Title
Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Tarlac
Case
G.R. No. L-15759
Decision Date
Dec 30, 1961
A bus terminal operator challenged a municipal ordinance and resolution as discriminatory and oppressive; the court ruled the measures invalid, upholding the terminal's legitimacy.
bus company
mall
complaint

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-15759)

Factual Background

The plaintiffs’ terminal location lay on F. Tanedo Street, within the specific area targeted by the municipal ordinance. The record showed that Pampanga Bus Company had leased different lots over time on F. Tanedo Street and used the improvements as a bus terminal. Initially, before liberation, it leased a lot and constructed a roofed building for its buses. After liberation, it leased another lot owned by Mr. Ricardo Roa and built a low-roofed structure of light materials, later reconstructed in “modern” styles of strong materials with employee quarters through joint management with LaMallorca. The terminal premises also included a store selling soft drinks and snacks, and it had modern toilet facilities.

Operationally, the plaintiffs had employees assigned to keep the premises and even the sidewalk in front of the terminal clean. During earlier operations, buses entered and exited through a common alley, requiring maneuvering first on the street to enter the terminal backward. On April 24, 1952, the plaintiffs leased an adjacent lot owned by Mr. Paguia, and they thereafter used that lot exclusively for entrance while the Roa lot was used only for exit.

The Supreme Court noted the manner of bus movements: a bus entered the terminal by going straight into the Paguia lot without the earlier maneuvering on the street, unloaded passengers and cargoes inside, then moved within the terminal grounds to turn right toward the Roa lot positioned toward Tanedo Street for loading. After loading, it left the terminal by turning right and proceeding directly to its destination. Buses were loaded and unloaded and parked inside the terminal when not in operation.

The record also showed that other vehicles, including jeepneys, midget buses, and calesas, were permitted to load and unload in public areas along F. Tanedo Street and parked on both sides of the street. Judicial notice was taken that F. Tanedo Street had ten streets intersecting between the national highway and Zamora Street. Evidence further showed that those intersecting streets were open to traffic, that buses could turn to enter and exit those streets, and that parking was allowed on them. The parties stipulated that the plaintiffs’ operations were authorized by the Public Service Commission, and that, at the time of the ordinance and up to the time of decision, there was no other bus terminal on F. Tanedo Street except the plaintiffs’ terminal.

The trial court found, and the Supreme Court treated as binding for purposes of the appeal on law only, that the terminal had been constructed and existed for a considerable time; it was built of strong materials; it had modern toilets and sanitary arrangements; and it functioned as a roofed facility where passengers waited inside rather than crowding the sidewalks. The trial court also found that the terminal did not constitute a nuisance because it did not injure the municipality and in fact helped relieve pedestrian congestion. The defendant’s Chief of Police allegedly even joined in acknowledging that the terminal relieved sidewalk congestion.

Municipal Measures Challenged

Ordinance No. 1, as described by the trial court, prohibited buses or freight trucks from being allowed along a portion of F. Tanedo Street within the area from the intersection of F. Tanedo and Zamora Streets to the intersection of F. Tanedo Street and the national highway. It required existing terminals within that area to be removed and transferred to other places within a specified period and imposed penalties for violations. It also provided for repeal of conflicting prior ordinances and stated that it would take effect upon approval.

The Provincial Board of Tarlac, through Resolution No. 262, approved the ordinance with modifications by extending the removal or transfer period from thirty (30) days to six (6) months. After that period elapsed, the Municipal Council issued Resolution No. 323 directing the plaintiffs to remove their bus station and transfer it to another place subject to municipal approval within ten (10) days from receipt, warning that further action would be taken under law if they failed to comply.

Trial Court Proceedings and Issues

After the plaintiffs filed their complaint on six May 1952, they sought a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement. The municipality opposed on the ground that enforcement would not cause great or irreparable injury because the plaintiffs could transfer to vacant spaces outside town. After hearing, the Court granted the writ on ten November 1952, conditioned upon the plaintiffs’ filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.

