Title
Orosa vs. Roa
Case
G.R. No. 140423
Decision Date
Jul 14, 2006
A dentist sued another for libel over an article questioning exam integrity; DOJ reversed prosecution, CA dismissed appeal, SC upheld, citing procedural errors.
libel complaint
dentist
licensure examination

Case Summary (G.R. No. 140423)

Factual Background

On November 27, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit for libel with the Pasig City Prosecution Office, docketed as I.S. No. 96-5442. The complaint was anchored on respondent’s article “Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa,” published in the March–April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post. Petitioner alleged that the article was defamatory because it implied the possibility that a father—who was allegedly an examiner in a licensure examination for dentistry where his sons were examinees—manipulated the examinations or the results to enable his children to top the same.

Respondent denied that the article was libelous. He argued that it was a fair and accurate report on matters of both public and social concern and insisted that it was not written with malice, but with a sincere purpose of contributing to the improvement of the integrity of professional examinations. After preliminary investigation, Pasig City Prosecutor Noel Paz issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner’s complaint. The dismissal was premised on the determination that the publication constituted a bona fide communication on matters of public concern and was made without malice, thereby entitling respondent to protection under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

Administrative and Trial Court Progression

Petitioner appealed the City Prosecutor’s dismissal to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno issued a Resolution that set aside the City Prosecutor’s findings and directed the filing of an Information for libel against respondent. In obedience to that directive, an Information for libel was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 114517.

Respondent then appealed to the Secretary of Justice. On October 28, 1998, then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuno Resolution and directed the Pasig City Prosecutor to withdraw the previously filed Information. The Pasig City Prosecution Office complied by filing a Motion to Withdraw Information in court. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but the Secretary of Justice denied it in his Resolution dated May 12, 1999.

Petition to the Court of Appeals and Its Dismissal

Petitioner proceeded to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53190. The CA dismissed the petition on July 8, 1999. It reasoned that the Pasig City Prosecution Office and the DOJ were not among the quasi-judicial agencies listed under Section 1, Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are reviewable by the CA. The CA further held that the Supreme Court, in approving the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Bar Matter No. 803 via an En Banc Resolution dated April 8, 1997, did not include final orders or resolutions issued by these agencies as appealable under Rule 43. Thus, the CA stated it could not supply what it considered an omission in the rules, since doing so would allegedly encroach upon the Supreme Court’s rule-making power. With the CA’s denial of reconsideration on October 14, 1999, petitioner elevated the controversy to the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner argued that the CA erred in holding that resolutions of the DOJ are not reviewable under Rule 43. He also contended that the CA found his Rule 43 petition prematurely filed, and that the CA should have treated the challenge as reviewable under Rule 65. On his view, the CA also failed to resolve the petition on the merits, including that respondent’s appeal from the DOJ dated January 22, 1998 was allegedly fatally defective, and that respondent’s article was allegedly defamatory, malicious, and not protected by the mantle of privileged matter.

At the core, the Supreme Court framed the question as whether a petition for review under Rule 43 was the proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to withdraw an Information in a criminal case.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Mode of Review

The Court held that petitioner’s thesis that Rule 43 intended to cover “all quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions” did not prevail. Rule 43, the Court explained, governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and from quasi-judicial bodies enumerated in Section 1, which includes multiple offices and agencies, and employs the phrase “among these agencies”. The Court acknowledged that the enumeration in Section 1 was not stated as formally exclusive, yet it concluded that the DOJ’s exclusion was deliberate and consistent with the President’s constitutional power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution.

The Court emphasized that the power of control allows the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what subordinates, including Cabinet members and heads of line agencies, have done. Given that the Secretary of Justice acted under the President’s control, the Court ruled that the decision of the Secretary of Justice is subject to review by the President rather than by the CA. It applied the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, reasoning that when an appeal or remedy is available within the administrative machinery, it must be resorted to before court intervention becomes proper. The Court stated that immediate resort to court would be premature and precipitous, subject only to recognized exceptions.

The Court also observed that Section 1, Rule 43 expressly includes the Office of the President, which underscored the rule that where the assailed ruling came from a department head, the matter must first reach and be resolved by the Office of the President before appellate recourse to the courts may be availed of.

In that setting, the Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve whether a preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial or whether the Secretary of Justice performs quasi-judicial functions when reviewing a prosecutor’s findings. The Court pointed out that preliminary investigation is inquisitorial, not adjudicative. Citing Santos v. Go, and referencing the principle stated in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated that the prosecutor in preliminary investigation does not determine guilt or innocence and does not exercise adjudication or rule-making functions; the prosecutor merely determines whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to justify the filing of charges. The courts ultimately pass judgment on the accused.

Prematurity and the Proper Remedy Before the RTC

Beyond the mode-of-review issue, the Court adopted and quoted the CA’s reasoning that the petition was premature. The CA noted that the Information for libel, docketed as C

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