Title
Cabili vs. Balindong
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
Decision Date
Sep 6, 2011
In an administrative case, Judge Rasad G. Balindong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TRO that interfered with the execution of a judgment from another co-equal court, resulting in a fine of P30,000.
administrative complaint
gross ignorance
grave abuse
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 161042)

Factual Background

Civil Case No. 06-2954 was an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against Mindanao State University (MSU) and others, arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others. On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision holding MSU liable for damages amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Iligan City RTC Decision, and the CA Decision lapsed to finality. An Entry of Judgment was made on January 19, 2009.

On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. MSU did not comply. Thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on MSU’s depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch. Although the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the motion for execution, the opposition was raised belatedly; the Iligan City RTC denied the OSG opposition in an Order dated March 31, 2009.

In response, MSU filed on April 1, 2009 with the RTC, Marawi City—where the case was raffled to Branch 8 presided over by the respondent judge—a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The respondent judge set the hearing for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009. After hearing, the respondent judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSU’s LBP-Marawi City Branch account.

On April 17, 2009, the respondent judge held a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and required MSU to file a memorandum. On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the case. The complainant, Atty. Cabili, subsequently filed the administrative complaint on May 8, 2009, asserting that the respondent judge interfered with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing a TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing the judgment amount.

Office of the Court Administrator Investigation and Recommendations

The respondent judge denied that he interfered with Branch 6. He explained that he only gave the parties an opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference among courts of co-equal jurisdiction. The OCA recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting it was the respondent judge’s second offense.

The Court thereafter re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they would submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records. Atty. Cabili complied on April 19, 2010 by manifesting that he learned from reliable sources that the respondent judge was “basically a good Judge” and that “an admonition will probably suffice.” The respondent judge filed his manifestation on September 28, 2010.

The Parties’ Positions in the Administrative Case

The complainant maintained that the respondent judge acted in a manner that interfered with the execution phase of a final judgment of a co-equal court. The respondent judge maintained that his actions did not amount to interference, and he pointed to his dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction as a corrective step.

Legal Issues Framed by the Court

The determinative issue was whether the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law and related administrative offenses when he issued a TRO restraining enforcement activity—specifically garnishment—during the execution stage of a final judgment issued by a co-equal court of concurrent jurisdiction.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court held that the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court was an elementary principle in the administration of justice. The Court stated that no court may interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction that possesses the authority to grant the relief sought by the injunction.

The Court anchored the rule on jurisdiction. It emphasized that once a court acquires jurisdiction, renders judgment, and proceeds to execution, it retains authority over its judgment and its incidents, including the control of ministerial officers acting in connection with the judgment. The Court reiterated jurisprudentially that when an execution order has been issued, the execution proceedings are still proceedings in the same suit. The issuing court has inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. The Court reasoned that splitting jurisdiction over incidents arising in execution proceedings is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Applying these principles, the Court considered the respondent judge’s issuance of a TRO as clear disregard of judicial stability. It held that the respondent judge issued a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing garnishment of the judgment amount from MSU’s account in LBP at Marawi City. The Court found that the respondent judge was aware he was acting over matters pertaining to the execution stage of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court, as shown by his quotation of MSU’s allegations in the April 8, 2009 Order.

The Court further explained that the respondent judge should have refrained from acting because Branch 6 retained jurisdiction to rule on questions involving enforcement of the writ of execution. It ruled that Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (on terceria) did not fit the case because it applies to claims by a third person other than the judgment obligor or his agent. It distinguished that context by noting that a third-party claimant may seek temporary relief from another court exercising jurisdiction over the separate claim. Here, however, the petition for injunction was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor.

The Court held that MSU’s proper recourse, after denial of its opposition in the Iligan City RTC, was not to seek intervention from a co-equal court but to elevate the matter to the proper reviewing forum. It recognized that alleged irregularities in enforcement may be assailed in the issuing court or attacked through a higher court via a proper special civil action for certiorari, as the constitutional judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 authorizes. The Court added that it was not a viable position to argue that a TRO issued against an erring sheriff, rather than against the issuing judge, would negate interference. It held that a TRO enjoining enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff, and that a sheriff’s duty in enforcing writs is ministerial, not discretionary.

The Court rejected the respondent judge’s eventual dismissal of the petition as a defense. It emphasized that familiarity with the rules governing interference with the acts of a co-equal court is fundamental. It noted the practical consequence that members of the public could take from the respondent judge’s action the impression that an official act of the Iligan City RTC could be thwarted by resort to the Marawi City RTC, despite their co-equal status.

The Court also refused to treat the complainant’s later manifestation that the respondent judge was “basically a good Judge” as determinative. It ruled that liability and penalty depended on the facts alleged and proven and on the applicable law and jurisprudence, not on the personal assessment of the complainant. It stated that when the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes the office to know and apply it, and failure amounts to gross ignorance of the law.

Doctrinal Takeaway and Penalty

The Court applied A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the amendment to Rule 140 on discipline of justices and judges. It treated gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension without salary for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal, depending on circumstances.

Given the attendant circumstances and noting that the respondent judge had a prior offense, the Court imposed a fine. It held that P30,000.00 was the appropriate penalty, characterizing the imposition as an act of leniency, since the maximum fine of P40,000.00 could have been imposed, or suspension could have been considered due to the second offense.

Disposition of the Supreme Court

The Court found Judge Rasad G. Balindong Guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and fined him P30,000.00, with a stern warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

All justices concurred except Justice Bersamin, who joined the dissent of Justice Abad, and Justice Perez, who took no part. The decision noted that the dissent addressed the propriety of the penalty and the characterization of the TRO’s effect on execution.

Dissenting Perspective (Justice Abad)

In the dissent, Justice Abad questioned the imposition of a fine of P40,000.00. The dissent framed the matter as whethe

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