Title
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes
Case
G.R. No. 170512
Decision Date
Oct 5, 2011
Ombudsman petitioned for review after Reyes was found guilty of grave misconduct for extorting fees for driver's licenses; the appellate court reversed the ruling for lack of evidence against Reyes.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 170512)

Factual Background

On January 10, 2001, Acero applied for a driver’s license at the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin and took the required written examination. He alleged that a clerk named Tata Penaloza (whose real name was Angelito) administered the examination and informed him that he failed. Acero further claimed that Penaloza, in the presence of Reyes, offered a “reconsideration” of the application if Acero would pay an additional amount. Acero asked the amount and Penaloza allegedly quoted P680.00. Acero then gave P1,000.00 to Penaloza.

Acero stated that Penaloza gave him change of P320.00 and issued LTO Official Receipt No. 62927785, but only for P180.00 as a temporary license valid for 60 days. Acero asserted that the remaining P500.00 was received by Penaloza without any receipt, and he believed the acts of Reyes and Penaloza were fraudulent. Acero executed an affidavit on January 11, 2001, attaching the official receipt showing payment of P180.00.

Penaloza’s Counter-Affidavit and Documentary/Support Evidence

Penaloza denied that he offered Acero a bargain to pay for a reconsideration, though he admitted administering the examination. He explained that he was busy, so he requested a security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check Acero’s answers using an answer guide. Daypuyat allegedly reported a failing score of 22/40. Penaloza informed Acero of the grade and stated that it was for Reyes to decide on the matter.

Penaloza’s account then turned to the manner by which Reyes allegedly handled “flunkers.” Penaloza narrated that when Acero returned after consulting Reyes, his application form bore no Reyes signature but instead showed a plus sign “+” and the number 27 beside the score, and Penaloza claimed that he knew Reyes had written “+ 27,” indicating that Acero had to pay additional costs to pass the examination. Penaloza claimed that when Acero arrived, Reyes offered Acero the choice to retake the exam or pay additional costs. Penaloza then alleged that Reyes instructed him to prepare the driver’s license.

Penaloza further alleged a payment arrangement in which Acero gave one-thousand-peso bill, the cashier returned change of P820.00, and Penaloza delivered P320.00 to Acero while giving P500.00 to Reyes. Penaloza said that Acero demanded a receipt for the P500.00, but Penaloza claimed that Acero and Penaloza had allegedly agreed that no receipt would be issued. According to Penaloza, Reyes later told him to cancel the license and to return the money in a way that nobody could see them, after which Reyes allegedly handed Penaloza P500.00 to refund Acero.

Penaloza also submitted the affidavit of Rey P. Amper, a former LTO employee, who claimed that Reyes had an established practice of directing applicants who failed the examination to pay additional costs instead of retaking, and that Reyes instructed Amper to “add more points” to pass the grade in exchange for money. Amper stated that the practice continued until he left the LTO and that Reyes alone took and benefitted from the illegal exactions.

Penaloza additionally presented the affidavit of Margie B. Abdala, who recounted a visit where Acero allegedly assured them the complaint was mainly against Reyes and that Penaloza tried to return the P500.00 without receipt, which Acero refused in refusing to fill up application matters and in refusing to accept the money. A further affidavit from Rickie Valdehueza was submitted during the proceedings, describing a similar alleged “bargain” arrangement where Reyes wrote a plus sign notation beside an applicant’s score and directed the adjustment of the score in exchange for additional payments.

Reyes’s Counter-Affidavit and Procedural Developments

Reyes, on June 19, 2001, manifested that he adopted for the case his counter-affidavit filed in another Ombudsman matter, OMB-MIN-01-0090, involving the same incident and parties. He denied participation and argued that Acero’s affidavit did not mention Reyes by name as one who received money, and did not allege Reyes was present when the money was handed to Penaloza. Reyes maintained that Penaloza processed the application, that Penaloza received the money, and that Penaloza returned change to Acero.

