G.R. No. 157472 - Pacoy vs. Cajigal

Case Summary (G.R. No. 157472)

Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework

The matter was decided under the 1987 Philippine Constitution as the governing charter, with key procedural provisions drawn from the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 110, Section 14 (amendment or substitution of complaint or information) and Rule 119, Section 19 (when mistake has been made in charging the proper offense), and Rule 117, Sections 3 and 7 (grounds to quash and requisites for double jeopardy). The decision treats the constitutional protection against double jeopardy as a fundamental right.

Charges, Original Information and Allegations

An Information for Homicide was filed alleging that on or about 18 March 2002 petitioner, with intent to kill, unlawfully and feloniously shot 2Lt. Frederick Escueta with an armalite rifle, causing multiple gunshot wounds resulting in instantaneous death; the Information also alleged the aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank.”

Arraignment and Trial Schedule

Petitioner was arraigned on September 12, 2002, and, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the homicide charge. The RTC scheduled pre-trial and trial for October 8, 2002.

Judicial Amendment Ordered and Nature of the Amendment

On the same date as arraignment the presiding judge ordered the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to charge Murder, reasoning that the alleged “disregard of rank” qualified the killing to Murder. The prosecutor complied by crossing out “Homicide” and inserting “Murder” in the caption and the opening paragraph; the accusatory portion containing the factual allegations remained unchanged except for a correction in the spelling of the victim’s name.

Objection to Re-arraignment and Entry of Plea

At the scheduled re-arraignment on October 8, 2002, petitioner’s counsel objected that the amendment would place the accused in double jeopardy because the original Homicide case had been terminated without petitioner’s express consent; petitioner refused to plead to the amended Information, and the public respondent entered a plea of not guilty for him.

Motion to Quash and Initial Denial

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash alleging double jeopardy, contending the original Homicide prosecution had been terminated without his consent; in an Order dated October 25, 2002, the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash, reasoning that no acquittal or conviction had occurred, the Information for Homicide had been amended rather than dismissed, and that the “disregard of rank” allegation qualified the killing to Murder.

Motions to Inhibit and for Reconsideration; Reversal of Amendment

Petitioner moved to inhibit the judge and filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 18, 2002 the respondent judge denied the inhibition, granted the Motion for Reconsideration, and reconsidered the October 25 Order; he concluded that “disregard of rank” is a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code and does not elevate Homicide to Murder, and therefore reinstated the original Information charging Homicide.

Petition for Certiorari and Issues Raised

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 raising principally three contentions: (1) that the judge gravely abused his discretion by ordering amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder after arraignment; (2) that denying the Motion to Quash the amended Information constituted grave abuse and violated the law because the original case was terminated without consent; and (3) that reinstating the Homicide Information after it had been terminated again violated the right against double jeopardy.

Positions of the Respondents in the Lower Court Proceedings

The Solicitor General argued that the judge’s reinstatement of the Homicide Information rendered the petition moot, that petitioner failed to establish the requisite elements of double jeopardy (including a valid termination), and that the judge’s initial order was an amendment under Section 14, Rule 110 rather than a substitution or dismissal. Private respondent (victim’s father) maintained there was no grave abuse and that petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy because proceedings under the first information had not commenced and the case had not been dismissed.

Legal Distinction Between Amendment and Substitution

The Court reiterated the established distinction (as articulated in Teehankee v. Madayag and cited authorities): amendment (Section 14, Rule 110) may be formal or substantial and applies where the new information charges the same offense or an offense necessarily included in the original; substitution (the latter paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 read with Rule 119, Section 19) entails dismissal of the original information and filing of a new one where the original charge is wholly different from the offense proved and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged. Substitution requires leave of court and entails re-arraignment, whereas formal amendment before plea may be made without leave and does not prejudice the accused if defenses remain applicable and evidence remains relevant.

