G.R. No. L-61042 - Ong vs. Tating

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-61042)

Factual Background

HECTOR L. ONG instituted an action of desahucio against his lessee, Evangeline Roces, in the City Court of Quezon City (Civil Case No. 28309). The case was later decided by the Court of First Instance (Branch XVIII) which set aside the City Court judgment and rendered judgment ordering defendant Evangeline Roces and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises at 169-D Tolentino St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; to pay rentals in arrears of P10,920.00 as of September 1978 and P260.00 monthly thereafter with 12% interest; and to pay attorney’s fees and costs. That judgment became final and executory.

Execution and Sheriff’s Levy

Upon remand of the records to the City Court, plaintiff Ong applied for execution and the sheriff enforced the judgment by clearing the premises. The sheriff seized certain chattels found in the premises, specifically a “Citizen” stereo set, a “Sanyo” television set, a “Frigidaire” refrigerator, and a “Hitachi” electric desk fan. Among those evicted were Anacleto Tating, Marilyn Tating, and Robert Tating, who had been residing in the leased premises with Evangeline Roces.

Third-Party Claims and Motions in City Court

MARILYN TATING and ROBERT TATING filed claims asserting ownership of the levied appliances in accordance with Section 17, Rule 39, Rules of Court. Robert lodged a Third Party Claim dated September 13, 1979 for the stereo; Marilyn filed a similar claim for the remaining appliances. When relief was not obtained from the sheriff, they filed identical motions in the City Court dated September 17, 1979 entitled “Urgent Motion for Suspension of Sheriff Sale and for Release of Properties Wrongfully Levied Upon on Execution,” praying for abatement of the auction sale then scheduled and for release of the goods to the rightful owners after hearing.

Protective Bond and City Court Restraint

To forestall the Tatings’ motions from obstructing the scheduled execution sale, Ong posted two surety bonds intended to indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages under Section 17, Rule 39. Despite the posting of bonds, the City Court, by order dated September 19, 1979, restrained the sale and set the Tatings’ motions for hearing. Ong then filed an “Omnibus Opposition” contending that the third-party motions should have been filed before the Court of First Instance because it had rendered the executory decision, and that the Tatings’ remedy lay in suing on the indemnity bonds after auction.

Motion to Inhibit and City Court Order

Ong filed a Motion to Inhibit dated January 9, 1980, which the City Court denied by Order dated January 23, 1980. The City Court also directed Ong’s counsel to explain allegedly contumacious statements in the motion. The City Court set the continuation of the hearing for February 11, 1980.

Petition for Certiorari and CFI’s Interim and Final Rulings

Ong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance on February 7, 1980. The CFI (Branch IX) issued an April 2, 1980 Order directing maintenance of the status quo and enjoining the City Court from hearing and deciding the third‑party claims and the motion for suspension of sheriff sale until resolution of the injunction. Thereafter, the CFI rendered a decision dated December 15, 1981 holding that the third‑party claims should not be entertained by the executing court because the Tatings were strangers to the ejectment action and had other remedies; the CFI declared Ong entitled to relief and ordered the preliminary injunction made permanent.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals and Its Ruling

The Tatings appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review filed March 1, 1982. The Court of Appeals noted that the proceedings in the CFI had exceeded the narrow issue of the propriety of denial of the motion to inhibit by delving into the merits of execution, levy, third‑party claim, indemnity bond, and sheriff’s bond. The Court of Appeals set aside the CFI decision insofar as it improperly adjudicated matters beyond the inhibition question, remanded the case to the City Court, and found that the denial of the motion to inhibit was well taken.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

On further appeal, Ong presented three principal contentions: first, that the Tatings’ proper mode of appeal from the CFI decision was by writ of error to the Court of Appeals rather than by petition for review; second, that the City Court lost jurisdiction to decide the Tatings’ third‑party claims once Ong posted the indemnity bonds prescribed by Section 17, Rule 39; and third, that the Tatings’ sole remedy, in the event of adverse rulings by the executing court, was a separate action to recover against the indemnity bonds for damages.

Analysis of Mode of Appeal

The Court agreed with Ong that the Tatings should have appealed the CFI’s certiorari judgment by ordinary appeal (writ of error) under Rule 41, Rules of Court and provisions cited from B.P. Blg. 129 and the Interim Rules, because the CFI had acted in its original jurisdiction. The Court explained that a “petition for review” is the procedure for appeals when the CFI sits in appellate capacity. The Court nonetheless held that the Tatings’ erroneous use of a petition for review to the Court of Appeals was immaterial because the defect had been waived and the Court of Appeals had proceeded to resolve the matters presented.

