omission, the information did not plead the elements of that particular form of estafa and thus did not properly charge an offense within the RTC’s jurisdiction as assumed by that court.

Proper characterization of the pleaded offense: Article 318 ("other deceits")

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General that the factual allegations of the information, viewed in context and read as pleaded, actually fit within the blanket provision of paragraph 1(a) of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (other deceits). The penalty for such an offense, as reflected in the record at the time of filing, was imprisonment of not more than six months, placing it within the jurisdictional ambit addressed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 32.

Jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, Section 32

Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 vested exclusive original jurisdiction in municipal‑level trial courts over criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding four years and two months (or fines not exceeding P4,000, inclusive of accessory penalties and civil liability arising from such offenses). Since the offense as pleaded (Article 318) carried a penalty within those bounds, the Municipal Trial Court (not the RTC) had exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.

Estoppel and the Office of the Solicitor General’s contention

The Solicitor General argued that petitioner was estopped from challenging jurisdiction because estoppel previously attached in similar circumstances (citing Tijam v. Sibanghanoy). The Supreme Court rejected that contention. It explained that the Tijam doctrine is an exception applicable where the party complaining had previously invoked the forum’s jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief and later sought to repudiate that jurisdiction. Here, petitioner never invoked the RTC’s ju

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