Title
Supreme Court
Ongkingco vs. Sugiyama
Case
G.R. No. 217787
Decision Date
Sep 18, 2019
Petitioners convicted under B.P. 22 for bouncing checks; Socorro upheld, Marie Paz acquitted due to lack of notice. Addendum did not extinguish debt.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 217787)

Facts and Background

Sugiyama invested P2,200,000.00 in New Rhia Car Services, Inc. under a Contract Agreement dated April 6, 2001, entitling him to monthly dividends of P90,675.00 for five years. The petitioners issued six checks to cover these dividends; the first three were honored, but the last three bounced due to insufficient funds. Additionally, Socorro obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from Sugiyama under a Memorandum of Agreement dated October 2001, issuing a check for P525,000.00 as a guarantee, which was also dishonored. A formal demand letter for payment was served but went unheeded, prompting Sugiyama to file separate criminal cases for four counts of violation of B.P. 22.

Charges and Trial Court Decisions

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) convicted both petitioners for four counts of violating B.P. 22, imposing fines totaling P500,000.00 and ordering them to jointly and severally pay Sugiyama the face value of the dishonored checks amounting to P797,025.00, plus 12% interest per annum from April 11, 2002, until full payment. The claim was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Essential Elements of B.P. 22 Violation

To sustain a conviction under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt:

  1. The making, drawing, or issuance of a check to apply on account or for value.
  2. Knowledge by the issuer at the time of issuance of insufficient funds or credit in the drawee bank to pay the check in full.
  3. Subsequent dishonor of the check due to insufficient funds or credit.

Prosecution's Evidence and Findings

The MeTC and CA found that the petitioners issued the four checks as a guarantee and consideration for the loan and dividends owed to Sugiyama. The checks were dishonored upon presentment for insufficient funds ("Drawn Against Insufficient Funds"). The prosecution presented evidence that the demand letter notifying the dishonor was received by Socorro's secretary with Socorro’s implied permission, fulfilling the notice requirement under Section 2 of B.P. 22. Petitioners failed to dispute these facts with credible evidence or evidence of payment or arrangement within five banking days after receipt of the dishonor notice.

On Notice of Dishonor and Knowledge Element

The Court emphasized that receipt of notice of dishonor is crucial in establishing the issuer’s knowledge of insufficient funds. The secretary of Socorro acknowledged receipt of the demand letter with Socorro’s permission, constituting valid notice. Socorro’s mere denial without presenting contradictory evidence, such as testimony of the secretary, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of receipt. Conversely, the prosecution failed to prove notice of dishonor to Marie Paz, as there was no evidence that notice was served upon her or that her secretary received it on her behalf with authorization.

Authority to File Informations and Procedural Issues

A dissenting opinion argued that the Informations were defective for having been filed without prior written authority from the city prosecutor, citing Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires such approval to confer jurisdiction. The dissent relied on precedents where lack of authorization constituted a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal. The majority ruled this objection was waived due to petitioners’ failure to raise it earlier via motion to quash and attributed laches for the delay in asserting this procedural defect. It also found that the 1st Assistant City Prosecutor approved the filing "for the City Prosecutor," and presumption of authority applied. The Court held that procedural defects relating to signature or delegation in filing may be cured by amendment or approval, especially if not timely objected.

Corporate Liability and Personal Liability of Officers

Under B.P. 22, corporate officers who sign and issue dishonored corporate checks are personally liable for criminal and civil liability. Socorro bound herself personally to the payment of dividends and loan obligations via agreements and was found personally liable. The Court stressed that corporate officers can only be civilly liable if convicted criminally for such violations. Moreover, since Marie Paz was acquitted for lack of proof that she received notice of dishonor, she could not be held civilly liable for the dishonored checks. The Court also noted that Socorro was not shown to have been authorized by corporate board resolution or secretary’s certificate to fix dividends, obtain loans, or adopt payment schedules, making her acts arg


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