Reyes also alleged that, during Reyes’s informal investigation, Penaloza admitted pocketing the P500.00, and Reyes supposedly reprimanded Penaloza and ordered the return of the money. Reyes argued that the receipt Acero submitted proved that, as far as the LTO and Reyes were concerned, only P180.00 was received. Reyes asserted a violation of his right to due process, particularly because he alleged he was not furnished with Penaloza’s counter-affidavit and supporting affidavits before the Ombudsman rendered its decision.

A preliminary conference was scheduled by the Ombudsman-Mindanao for July 11, 2001, but the record showed no appearance. The Ombudsman treated non-appearance as waiver. Acero sent a telegram waiving his right to preliminary conference on July 6, 2001. On July 23, 2001, Penaloza waived formal investigation and signified willingness to submit on the evidence on record.

Ombudsman Ruling in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170

On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao rendered its Decision. It held that Acero failed the written examination, yet Acero was granted a temporary license. The Ombudsman concluded it was logical that an agreement had been made between Acero and the persons charged with granting the license. It relied heavily on Penaloza’s statements corroborated by Amper and Valdehueza, finding that Reyes gave “flunkers” the option of retaking or paying additional costs to obtain a passing grade without retaking.

The Ombudsman found that Reyes, as Head of Office, took advantage of his position by exacting the so-called additional costs from applicants who failed the examination, despite the absence of legal authority to adjust failing grades or to collect additional costs beyond legal fees. It characterized the conduct as extortion constituting grave misconduct, and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service under Section 23(c), Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.

As to Penaloza, the Ombudsman found simple misconduct and imposed a penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) months under Section 23(b), Rule XIV of the same Rules Implementing Book V. A Joint Order later denied Reyes’s motions for reconsideration and to set the case for preliminary conference.

Court of Appeals Reversal

Reyes brought the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition under Rule 43 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. In its Decision dated July 4, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Ombudsman’s ruling and exonerated Reyes for insufficiency of evidence.

The appellate court emphasized that Acero’s affidavit-complaint identified Penaloza as the one who received the money and retained the unreceipted balance, but did not name Reyes. The Court of Appeals observed that there was no showing in the complaint-affidavit that Reyes was around when Acero handed P1,000.00 to Penaloza, and it therefore treated Penaloza as the sole actor implicated in the complaint.

The Court of Appeals also criticized the Ombudsman’s reliance on Penaloza’s counter-affidavit. It described Penaloza’s counter-affidavit as a self-serving statement and characterized objections to the evidence as relating to its hearsay nature, reasoning that hearsay evidence could not be given credence. It further pointed out Reyes’s claim that he was not furnished with a copy of Penaloza’s counter-affidavit, and it reasoned that admissions of Penaloza in a sworn statement were binding only on Penaloza and could not prejudice Reyes, invoking res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

The Court of Appeals held the charge of misconduct to be serious and required proof by substantial or competent evidence. It found the evidence against Reyes wanting.

Office of the Ombudsman’s Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Office of the Ombudsman moved for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, but its motion was denied in Resolution dated October 27, 2005. The Ombudsman then filed a petition to the Supreme Court, raising whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Ombudsman’s findings by reweighing evidence and substituting its own judgment, and whether substantial evidence existed to prove Reyes’s grave misconduct.

The Ombudsman relied on Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, asserting that findings of fact by the Ombudsman supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. It argued that the Court of Appeals exceeded its role when it reexamined and weighed evidence already evaluated by the Ombudsman and when it concluded that substantial evidence was lacking.

Supreme Court’s Resolution: Administrative Due Process and the Requirement of Disclosed Evidence

The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. It also addressed the legal standard governing review of Ombudsman fact-finding, acknowledging the general rule that Ombudsman factual findings supported by substantial evidence are conclusive under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, and that appellate courts should not ordinarily reassess credibility and weight of evidence.

However, the Court held that an exception applied because of serious due process deficiencies. It found merit in Reyes’s claim of denial of due process. The Court anchored its analysis on due process principles in administrative proceedings, invoking doctrines that due process requires that a respondent be notified of the charges and be given an opportunity to explain and defend himself. It cited the requirements that the tribunal must consider evidence presented, decisions must have basis in evidence, substantial evidence must exist, and the decision must be rendered on the evidence disclosed or contained in the record and disclosed to the part

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