Title
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Duterte
Case
G.R. No. 198201
Decision Date
Mar 15, 2023
A Canal-Cover Project in Davao City, intended to prevent accidents and improve public spaces, caused flooding due to design flaws. City officials demolished it without proper permits, leading to legal disputes. The Supreme Court ruled the demolition violated procedures, constituting simple misconduct, and upheld the Ombudsman's decision.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 198201)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Canal-Cover Project completed February 16, 2006; DPWH and Davao City correspondence in 2008 (City Engineer’s letter April 17, 2008; City Legal Officers’ opinion September 17, 2008); demolition performed October 20, 2008; Ombudsman decision finding respondents guilty of simple neglect (April 21, 2010) later amended to simple misconduct (May 6, 2010) imposing six-month suspension; Court of Appeals (CA) granted preliminary injunction (August 4, 2010) and ultimately exonerated respondents (January 28, 2011) and made the injunction permanent; petitions for review consolidated in the Supreme Court; final judgment: petitions denied and CA decision affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether presidential immunity required dismissal or abeyance of the petitions; 2) Whether respondents committed simple misconduct by summarily demolishing a national-government-funded canal-cover project (allegedly a nuisance per se) without complying with Section 216 of the IRR of the National Building Code; 3) Whether the CA erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Ombudsman’s suspension order.

Factual Nexus and Nature of the Project

The Canal-Cover Project (locally called “Nograles Park”) was a concrete covering constructed over a drainage canal in Quezon Boulevard, Davao City, funded by DPWH but physically affecting local drainage. After the cover impeded dredging and contributed to flooding, Davao City repeatedly informed DPWH; DPWH created manholes and participated in later demolition-related activities. City Legal Officers advised that the structure was a nuisance and could be summarily abated; the City Engineer notified DPWH of planned demolition three days before the demolition; DPWH representatives assisted during demolition.

Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

  • 1987 Constitution (framework governing Ombudsman independence and presidential immunity principles).
  • Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code) and its IRR, particularly Sections 103, 203, 205, 214–216 (procedures and powers relating to declaration and abatement/demolition of dangerous or nuisance structures, 15‑day notice and appeal to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways).
  • Local Government Code (1991), Section 477 (city engineer acts as local building official).
  • Republic Act No. 6770, section 27 (Ombudsman orders immediately executory when supported by substantial evidence; procedures for appeal).
  • Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7/17 (administrative execution rules; penalties and executory nature of certain Ombudsman decisions).

Legal Characterization: Nuisance Per Se Versus Per Accidens

The Court reviewed Civil Code Article 694–695 definitions and established jurisprudential distinction: nuisances per se (summarily abatable without notice because they endanger immediate safety) versus nuisances per accidens (require notice and hearing). The CA and Ombudsman factually concluded the canal-cover did not constitute a nuisance per se because the flooding did not present the immediate danger associated with an open hazardous condition. Where a structure is not a nuisance per se, municipal authorities cannot unilaterally effect extrajudicial summary abatement without observing applicable procedures or judicial determination.

Interpretation and Application of Section 216 (IRR, National Building Code)

Section 216 prescribes: (1) a finding/declaration by the building official; (2) written notice to owner/occupant giving 15 days to act; (3) right to appeal to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways within the 15‑day period; and (4) remedial steps and sequencing culminating in demolition by the building official upon failure to comply. The Court emphasized that these rules anticipate separate roles for owner (here, the State/DPWH), the building official, and the Secretary. The facts showed DPWH was aware of the flooding and had been involved before demolition; DPWH did not object and even sent representatives who aided demolition. Where the owner is the national government and its representative participated and did not object, the notice and appeal rationale embodied in the 15‑day requirement was substantially, if not strictly, satisfied.

Building Official Permits and Practical Constraints

Section 216 requires that “all required permits” be secured within 15 days; the Rules, however, also contemplate that an incumbent City Engineer may be the building official (per Local Government Code Section 477 and PD 1096/IRR). The Court recognized the practical absurdity of requiring the building official to obtain a demolition permit from the same office that would issue it and then penalizing that official for strict noncompliance. Given that the building official exercised the authority to declare and effect abatement and the DPWH (owner) tacitly assented and participated, the Court found the failure to produce a formal demolition permit or strict observance of the 15‑day clock did not automatically translate into actionable simple misconduct.

Definition and Threshold of Misconduct Applied to Respondents

Misconduct is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,” including unlawful behavior or gross negligence; it is grave only if additional elements (e.g., corruption, willful intent) are present. Because the Court of Appeals and Ombudsman found the canal-cover not to be a nuisance per se, respondents should have followed Section 216. But the Court concluded that, on the facts—DPWH’s prior knowledge and active participation, the owner’s practical acquiescence, and the building official’s overlapping role—there was no sufficient proof of willful intent or gross negligence to sustain a finding of simple misconduct. Consequently, respondents were properly exonerated of simple misconduct.

Presidential Immunity and the OSG’s Motion to Withdraw

The Supreme Court reiterated settled doctrine: the sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during tenure as to civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings (to protect functioning of the executive), but such immunity is not absolute and does not confer impunity; unlawful acts are not acts of the State and accountability remains (removal via impeachment is the constitutional remedy). The OSG filed a Motion to Withdraw th

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