Title
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lerma
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2077, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2080
Decision Date
Oct 12, 2010
Judge Lerma violated Supreme Court directives, engaged in misconduct, ignored the law, abused authority, and delayed cases, resulting in fines and dismissal.
A

Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2077, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2080)

Procedural Posture and Referral of Five Administrative Cases

Five administrative matters were consolidated administratively and redocketed as A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2077, and RTJ-07-2080 following an OCA memorandum (September 24, 2007) and an En Banc resolution (September 25, 2007). The cases were referred to an Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals for inquiry and recommendation. The Supreme Court considered each matter separately, applying the relevant rules governing judicial conduct, administrative discipline, and procedural requirements for contempt and criminal-process determinations.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076 — Referral-Limited Authority; Demurrer Granted; Fine P15,000

Facts: Criminal Case No. 3639-R (Rosales, Pangasinan) was transferred pursuant to a Supreme Court resolution that authorized the RTC, Muntinlupa City, to arraign the accused and take his testimony, after which the records were to be returned to RTC Branch 53, Rosales. The case was raffled to Branch 256 (Judge Lerma). Following arraignment and receipt of prosecution evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to the evidence; respondent granted the motion and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence on February 28, 2007. OCA charged respondent with exceeding the limited authority granted by the Supreme Court’s June 30, 1998 resolution, contending the referral authorized arraignment and taking testimony only, not adjudication on the merits.

Findings and reasoning: The Investigating Justice and the Supreme Court agreed that the referral’s scope was limited; respondent should have returned the records to Branch 53 for continuation of proceedings. The Court emphasized venue and jurisdiction are jurisdictional and determined by the information, and that a judge must exercise due diligence in ascertaining the facts and limits of his authority. The Court found respondent deficient in diligence and in obeying the Court’s directive.

Disposition: Respondent found guilty of violating a Supreme Court directive (a less serious administrative offense under Section 9(4), Rule 140) and fined Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080 — Unreported Absences, Golf Play, and False Certificates; Fine P15,000

Facts: The OCA presented documentary inquiries from two golf clubs indicating dates and times when Judge Lerma played golf. The OCA’s administrative records showed he did not file leave applications for several of those dates. The OCA charged violations of the Supreme Court Memorandum Order (Nov. 19, 1973) on working hours and of Administrative Circulars requiring leave filings, and alleged untruthful statements in certificate(s) of service.

Findings and reasoning: The Investigating Justice found insufficient evidence on some Alabang Country Club dates but substantial evidence that the respondent played at TAT Filipinas on multiple listed dates, supported by a front-desk receptionist’s testimony and club records. Certification from the OCA Leave Division confirmed no leave applications were filed for those dates. The Court held that the respondent violated the Supreme Court memorandum and the administrative circulars; failure to report absence during working/session hours and making untruthful statements in certificates of service are classed as less serious charges under Section 9 and Section 11(B) of Rule 140.

Disposition: Respondent fined Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars and for making untruthful statements in his certificate of service.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077 — Issuance of Secret Divergent Order Re: Van Twest Administration; Dismissal from Service

Facts: In Special Proceeding No. 97-045 (appointment of administrator for absentee Alexander Van Twest), respondent issued an initial procedural order on June 6, 2007 setting submission deadlines, but the same date respondent issued a second order—secretly issued—purporting to sustain the Letters of Administration and to allow the administrator to exercise full powers. The second order contradicted the first; it was not provided promptly to opposing counsel and was unknown even to respondent’s staff. Union Bank relied on a pairing judge’s order when it sought relief in Makati RTC; the secret second order arguably furnished Atty. Perez the basis to oppose recall of garnishment and other proceedings.

Findings and reasoning: The divergence between two orders issued the same date, the clandestine issuance of the second order, and the secrecy surrounding it raised grave concerns about respondent’s integrity, probity, and impartiality. The Court characterized these actions as flagrant and palpable breaches amounting to gross negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law, giving rise to an inference of bad faith. The conduct was held to violate Section 8 of Rule 140, which encompasses serious charges warranting the most severe administrative sanctions.

Disposition: Respondent found guilty of gross misconduct and dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except earned leave credits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078 — Assumption of Jurisdiction in AAVA Case; Improper Indirect Contempt Finding; Fine P40,000

Facts: In Civil Case No. 2003-433 (AAVA dispute), respondent took cognizance of and rendered judgment declaring an association meeting and election void ab initio, enjoining certain governors and ordering another election. The complaint should, according to the CA, have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in favor of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Complainant Duarte also became the subject of a petition for indirect contempt filed with the trial court and respondent issued an order finding him guilty of indirect contempt (July 1, 2004) without adequate procedural process; that order was later reversed on reconsideration.

Findings and reasoning: The Court held that judges must be well-versed in elementary jurisdictional principles and that ignorance of such elementary law constitutes gross ignorance when the matter is plainly within another tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court emphasized judicial competence and the duty to keep abreast of law. Regarding the contempt proceedings, the Court noted mandatory procedural requirements under Section 4, Rule 71: indirect contempt charges must commence either motu proprio by the court by formal charge or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified copies; the records failed to show complainant was afforded a proper hearing or an opportunity to rebut the charge. The failure to provide the required procedural safeguards underscored the respondent’s dereliction.

Disposition: Respondent found guilty of gross ignorance of the law (a serious offense under Section 8(9), Rule 140) and fined Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079 — Dismissal of Estafa Case, Delay, Failure to Order Ocular Inspection; Fine P21,000

Facts: Criminal Case No. 06-179 charged accused Cuason with estafa for convincing Gen. Goyena to entrust P20,000,000, partly repaid by two condominium certificates allegedly corresponding to non-existent units. The case was re-raffled to respondent on May 2, 2006. The court heard motions regarding probable cause on July 17, 2006 but did not issue its omnibus order dismissing the case until September 4, 2006—forty-eight days after the hearing. The court relied on documentary permits and titles rather than ordering an ocular inspection to determine existence of the condominium units; the prosecutor’s prior finding of probable cause had been reversed.

Findings and reasoning: The Court found undue delay in rendering a decision on probable cause contrary to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the judge to personally evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution within ten days or resolve issues within thirty days when additional evidence is ordered. Given the July 17, 2006 hearing date, prudence required that respondent determine probable cause within ten days thereafter; issuing a dismissal only after forty-eight days constituted undue delay and a less serious administrative offense under Section 9(1), Rule 140. The Court also found abuse of judicial discretion in failing to order ocular

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.