Title
Ortigas and Co. Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 126102
Decision Date
Dec 4, 2000
A 1976 deed restricted land use to residential until 2025; a 1981 zoning ordinance reclassified it as commercial. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, nullifying the restriction, ruling police power supersedes contractual terms.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 126102)

Key Dates

• August 25, 1976 – Deed of sale executed with restrictive residential‐use covenants (annotated on TCT No. 0737).  
• March 1981 – MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 reclassifies portion of Greenhills from residential to commercial.  
• June 8, 1984 – Mathay leases the lot; constructs a one‐story commercial building.  
• January 18, 1995 – Ortigas files suit in RTC Pasig (Civil Case No. 64931) for demolition and injunctive relief.  
• June 16, 1995 – RTC issues writ of preliminary injunction.  
• March 25, 1996 – CA grants Mathay’s certiorari petition, sets aside injunction.  
• August 13, 1996 – CA denies Ortigas’s motion for reconsideration.  
• December 4, 2000 – Supreme Court issues final decision under the 1987 Constitution.  

Facts of the Case

  1. Ortigas sold a residential lot to Hermoso in 1976, embedding covenants (exclusive residential use, single-family building, seller’s approval of plans) running until December 31, 2025.
  2. In 1981, MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 reclassified that portion of Greenhills as commercial.
  3. In 1984, Mathay leased the lot and erected a commercial structure for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc. without seller’s approval.
  4. Ortigas sued in 1995, obtained a preliminary injunction; Mathay challenged this by certiorari in the CA, alleging the zoning ordinance nullified the restrictions.

Procedural History

• RTC Pasig issued a writ of preliminary injunction against commercial use.
• Mathay petitioned the CA for certiorari, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC in ignoring MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
• CA granted the petition (Mar 25, 1996), nullifying the injunction; denied reconsideration (Aug 13, 1996).
• Ortigas elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented

  1. Whether MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, a police‐power measure, retroactively extinguished the 1976 residential‐use covenants.
  2. Whether Mathay, as a lessee and stranger to the deed, had locus standi to challenge the restrictive covenants.

Applicable Law

• 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 10 – Non-impairment of contracts; police power exception.
• Civil Code (Arts. 1159, 1306, 525) – Sanctity of contract; stipulations contrary to law/public policy are void; concepts of possession.
• Torrens system – Annotations on certificate of title.
• Jurisprudence – Police‐power legislation may be read into existing contracts (Phil. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor Gen.; Presley v. Bel-Air Village Ass’n; Sangalang v. IAC).

Court’s Analysis

  1. Retroactivity of Police Power
    – General rule: statutes are prospective (lex prospicit), and contracts are governed by laws in force at execution.
    – Exception: valid police‐power measures may operate retroactively and impair vested rights.
    – MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 was upheld as legitimate police power in Sangalang v. IAC. It reclassified urban residential land to commercial, thereby extinguishing contrary covenants.
    – Unlike agricultural zones in Co v. IAC, the Greenhills reclassification explicitly affected existing residential parcels, and contractual restrictions cannot override police power.

  2. Locus Standi of the Lessee
    – Real party in interest: one who stands to gain or lose from the suit’s outcome (Rules of Court, Rule 3, S



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