On three December 1952, the municipality answered and specifically denied material allegations while asserting special defenses. It claimed that Ordinance No. 1 was a valid exercise of municipal authority under section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, section 17(j) of the Public Service Act, and section 71 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. It also contended that the terminal was a public nuisance that could be abated even without the ordinance, because its location on a busy street allegedly obstructed the street, inconvenienced the public, and endangered pedestrians. The municipality additionally filed a counterclaim for P10,000 as actual and moral damages, alleging malicious institution of an unfounded suit meant to delay a valid ordinance.

The plaintiffs replied on five December 1952, denying the counterclaim and insisting that the municipality’s actions caused them incalculable damage. After trial and submission of memoranda, the Court rendered judgment on seventeen March 1958 declaring the ordinances null and void, enjoining enforcement, and rendering the preliminary injunction final.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

In its appeal, the municipality assigned errors that, in substance, attacked the trial court’s conclusions: first, that the lower court erred in finding Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 323 discriminatory, unreasonable, and oppressive and therefore void; and second, that the trial court erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that it made permanent in its decision of March 17, 1958.

The municipality defended the measures as legitimate regulation based on the general welfare clause, on the requirement that public utility operators comply with provincial resolutions and municipal ordinances, and on the power of municipal councils to regulate garages and determine where and how vehicles may park. It also argued, alternatively, that the challenged measures could be supported through nuisance abatement principles, particularly that the bus terminal could be abated as a public nuisance.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, insisted that their terminal was lawful, not a nuisance, and properly provided for passenger convenience and traffic flow without causing obstruction. They maintained that the ordinance was arbitrary and oppressive and not grounded on valid municipal authority.

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ bus terminal was not a nuisance per se or per accidens. It relied on the factual finding that the terminal was built of strong materials and equipped with modern toilet facilities. It also found that the plaintiffs employed a janitor assigned to clean the premises and sidewalk and that the terminal’s area permitted buses to ingress and egress without obstructing traffic on F. Tanedo Street.

The trial court further held that the ordinance’s purpose was to prevent plaintiffs’ buses from entering and leaving the terminal in a manner that allegedly disturbed smooth traffic flow and caused congestion. However, the court found that the real traffic obstruction was not caused by the plaintiffs’ bus movements entering and exiting the terminal. It concluded that the congestion resulted from the U-turns and loading and unloading by other vehicles, including carromatas, other buses, midget buses, and jeepneys, on F. Tanedo Street.

The trial court also reasoned that the traffic problem could have been addressed by ordinances prohibiting parking and U-turns on F. Tanedo Street rather than by targeting the plaintiffs’ terminal. It declared that the challenged ordinance had no real connection to public health, safety, or general welfare as claimed, and it further held that Ordinance No. 1 was not a zoning ordinance because it did not establish residential, industrial, or other defined zones.

Finally, the trial court declared the ordinance and resolution null and void and rendered the writ of preliminary injunction final.

Supreme Court Disposition

On nineteen April 1958, the municipality moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on seventeen June 1958. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the judgment on appeal with costs against the municipality.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court treated the appeal as one on questions of law only, making the trial court’s factual findings binding. Against that binding record, the Court tested Ordinance No. 1 by the standard applicable to ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause. It held that the ordinance fell short of the standard required by section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code because it did not satisfy the requirement that the regulation be directed to health, safety, comfort, convenience, and the general welfare.

Relying on the trial court’s findings, the Supreme Court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ terminal was constructed of strong materials, equipped with modern sanitation facilities, and operated with measures to keep premises and sidewalk clean. It also underscored that, at the time of the ordinance, there was no showing of necessity because the location and manner of plaintiffs’ bus movements had not obstructed traffic or created a nuisance. The Court thus sustained the trial court’s view that the municipality’s attempt to justify the ordinance on welfare and traffic grounds was not supported by the ev

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