Jurisdictional Effect of Posting the Indemnity Bond

The Court rejected Ong’s contention that posting the judgment creditor’s bond under Section 17, Rule 39 divested the executing court of jurisdiction to supervise execution or to hear complaints that the sheriff had levied third‑party property. The Court reaffirmed that the trial court retains plenary supervisory authority over enforcement of its judgments. The executing court may act on motions for execution, determine exemption from execution, fix value of claimed property, require posting of bond, quash writs, examine judgment debtors, and otherwise supervise the sheriff and other court officers. The indemnity bond did not divest the court of supervisory power; it operated instead to transfer potential civil responsibility to the indemnitor and sureties while leaving the court competent to correct wrongful seizures and to restore property to rightful possessors after summary hearing.

Proper Remedies of Third‑Party Claimants under Section 17, Rule 39

The Court explained that a third‑party claimant who alleges wrongful levy has two distinct remedies. First, the claimant may invoke the executing court’s supervisory authority to determine whether the sheriff acted improperly and, upon summary hearing, order restoration of property if the levy was mistaken. Such an action does not reach title with fina

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-61042)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Hector L. Ong was the petitioner seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and perpetual inhibition of the City Judge from hearing third-party claims.
Marilyn Tating and Robert Tating were respondents who claimed ownership of chattels levied in execution and sought their release.
The ejectment action originated in the City Court of Quezon City, which judgment was set aside and replaced by a judgment of the Court of First Instance (Branch XVIII) ordering eviction and payment of rentals in arrears.
The CFI decision became final and executory and was remanded to the City Court for execution.
After execution, the City Court issued orders restraining sale and set hearings on the Tatings' motions and denied Ong’s Motion to Inhibit.
Ong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance (Branch IX) which issued a preliminary injunction and later permanently enjoined the City Court from hearing the third-party claims.
The Tatings appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the CFI certiorari decision in part and remanded the case to the City Court, prompting Ong’s present appeal under Rule 45, Rules of Court.

Key Factual Allegations

The CFI judgment ordered Evangeline Roces and all persons claiming under her to vacate premises at 169-D Tolentino St., Quezon City, and to pay rentals in arrears of P10,920.00 as of September 1978 and P260.00 per month thereafter with interest at 12% and P1,000.00 attorney's fees.
The sheriff executed the eviction and levied on four chattels: a "Citizen" stereo set, a "Sanyo" television set, a "Frigidaire" refrigerator, and a "Hitachi" electric desk fan.
Marilyn and Robert Tating alleged that the levied appliances belonged to them and not to the lessee and filed third-party claims with the sheriff and subsequently identical motions in the City Court titled Urgent Motion for Suspension of Sheriff Sale and for Release of Properties Wrongfully Levied Upon on Execution.
Ong posted two surety bonds to indemnify the sheriff pursuant to Section 17, Rule 39, Rules of Court and filed an Omnibus Opposition arguing that the third-party claims should have been filed in the CFI and that the Tatings’ remedy was an action for damages against the bond.
The City Court restrained the sale and scheduled hearings, and later denied Ong’s Motion to Inhibit, ordering counsel to explain alleged contemptus remarks.

Procedural History

The City Court rendered an initial judgment; the CFI (Branch XVIII) set aside that judgment and rendered the eviction and money judgment which became final.
Execution was directed by the City Court and sheriff’s levy ensued resulting in third-party claims by the Tatings.
Ong sought relief by certiorari and prohibition in CFI Branch IX, which issued a preliminary injunction on April 2, 1980 and later a decision on December 15, 1981 making that injunction permanent.
The Tatings filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals on March 1, 1982, and the Court of Appeals on June 23, 1982 dismissed the petition and remanded the case to the City Court for further proceedings.
Ong filed the present petition to the Supreme Court seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals and perpetual inhibition of the City Judge.

Issues Presented

Whether an inferior court had jurisdiction to hear third-party claims impugning the sheriff’s execution of a final judgment.
Whether the posting of indemnity bonds under Section 17, Rule 39 divested the executing court of jurisdiction over third-party claims.
Whether the Tatings’ proper remedy was to bring a separate action for recovery and damages against the bond and the sheriff.
Whether the City Judge should have been inhibited from participating in further proceedings.
Whether the Tatings were liable for payment of rents jointly or solidarily with the lessee.

Contentions of the Parties

Ong maintained three principal contentions: that the Tatings’ appeal to the Court of Appeals should have been by writ of error and not by petition for review; that posting the indemnity bond divested the trial court of jurisdiction o