Title
Odsigue vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 111179
Decision Date
Jul 4, 1994
Petitioner, possessing land by tolerance since 1972, refused to vacate after owner’s death. Courts ruled ejectment valid, citing proper demand, property identification, and absence of tenancy relationship.
dispute
possession
parcel of land
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 111179)

Facts Material to the Ejectment Suit

The Court found that, beginning in 1972, petitioner had possessed the property “by tolerance of the owner,” Platon Espiritu Santo. After Espiritu Santo’s death in 1989, his heirs succeeded to the property, and private respondent Armando Angeles was among those heirs. On January 10, 1991, Armando Angeles sent petitioner a letter of demand to vacate the premises. The letter was delivered to petitioner through the Barangay Captain, Fernando Austria, who executed a sworn affidavit stating that he personally tried to hand the demand letter to petitioner but the latter refused to receive it. On February 8, 1991, private respondent instituted an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC, seeking petitioner’s ejectment.

Issues Raised in the Petition

In his answer in the unlawful detainer case and later in the appeal, petitioner raised defenses that he reiterated in the petition for review. He claimed, first, that the jurisdictional requirement of a formal demand had not been complied with. Second, he insisted that the property sought to be recovered had not been sufficiently identified. Third, he argued that he had been instituted as a tenant by the predecessor-in-interest, Platon Espiritu Santo, and that he was therefore an occupant-tiller under agrarian reform laws because he had planted and cultivated fruit-bearing trees and introduced improvements. In his assignments of errors before the reviewing court, petitioner specifically asserted that the appellate court erred in ruling that the demand was valid and properly served, in ruling that the property was properly identified in line with Art. 424 of the Civil Code for unlawful detainer purposes, and in ruling that petitioner could be summarily ejected.

Trial Court Proceedings and Summary Procedure

After the demand issue and identification defenses were presented, the MTC rendered judgment on December 10, 1991, ordering petitioner to vacate the premises. On appeal, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals treated the case as having proceeded under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court noted that the matter was set for a preliminary conference that produced no agreement; the parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers, after which the case was deemed submitted and the MTC decided the case for the plaintiffs.

Validity and Service of the Demand Letter

On the first assigned error, petitioner argued that no demand had been made and that there was no proof that he received the demand letter sent on January 10, 1991. He attacked the evidentiary weight of Barangay Captain Austria’s affidavit by asserting that he had not been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant because no trial on the merits had taken place in the MTC. He also contended that any demand made did not comply with Rule 70, sec. 2, of the Rules of Court.

The Court rejected these contentions. It held that Austria’s affidavit stated that the demand letters were personally handed by him to petitioner and refused by petitioner. The Court ruled that the affidavit deserved “great respect” in the absence of proof to the contrary. It further held that petitioner’s claim that the affidavit should be disregarded because he was not able to cross-examine the Barangay Captain had “no basis in law.” The Court emphasized that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the submission of affidavits and position papers and does not require hearing unless it is necessary to clarify factual matters. It found no basis for petitioner’s assertion that the record did not show compliance with the Summary Procedure. It also adopted the Court of Appeals’ factual finding that a preliminary conference was held and failed to result in agreement, after which position papers were submitted and the case was decided.

Identification of the Property for Purposes of Unlawful Detainer

On the second assigned error, petitioner argued that the property had not been properly identified as required by the Civil Code. He asserted that the land was within Sitio Aduas, which, according to him, lay at the boundary between Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. He maintained that his occupied parcel was located in Barangay May-Iba and that the technical description in the title did not sufficiently identify the property. He further argued that a geodetic survey should have been conducted to determine what improvements should be demolished.

The Court treated the identification issue as settled by the land’s title and the administrative certifications presented. It noted that OCT No. 4050 indicated that the property was located in Barangay Lagundi. It also noted a certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer at Morong, Rizal stating that petitioner was occupying a landholding at Barangay Lagundi. The Court held that, for purposes of the case, a survey was not necessary. It declared that a certificate of title is conclusive not only as to ownership but also as to location. Thus, the subject of the proceedings was the land covered by OCT No. 4050, and petitioner would be required to demolish only constructions within its boundaries.

Claim of Tenancy and Entitlement to Equitable Remedies

On the third assigned error, petitioner contended that he had been instituted as a tenant by the private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest nearly twenty years before the filing of the action and that he was entitled to “certain justiceable and equitable remedies.” He did not specify the remedies claimed. The Court nevertheless addressed the substance of his theory. It held that petitioner’s stay was merely tolerated; one who is tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land once required to leave. It further rejected the claim that petitioner was an agricultural tenant. The Court ruled that a core requirement for a tenancy relationship is the sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and it found no proof of such sharing in the case.

Invoking controlling tenancy principles, the Court explained that all requisites must be present to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de jure tenant as distinguished from a de facto tenant. It cited De la Cruz v. Bautista, G.R. No. 39695, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 517 for that doctrine.

Appellate Review, Disposition, and Legal Effect

Petitioner’s petition for review was considered without merit aft

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