Case Summary (G.R. No. 127685)
Administrative Order No. 308
- Creates a decentralized Identification Reference System among basic-service and social-security agencies.
- Constitutes an Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) chaired by the Executive Secretary.
- Designates the National Computer Center as IACC secretariat.
- Mandates use of the NSO’s Population Reference Number (PRN) and unspecified biometrics standards to link agency databases.
- Directs tri-media information campaigns, funding from agency budgets, and regular status reports to the President.
Petitioner’s Grounds for Challenge
- Legislative Usurpation – AO 308 creates substantive law on identification systems and thus intrudes on Congress’s exclusive legislative power.
- Appropriation Power – Funding implementation from agency budgets violates Congress’s exclusive power to appropriate public funds.
- Right to Privacy – The order’s data-linkage scheme and unspecified biometric encoding threaten protected privacy zones under the Bill of Rights.
Respondents’ Counterarguments
- Non-justiciability – No justiciable controversy until implementing rules are issued.
- Valid Executive Action – AO 308 falls squarely within the President’s executive and administrative powers as head of the bureaucracy.
- Budgetary Authority – Agencies may fund their own programs from existing appropriations; no usurpation of Congress’s power.
- Privacy Protection – The order’s identification measures are voluntary and designed to prevent fraud, not to invade privacy.
Standing and Ripeness
- Senatorial Standing – Citing Philconsa v. Enriquez and other precedents, a Senator has standing to challenge executive encroachments on legislative power.
- Taxpayer/Member Standing – As a GSIS member and taxpayer, petitioner may contest agency misapplication of funds.
- Ripeness – Although implementing guidelines are pending, respondents have commenced implementation (e.g., SSS bid for ID cards), rendering the challenge neither hypothetical nor premature.
Separation of Powers: Legislative vs. Executive
- Legislative Power (Art. VI, § 1) resides in Congress: authority to make, alter and repeal laws.
- Executive Power (Art. VII, § 1) resides in the President: power to enforce and administer laws.
- Administrative Power (Administrative Code, Book III, Tit. I, Ch. 2, § 3) permits the President to issue orders to implement existing statutes, but not to enact substantive policy beyond legislative intent.
- AO 308 transcends mere implementation; it establishes new legal rights and duties, a function reserved for Congress.
Nature and Scope of Administrative Orders
- Administrative orders must “relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of [the President’s] duties as administrative head.”
- AO 308 does not simply implement an existing law (e.g., the Administrative Code); it formulates an entirely new nationwide identification policy requiring legislative enactment.
Right to Privacy under the 1987 Constitution
- Expressly protected in Article III:
• § 3(1): “privacy of communication … shall be inviolable …”
• § 2: protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• § 1, 6, 8, 17: due process, travel, association, self-incrimination. - Right to privacy also enshrined in Civil Code (Art. 26, 32, 723), Revised Penal Code (Arts. 229, 280, 290-292) and special laws (Anti-Wiretapping, Bank Secrecy, IP Code).
Privacy Intrusions, Biometrics, and Data Linkage
- Biometric methods (fingerprint, retinal scan, facial thermogram, voice print) allow precise identification but also carry risks of exhaustive personal dossiers.
- AO 308 is silent on which biometrics will be used, what data will be collected, who controls access, and what safeguards apply.
- Potential abuses include tracking movements (impairing liberty of abode/travel), self-incrimination, “fishing expeditions,” data leakage, manipulation, and denial of confidentiality.
Standard of Review and Strict Scrutiny
- When fundamental rights (privacy, freedom of thought) are at stake, government actions must satisfy:
- Compelling state interest.
- Narrowly tailored measures.
- AO 308’s stated interests (service convenience, fraud prevention, population data) are debatable; its breadth and
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 127685)
Facts
- On December 12, 1996 President Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 adopting a National Computerized Identification Reference System (NCIRS).
- A.O. No. 308 established:
• A decentralized Identification Reference System among key basic services and social security providers
• An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) chaired by the Executive Secretary, with heads of PMO, NEDA, DILG, DOH, GSIS, SSS, NSO, NCC as members
• NCC as Secretariat to provide administrative and technical support
• Use of the Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by NSO as common linkage among agencies, with standards for biometrics technology and computer application design
• A tri-media information campaign coordinated by the Press Secretary, NSO, GSIS and SSS
• Funding to be sourced from respective agency budgets and regular reports to the President through IACC - A.O. No. 308 was published January 22–23, 1997; petitioner filed the petition on January 24, 1997.
- April 8, 1997: Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining implementation.
Issues
- Standing and justiciability: Can Senator Ople, as taxpayer and GSIS member, challenge A.O. No. 308 before implementing rules exist?
- Separation of powers: Does A.O. No. 308 usurp Congress’s exclusive legislative power?
- Appropriation of funds: Does funding via agency budgets invade Congress’s power to appropriate public funds?
- Right to privacy: Does A.O. No. 308 impermissibly intrude on the constitutional right to privacy and set the groundwork for other Bill of Rights violations?
Petitioner’s Contentions
- A.O. No. 308 creates a nationwide ID system that is legislative in nature and must be enacted by Congress.
- Funding through agency budgets is an unconstitutional usurpation of Congress’s appropriation power.
- The System is vague, overbroad and grants roving authority to gather, store and link sensitive personal data—biometric, financial, medical—threatening privacy, freedom of movement, self-incrimination