Title
Pangandaman vs. Casar
Case
G.R. No. 71782
Decision Date
Apr 14, 1988
A 1985 shooting in Lanao del Sur led to a warrant of arrest for 14 petitioners, upheld by the Supreme Court, but voided for 50 unidentified "John Does" due to constitutional violations. The Court ruled probable cause sufficed for arrest warrants, directing further investigation by the Provincial Fiscal.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 193494)

Key Dates

Incident: July 27, 1985 (shooting in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur).
Complaint filed before respondent judge: August 10, 1985.
Motion for reconsideration: August 14, 1985.
Decision under review: appealed to the Supreme Court (decision rendered April 14, 1988).

Applicable Law and Procedural Rules

  • Rule 112, Rules of Court (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), particularly Section 3 (procedure for preliminary investigation) and Section 6 (when a warrant of arrest may issue); related provisions noted in the record.
  • Relevant jurisprudence interpreting preliminary investigation procedure and the power of inferior court judges to issue arrest warrants after preliminary examination (e.g., Mayuga v. Maravilla; Luna v. Plaza).
  • Constitutional requirement that warrants of arrest must particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.

Factual Background

On July 27, 1985 a violent incident left at least five persons dead and two wounded; competing accounts described either an attack on a residence or an ambush. A letter-complaint requesting a full preliminary investigation was filed with the Provincial Fiscal on July 28, 1985. On August 10, 1985 P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laru-an filed a criminal complaint for multiple murder before the respondent municipal judge (docketed Criminal Case No. 1748). The judge personally examined three witnesses under oath that same day, approved the complaint, and issued a warrant of arrest naming fourteen persons (the present petitioners) and fifty John Does. Counsel for the complainant later moved to recall the warrant alleging the judge’s investigation was hasty; that motion was denied.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent municipal judge conducted the preliminary investigation in conformity with Section 3, Rule 112 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), and whether any procedural failure amounted to denial of due process invalidating the warrant.
  2. Whether a municipal trial judge may issue a warrant of arrest prior to completion of the entire Section 3 preliminary investigation procedure.
  3. Whether issuance of a warrant naming fifty John Does was constitutionally permissible.
  4. Whether the judge was precluded from conducting any inquiry because the Provincial Fiscal had previously expressed intent to investigate.

Legal Framework: Two-Phase Preliminary Investigation

The Court explained that the Rule 112 mechanism contemplates two phases: (1) an initial ex parte inquiry (preliminary examination) into the sufficiency of the complaint and supporting affidavits, which either leads to dismissal or opens the second phase; and (2) a second phase in which the respondent is notified, given access to the complainant’s evidence, allowed to submit counter-affidavits, and the judge may hold a hearing and question parties and witnesses. Completion of both phases is required before filing a complaint or information in the Regional Trial Court, but the Court emphasized that the Rule does not prohibit issuance of an arrest warrant at the close of the first phase where the judge, after examining the complainant and witnesses under oath and in writing (searching questions and answers), finds probable cause and necessity for immediate custody.

Authority to Issue Warrant after Preliminary Examination

The Court held that Section 6 of Rule 112 expressly authorizes a municipal trial judge to issue a warrant of arrest after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses if the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists and immediate custody is necessary to prevent frustration of justice. Prior jurisprudence was cited to affirm that issuance of an arrest warrant after the first stage is consistent with the purpose of preliminary investigation: to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that full completion of the second phase is a prerequisite to issuance of an arrest warrant.

Evaluation of the Judge’s Conduct and Probable Cause Finding

The record contained the judge’s own certification that he personally examined all three witnesses under oath and reduced their responses to writing. Those witnesses—separately examined—offered mutually corroborative accounts identifying the ambush, describing casualties, giving circumstances (time, place, alleged motive), and naming each of the fourteen petitioners as participants. The Court gave weight to the judge’s affirmations and to the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Absent clear contrary proof in the record, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the judge’s determination of probable cause or in the scope and content of the questioning (searching questions and answers). The Court thus upheld the warrant insofar as it named the fourteen petitioners.

On the Validity of the Warrant as to Fifty John Does

The Court held that issuing a warrant against fifty unidentified John Does produced a general warrant, constitutionally impermissible because it did not particularly desc

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