Court’s Analysis: Amendment Was Formal, Not Substantial

The Court found the change from “Homicide” to “Murder” was a formal amendment limited to the caption and preamble; the accusatory portion containing factual allegations remained identical. Because the elements and factual allegations were unchanged, the amendment did not alter the prosecution’s theory nor prejudice petitioner’s defense; thus it fit within the category of formal amendment permissible under Section 14, Rule 110 even after arraignment so long as n

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 157472)

Case Citation and Panel

Decision reported at 560 Phil. 598, Third Division, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007.
Ponente: Justice Austria‑Martinez.
Concurring Justices: Ynares‑Santiago (Chairperson), Chico‑Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ.
Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Parties and Case Identity

Petitioner: SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy (spelled Pakoy in a Certification/Verification; corrected in the Information).
Respondent judge: Hon. Afable E. Cajigal, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac.
Private respondent: Col. Olimpio L. Escueta, father of the victim.
Public respondent: People of the Philippines (prosecution).
Criminal Case No.: 02‑42 (RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac).

Underlying Facts Alleged in the Information

Date and place: On or about March 18, 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Allegation: The accused, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita (name later corrected to Escueta), with an armalite rifle, causing multiple gunshot wounds resulting in instantaneous death.
Aggravating circumstance alleged in the original Information: killing in disregard of rank.

Criminal Charge(s) and Arraignment

Original charge: Information for Homicide filed July 4, 2002.
Arraignment: September 12, 2002; petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to Homicide.
RTC setting: Pre‑trial conference and trial set for October 8, 2002.

Motions and Court Actions Prior to Petition

Motu proprio Order dated September 12, 2002: Respondent judge issued an Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank (public respondent registered this as qualifying the crime to Murder).
Prosecutor’s amendment: The prosecutor crossed out the word "Homicide" and wrote "Murder" in the caption and opening paragraph; the accusatory portion remained substantively identical; the victim’s name spelling corrected from "Escuita" to "Escueta."
October 8, 2002: Re‑arraignment for Murder scheduled; petitioner’s counsel objected on double jeopardy grounds, asserting that the Homicide case had been terminated without petitioner’s express consent and that re‑arraignment would place petitioner in double jeopardy.
Public respondent entered a plea of not guilty for petitioner when petitioner refused to plead to the amended Information.
Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings pending its resolution filed by petitioner on October 28, 2002, alleging double jeopardy because the Homicide Information had been terminated without his express consent.
Order dated October 25, 2002: Respondent judge denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash, ruling that (a) a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant; (b) petitioner was not acquitted or convicted of Homicide because the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the case; (c) the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and (d) the allegation of disregard of rank qualified the killing to Murder (the judge so registered).
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with an attached Motion for Reconsideration: alleged the respondent judge acted arbitrarily, capriciously and partially in mandating the amendment; reiterated the contention that the Homicide case was terminated without his express consent and that the amendment was substantial and barred by Section 14, Rule 110 after arraignment; contended that disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance that affects penalty only and does not qualify Homicide to Murder.
Order dated December 18, 2002: Respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration; the order directed that, unless ordered otherwise by the highest court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing the case; further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 was reconsidered and "the original information charging the crime of homicide stands."

Petition for Certiorari: Nature and Relief Sought

Filed by petitioner on April 30, 2003 via Rule 65.
Petitioner sought annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated October 25, 2002 and December 18, 2002 issued by the respondent judge.
Specific grounds alleged in the petition:
- Grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder.
- Grave abuse of discretion and violation of law in denying the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder.
- Grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction and violation of law in ordering reinstatement of the Information for Homicide which petitioner alleged was already terminated.

Petitioner’s Principal Contentions

The September 12, 2002 amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder (based on disregard of rank) violated Section 14, Rule 110 because the amendment was ordered after arraignment and would place petitioner in double jeopardy.
Disregard of rank under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is a generic aggravating circumstance affecting penalty and does not qualify Homicide to Murder; therefore, treating it as qualifying was erroneous.
Even if disregard of rank were a qualifying aggravating circumstance, the amendment effected after arraignment was substantial and not permissible under Section 14, Rule 110.
The termination of the Homicide Information without his express consent constituted termination of the case and thus a bar to further prosecution for the same offense; to try him again for Murder equates to double jeopardy.
Petitioner maintained that the respondent judge did