Title
Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34
Case
G.R. No. L-54558
Decision Date
May 22, 1987
Civilians detained under martial law challenged military tribunal jurisdiction and due process violations; Court upheld military authority, citing martial law exigencies, but habeas corpus petitions were mooted by their release.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-54558)

Chronology of Arrests, Charges and Creation of Military Commission No. 34

The petitioners were arrested on December 24, 1979, initially detained at Camp Crame and later transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa (except Olaguer). On May 30, 1980, they were charged with subversion upon recommendation of the Judge Advocate General and approval of the Minister of National Defense; the matter was docketed as Criminal Case No. MC‑34‑1. On June 13, 1980, Military Commission No. 34 was created by the AFP Chief of Staff to try the case; the charge sheet was later amended (July 30, 1980) to allege seven offenses including unlawful possession of explosives, multiple assassination conspiracies, arson, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit rebellion.

Procedural Posture before the Supreme Court

Petitioners filed petitions for prohibition and habeas corpus (first petition filed August 19, 1980) seeking to enjoin Military Commission No. 34 and to obtain release from detention; later petitions (filed February 14, 1985) added certiorari, mandamus and preliminary injunctive relief and sought to bar implementation of the military commission’s conviction. Respondents answered; there were replies, rejoinders, motions to withdraw as to one petitioner, and intervening filings. While petitions remained pending, Military Commission No. 34 rendered conviction and imposed death sentences on December 4, 1984.

Supervening Events: Lifting of Martial Law and Releases

The Court considered two material developments: (1) Proclamation No. 2045 (January 17, 1981) formally lifting martial law and revoking General Order No. 8, directing dissolution of military tribunals upon final determination of cases which could not be transferred without irreparable prejudice; and (2) the progressive provisional release of several petitioners (Ester Misa‑Jimenez in January 1981; Olaguer, Othoniel Jimenez and others in January 1986 and later). Many petitioners were released before or after the 1986 change in administration.

Dismissal of Habeas Corpus Claims as Moot

The Court applied settled habeas corpus doctrine: because the petitioners had been released from military detention, the habeas corpus petitions concerned solely detention and had become moot and academic; the habeas corpus petitions were therefore dismissed.

Central Legal Issue: Military Jurisdiction over Civilians While Civil Courts Operate

The principal legal issue retained was whether military commissions lawfully possess jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses committed before or during martial law when ordinary civil courts are open and functioning. Petitioners contended such military jurisdiction was unconstitutional and denied due process; respondents relied on prior Supreme Court rulings upholding military jurisdiction during national emergency, notably Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 and several subsequent decisions.

Prior Precedent and Its Reasoning (Aquino, Jr. Line)

The Aquino, Jr. opinion and related rulings had sustained military tribunal jurisdiction over civilians during martial law on the ground that, in national emergency, the President possessed broad authority to promulgate orders vesting military tribunals with jurisdiction over offenses connected to public order and national security, and that due process does not require a particular form of tribunal so long as the tribunal is competent, provides notice and opportunity to defend, and is impartial. Those decisions emphasized executive power in times of peril and accepted military trials as compatible with due process in such circumstances.

Re‑examination and Overruling of Prior Ruling

The Court undertook a re‑examination of the Aquino line, noting subsequent decisions and practical developments indicating that the earlier rule warranted revision. The Court concluded that civilians accused of ordinary crimes are entitled, under due process and the constitutional allocation of judicial power, to trial by the judicial process before civil courts, not by military tribunals. It emphasized separation of powers and the exclusive vesting of judicial power in courts established by law. The Court held that military tribunals are not part of the judicial system and, while the exigencies of war or actual military occupation may justify exceptional measures, military commissions cannot try civilians for civil offenses when civil courts are open and functioning.

Due Process and Independence Concerns

The Court stressed qualitative differences between military and civilian tribunals — composition, tenure, procedural and evidentiary rules, potential command influence over military judges — and reiterated concerns that military trials of civilians inherently risk prejudice and lack the guarantees of an independent judiciary. The Court echoed dissenting views in Aquino, Jr. that civilians tried under general law are entitled to judicial, not executive or military, processes.

Manifestation of the Solicitor General and Specific Due Process Violations

The Solicitor General submitted a manifestation criticizing the conduct of Military Commission No. 34, particularly the December 4, 1984 session: prosecutors delayed furnishing complete records, failed to subpoena a defense witness for Othoniel Jimenez, the Commission deemed the accused to have waived their presentation of evidence despite such deficiencies, and within twenty‑five minutes rendered conviction and death sentences. The Court observed that such deprivation of constitutional rights ousts the tribunal of jurisdiction; a tribunal’s judgment rendered in disregard of constitutional guarantees is void.

Effect of Proclamation No. 2045 on Military Tribunal Authority

The Court held that Proclamation No. 2045, officially lifting martial law and revoking the military tribunal creation order, acknowledged the disappearance of the national emergency which had been the asserted basis for military jurisdiction over civilians. Under the Court’s analysis, Proclamation No. 2045 divested Military Commission No. 34 (and other similar bodies) of authority to try civilians, and pending cases against civilians should be transferred to the civil courts where possible without violating double jeopardy principles, because a prior tribunal lacking competent jurisdiction cannot bar civil prosecution by reason of double jeopardy.

Holding, Relief and Overruling of Precedent

The Court held that military commissions cannot try or exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them as long as civil courts are open and functioning; any judgment rendered by such military bodies against civilians is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court: dismissed the habeas corpus petitions as moot; granted petitions for certiorari and prohibition; declared the creation of Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians unconstitutional; declared all of its proceedings null and void; made permanent the restraining orde

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