Title
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sardido
Case
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370
Decision Date
Apr 25, 2003
Judge Sardido misinterpreted Circular No. 3-89, excluding Judge Hurtado from a criminal case, leading to a P10,000 fine for gross ignorance of the law.
judge
exclusion
criminal case
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370)

Factual Background

Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document. The Amended Information included Judge Hurtado as an accused. The criminal case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 14071 and raffled to Judge Sardido, then presiding judge of MTC-Koronadal.

The accusations were linked to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993, under which private complainant Magbanua and six other vendors allegedly sold two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633 located in the commercial district of Koronadal to Davao Realty Development Corporation, represented by accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan as broker. Judge Hurtado, at the time, served as RTC-Koronadal Clerk of Court and an ex-officio notary public, and he notarized the deed. Private complainant, however, denied signing the 8 August 1993 deed as described, including its stated consideration of P 600,000.00, and instead asserted that the true instrument she and the other vendors signed was a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of P 16,000,000.00, with the vendee assuming payment of capital gains tax.

According to the record, the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the vendors a deficiency capital gains tax of P 1,023,375.00. In connection with the criminal complaint, Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the case against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court, invoking Circular No. 3-89 and arguing that the circular required forwarding all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts, regardless of whether the complained acts were related to official functions. The Provincial Prosecutor opposed the motion, contending that the circular did not cover the criminal case because it was not an IBP-initiated case and because the alleged offense occurred in 1993, when Judge Hurtado was not yet an RTC judge but only a clerk of court and notary public.

Respondent’s Order Excluding Judge Hurtado and Forwarding the Case

On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued the assailed Order excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and ordering the forwarding of the case against him to the Supreme Court. The order framed the issue as whether Judge Hurtado’s case, based on acts allegedly committed before his appointment as an RTC judge, fell within the ambit of Circular No. 3-89. Respondent reasoned that the circular required forwarding all cases involving lower court judges to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, “whether or not” the complaints related to acts unrelated to official functions, and “regardless of the nature of the crime,” without distinguishing between criminal acts committed before or during tenure. The order further stated that it would be awkward for a first level court to try an incumbent judge of a second level court, and thus MTC-Koronadal should not proceed against Judge Hurtado unless ordered otherwise by the Supreme Court.

Following the order, Maxima S. Borja, Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of MTC-Koronadal, wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.

OCA’s Initial Scrutiny and the Administrative Charge Against Judge Sardido

Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo later issued a Memorandum dated 25 October 2000, explaining that Circular No. 3-89 referred only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against lower court justices and judges, and that it did not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts. In a Resolution dated 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter be returned to MTC-Koronadal along with the records of the criminal case, and required Judge Sardido to explain in writing why he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado and transmitting the records.

In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido defended his action by reiterating that he excluded Judge Hurtado because Circular No. 3-89 allegedly directed the IBP to forward all cases involving lower court judges to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. He asserted that the circular’s direction extended beyond the IBP as initiator, and that it should apply at least to courts handling cases involving judges of the lower courts. He also pointed out that Judge Hurtado was charged with falsification of a public document as a notary public while he was then still a clerk of court in the RTC of Koronadal.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2001, the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. On 10 July 2001, the OCA submitted a Memorandum recommending that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. Judge Sardido thereafter filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001, submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings and records already filed.

The Parties’ Positions and the OCA’s Findings

The OCA found that respondent erred in excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information. It held that Circular No. 3-89, the basis for respondent’s action, referred to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against lower court judges. On this understanding, the circular did not govern criminal cases filed in the trial courts. The OCA thus recommended a fine of P 5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law.

The Supreme Court’s subsequent review focused on the proper construction of Circular No. 3-89, its source in prior Supreme Court resolutions, and the constitutional allocation of disciplinary authority over justices and judges of lower courts.

Legal Basis: Circular No. 3-89 and the Constitutional Allocation of Disciplinary Authority

The Court traced Circular No. 3-89 to an earlier development. The circular was issued in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP President Leon M. Garcia seeking clarification of the Court’s En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988. The earlier En Banc resolution required the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action a complaint (docketed as CBD Case No. 055) filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing against then Court of Appeals Justices Rodolfo A. Nocon, Reynato Puno, and Alfredo Marigomen. The Court in the En Banc resolution had stated that the power to discipline judges of lower courts lay within the Court’s exclusive power and authority under Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution.

The Court explained that the IBP’s role in disciplinary matters was addressed by the circular. Circular No. 3-89 provided, in relevant part, that the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court “all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts,” whether or not the acts complained of were related to their official functions, including acts such as immorality, estafa, or crimes against persons and property. The Court further noted that the circular clarified the phrase “attorneys x x x in the government service” in Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which governs the IBP’s initiation and prosecution of charges against erring attorneys.

The Court held that the clarification meant the term “attorneys” did not include justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts who were not subject to the IBP’s disciplining authority. Accordingly, all administrative cases against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts fell exclusively within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The Court emphasized, however, that Rule 139-B involved the discipline of attorneys and was administrative, not criminal, in nature. Thus, the cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 were administrative cases for disbarment, suspension, or discipline—directed to the Supreme Court because of the Court’s constitutional disciplinary authority over lower court judges. The directive in the circular was therefore directed to the IBP’s administrative function, not to the criminal jurisdiction of trial courts.

The Supreme Court’s Reasoning: Criminal Jurisdiction Remains With Trial Courts; Circular No. 3-89 Does Not Reach Criminal Cases

The Court ruled that Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. The Court stressed that trial courts retained jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by such officials, and that the circular’s directive targeted administrative cases because it instructed the IBP—not trial courts—to refer administrative complaints to the Supreme Court.

The Court added that the circumstance that Judge Hurtado’s alleged acts occurred before he became an RTC judge did not matter for determining whether the trial court had criminal jurisdiction. Likewise, the Court held that it did not matter that an MTC judge would try an RTC judge in the criminal case. The Court treated a criminal case against an attorney or judge as distinct and separate from an administrative case. It further explained that the dismissal or exclusion of a criminal case would not warrant the dismissal of a related administrative case arising from the same facts. It also observed that administrative liability could proceed independently because the quantum of proof differed: administrative cases required only preponderance of evidence, while criminal cases required proof beyond reasonable doubt.

To underscore this doctrinal separation, the Court cited Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, which held that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases, with different burdens of proof. The Court also referenced In re Almacen, explaining that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis and are not criminal prosecutions in nature, since they are meant to investigate the conduct of an officer of the court for the protection of public interest and the purity of the legal profe

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