G.R. No. 150185 - Okabe vs. Gutierrez

Case Summary (G.R. No. 150185)

Factual Background

Cecilia Maruyama executed and filed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint on December 29, 1999, charging Lorna Tanghal and Teresita Tanghal Okabe with estafa. Maruyama alleged that on December 11, 1998 she entrusted Japanese yen equivalent to P3,993,500 to Okabe for door-to-door delivery to the Philippines, that Okabe failed to deliver the money, at first denied receipt and later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, Maruyama submitted the affidavits of witnesses Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu, and Marilette G. Izumiya and documentary evidence; the complainant also filed a reply to the accused's counter-affidavit.

Prosecutorial Action and Information

After preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor issued a resolution dated March 30, 2000 finding probable cause for estafa against Okabe, and an Information was approved by the city prosecutor and filed in the RTC, Pasay City, on May 15, 2000 as Criminal Case No. 00-0749. The Information alleged that Okabe received in trust Japanese Yen 1141 (with peso equivalent P3,839,465.00) and willfully misappropriated the same, thereby committing estafa.

Arrest Warrant, Bail and Movements of the Accused

On May 19, 2000 the trial court issued a warrant for Okabe's arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Okabe posted a personal bail bond in that amount on June 15, 2000, approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of RTC, Quezon City, who recalled the warrant. Certified copies of the Information, the resolution and the complaint were furnished to Okabe. Between June and July 2000 Okabe traveled to and from Japan several times without prior permission of the trial court.

Hold Departure Order and Motions Filed

On July 14, 2000 the private prosecutor moved ex parte for a hold departure order (HDO), alleging that Okabe could post bail quickly and leave for Japan thereby frustrating prosecution. The trial court issued the HDO the same day and directed the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to prevent Okabe's departure. On June 17 and thereafter Okabe filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer arraignment, alleging that the investigating prosecutor submitted only the affidavit-complaint and his resolution and omitted the affidavits of witnesses, counter-affidavits, transcripts and other documents. She also filed motions to lift the HDO and to allow travel to Japan for humanitarian reasons.

Trial Court Proceedings and Orders

The trial court denied Okabe's motions on August 25, 2000, ruling that upon personal examination of the Information, affidavit-complaint and the resolution, a finding of probable cause was in order; that Okabe's motion for judicial determination of probable cause filed after bail was a mere surplusage; and that posting bail constituted waiver of the right to question probable cause and submission to the court's jurisdiction. The court relied on Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 and the decision in Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals. At arraignment on August 28, 2000 Okabe refused to plead and the court entered a plea of not guilty for her; the court set pre-trial and initial prosecution presentation for September 20, 2000.

Court of Appeals Decision

Okabe sought certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. The CA, in a Decision dated January 31, 2001, partially granted the petition by setting aside the trial court's denial of the motion to lift the HDO and allowing conditional travel to Japan, but denied relief as to the petition to nullify the August 25, 2000 order and affirmed the trial court's finding of probable cause. The CA held that by posting bail and seeking relief from the trial court Okabe waived her right to attack the finding of probable cause, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. The CA imposed conditions for travel including posting bond double the alleged monetary liability and reporting obligations.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The primary issues were whether the CA erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 retroactively; whether posting bail and filing motions constituted a waiver of the right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant and the existence of probable cause; whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant relying solely on the prosecutor's resolution and the complainant's affidavit; and whether the CA misapplied Cojuangco, Jr. and failed to assess trial judge partiality or forum shopping allegations.

Parties' Contentions on Review

The petitioner argued that the trial court lacked probable cause because the investigating prosecutor submitted only the resolution and the complainant's affidavit and omitted the affidavits of the complainant's witnesses, the counter-affidavit of the accused and other records; that the trial court should have personally reviewed those records per Lim v. Felix, Roberts, Jr., and Ho v. People; and that posting bail did not waive her right to challenge the warrant since she promptly filed motions to determine probable cause and to lift the HDO. Okabe further asserted that Section 26, Rule 114 rendered Cojuangco, Jr. obsolete and must be applied retroactively. The Office of the Solicitor General defended the CA, contending the trial judge properly made an independent determination of probable cause on the Information, the resolution and the affidavit and that the CA correctly applied Cojuangco, Jr.

