Title
Opriasa vs. City Government of Quezon City
Case
G.R. No. 149190
Decision Date
Dec 19, 2006
Quezon City sought reconstitution of a fire-destroyed title in 1990. Petitioners, claiming lack of notice and fraud, challenged the 1991 reconstitution order in 1997. SC upheld jurisdiction, no fraud, and ruled petition time-barred.
petition for review
trial court
reconstitution

Case Summary (G.R. No. 149190)

Factual Background: Filing and Grant of Reconstitution

Respondent, represented by former City Mayor Brigido R. Simon, Jr., filed on 15 June 1990 a petition for reconstitution docketed as LRC Case No. Q-4146(90). Respondent claimed that J.M. Tuason donated to respondent on 12 July 1973 the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23110 (TCT No. 23110), registered earlier in the name of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Respondent asserted that the original TCT No. 23110 was among the documents destroyed by the fire that razed the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 11 June 1988. Respondent sought reconstitution under Section 3(c) of RA 26 based on a certified true copy of TCT No. 23110 issued by the Register of Deeds on 5 January 1987.

The trial court scheduled the case for hearing on 8 November 1990. Notice of hearing was published in the 10 and 17 September 1990 issues of the Official Gazette and posted at the lobby of Quezon City Hall and on the bulletin board outside the trial court on 2 July 1990. Copies of the notice were furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Bureau of Lands, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, and the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor.

At the 8 November 1990 hearing, because no opposition had been filed, the trial court issued a general order of default against the whole world except the government and permitted respondent to present evidence ex parte. Respondent presented a certification that the original TCT No. 23110 was destroyed in the 11 June 1988 fire. It also presented the deed of donation and deed of acceptance to demonstrate respondent’s real interest over the property.

On 13 November 1990, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority informed the trial court that the technical description of the lots was not clear and could not be verified. The Administrator requested that respondent submit a clear and legible copy of the certified true copy of TCT No. 23110 to enable the LRA to render a report on the technical description. Without waiting for such report, the trial court issued an Order dated 13 March 1991 granting reconstitution and ordering the reconstitution of TCT No. 23110. The 13 March 1991 Order became final on 17 April 1991. The Register of Deeds issued to respondent TCT No. RT-28565(23110).

Petitioners’ Discovery of the Reconstituted Title and Their Annulment Petition

In the latter part of 1996, petitioner Opriasa learned, during verification of land records with the LRA and the Register of Deeds, of the issuance of TCT No. RT-28565. On 2 October 1997, petitioners, claiming to be occupants and possessors of portions of Block 416, Barangay Manresa, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the 13 March 1991 Order with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

Petitioners anchored their annulment petition on alleged lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. They contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because respondent failed to disclose petitioners’ actual possession and occupancy, as allegedly required by Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26. They further alleged extrinsic fraud, asserting that they were not notified of the reconstitution petition and were therefore deprived of their day in court. Petitioners also argued that the trial court acted without jurisdiction by failing to comply with Section 8 of LRC Circular No. 35. They additionally attacked the 13 March 1991 Order, asserting that the trial court ordered reconstitution “in the name of the Quezon City Government” and that there was a discrepancy in the property area as stated in the Order and in the notice of hearing.

Respondent, in its Comment dated 23 December 1997, denied extrinsic fraud by asserting that petitioners had always been aware of the reconstitution proceedings. Respondent also maintained that the 13 March 1991 Order had become final and executory long before petitioners filed their annulment petition, and that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals issued its Decision on 31 July 2000, dismissing petitioners’ petition and affirming the trial court’s 13 March 1991 Order. It held that there had been compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of RA 26. It further found no extrinsic fraud. Even assuming extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals ruled that the action would still fail for having been filed beyond the allowable period.

The Court of Appeals relied on Section 3, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that when based on extrinsic fraud, an action must be filed within four (4) years from discovery. It observed that petitioners’ allegations about discovery were inconsistent: in the original petition petitioners claimed they were not personally notified, but they did not state how and when they learned of the reconstitution proceedings. Only in the amended petition did they allege that discovery occurred “only lately,” when petitioner Opriasa was verifying land records before the LRA and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and that therefore the petition was filed within four years from the alleged 1996 discovery.

The Court of Appeals compared the parties’ narratives and found respondent’s evidence more credible. It also noted as an undisputed fact that petitioner Opriasa had been a barangay official at the subject property since 1988, and therefore could not plausibly claim ignorance of the development program (“pabahay plan”) of respondent city government and, by implication, of the reconstitution move since the time frame preceded the alleged discovery. It concluded that petitioners’ prolonged inaction amounted to negligence, which did not warrant equitable relief.

Petitioners sought reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its 18 July 2001 Resolution, prompting the present Rule 45 petition.

Issues Raised Before the Supreme Court

Petitioners presented the following issues: whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution petition despite the alleged lack of actual notice to occupants or persons in possession; whether there was extrinsic fraud; whether the period to file a petition for annulment had already prescribed; whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it issued the 13 March 1991 Order without waiting for the LRA report; and whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it (a) ordered reconstitution “in the name of the Quezon City Government,” and (b) proceeded despite alleged discrepancies in the stated property area between the Order and the notice of hearing.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: Petition Denied

The Court held that the petition had no merit and denied it. It affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 July 2000 and its Resolution dated 18 July 2001.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: RA 26 Notice Requirements as Mandatory and Jurisdictional

The Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Where the statute confers authority and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, compliance is required or the proceedings become void. Under Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, the Court held that the special requirements and procedure must be complied with before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution. Failure to comply renders the proceedings and the decision approving reconstitution void.

The Court reiterated the mandatory elements: publication of the notice twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette at the petitioner’s expense; posting at least thirty days prior to hearing at the main entrance of the provincial building and the municipal building of the city or municipality where the land is situated; the notice’s contents including the number of lost or destroyed certificates of title if known, the registered owner’s name, the names of occupants or persons in possession, adjoining owners, and all other interested parties, and the property’s location, area, and boundaries; and the date by which interested persons must appear and file their claims or objections. The Court also identified as mandatory the sending of a copy of the notice by registered mail or otherwise at the petitioner’s expense to every person named whose address was known, at least thirty days prior to hearing, and submission at hearing of proof of publication, posting, and service as directed by the court.

Notice to Occupants or Persons in Possession and Petitioners’ Alleged Status

On the issue of actual notice, the Court recognized that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, occupants of the property should be notified. It found that the notice of hearing and the case records did not show that petitioners, who claimed to be occupants or persons in possession, were notified of the reconstitution petition. Petitioners therefore asserted lack of jurisdiction due to absence of notice.

The Court, however, assessed petitioners’ own admission regarding possession. Petitioners admitted that on 19 June 1989, they filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2768 against respondent for Recovery of Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction involving about 20,000 square meters of the property. The Court treated this as an admission that petitioners were no longer in possession when respondent filed the reconstitution petition on 15 June 1990. On that basis, the Court concluded that there was no need to notify petitioners as they were not the occupants or persons in possession entitled to the notice requirement. Since petitioners were not entitled to notice, the Court further held that they could not successfully claim extrinsic fraud premised on deprivation of notice and opportunity to be heard.

LRC Circular No. 35 and Non-Waiting for the LRA Report

Petitioners

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