Legal Analysis and Reasoning

The Court first addressed retroactivity. It held that Section 26, Rule 114 was curative and intended to modify prior rulings that bail amounted to waiver of rights to assail arrest; curative and procedural rules generally apply retroactively to pending cases. The Rule, which took effect before the CA decision, restored the rule in People v. Red and allowed an accused who applied for or was admitted to bail to still challenge illegal arrest or lack of preliminary investigation provided the challenge is raised before plea. The Court found that the CA erred in failing to apply Section 26.

The Court then considered waiver. It reiterated that waiver by posting bail required clear and convincing proof of an unequivocal intention to relinquish the right to challenge the warrant. The Court found that Okabe's post-bail conduct — filing a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause the next day and seeking the lifting of the HDO — were inconsistent with waiver; the furnishing of bond was driven by imperative necessity to avert incarceration.

On the core question of probable cause, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional and statutory duty of the issuing judge to personally determine probable cause under Section 6, Rule 112 and Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. While the judge may review the prosecutor's resolution, he may not rely solely on the investigating prosecutor's certification. The judge must examine supporting documents sufficient to make an independent judgment, which generally included the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses and other supporting evidence, as provided in Section 8(a), Rule 112 and articulated in decisions such as Webb v. De Leon, Ho v. People, Lim v. Felix, and Soliven v. Makasiar. The standard for probable cause was described as facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the accused probably committed the offense; it requires more than mere suspicion and less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the investigating prosecutor submitted only his resolution and the complainant's affidavit to the trial court and omitted the affidavits of the complainant's witnesses, the complain

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 150185)

Parties and Procedural Posture

TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, Petitioner was charged by CECILIA MARUYAMA, Respondent, by way of an Information for estafa filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119.
HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, Respondent, was the presiding judge who issued the warrant of arrest and the orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 that are challenged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, is the prosecuting authority in the criminal action against the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals which resulted in a decision partially granting relief regarding the hold departure order and otherwise denying relief, prompting the present Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Key Factual Allegations

CECILIA MARUYAMA alleged in a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint that on December 11, 1998 she entrusted Japanese Yen 11,410,000 with a peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner for delivery to the Philippines and that the petitioner misappropriated the money.
The complaint alleged that the petitioner initially denied receipt and later returned only US$1,000 through one Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation the complainant submitted affidavits of witnesses including Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu and Marilette G. Izumiya and documentary evidence.
A resolution of probable cause was issued by Investigating Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor on March 30, 2000, and the city prosecutor approved the resolution and the Information was filed with the RTC on May 15, 2000.
The trial court issued a warrant of arrest on May 19, 2000 with a recommended bond of P40,000, which the petitioner posted as a personal bail bond on June 15, 2000 and which resulted in recall of the warrant by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of Branch 79, RTC Quezon City.
The trial court issued a hold departure order on July 14, 2000 and later denied the petitioner’s motions for a judicial determination of probable cause, for recall/lifting of the HDO, and to defer arraignment on August 25 and 28, 2000, after which the petitioner refused to plead and the court entered a not guilty plea for her.

Lower Court Rulings

The trial court found probable cause based on its personal examination of the Information, the investigating prosecutor’s resolution, and the affidavit-complaint, and it issued the warrant and later denied motions to recall the HDO and to defer arraignment.
The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60732 partially granted the petition for certiorari by setting aside the trial court’s denial of the motion to lift the HDO and by allowing travel under specified conditions, but otherwise denied the petition and affirmed the trial court’s finding of probable cause.
The petitioner sought reconsideration in the Court of Appeals and thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest and in finding probable cause on the basis of only the investigating prosecutor’s resolution and the complainant’s affidavit.
Whether the posting of bail and the filing of motions by the petitioner operated as a waiver of her right to challenge the legality of her arrest and the existence of probable cause.
Whether Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure applied retroactively and thereby altered the legal effect of posting bail on the right to challenge arrest.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and in denying other alleged infirmities including partiality and forum shopping.

Contentions of the Parties

The petitioner contended that the investigating prosecutor failed to submit the affidavits of the complainant’s witnesses, the petitioner’s counter-affidavit, the transcript of stenographic notes and other supporting evidence, and that the