Title
Ochida vs. Cabarroguis
Case
A.C. No. 1594
Decision Date
May 7, 1976
Atty. Cabarroguis called Mrs. Ochida a "fugitive from justice" in court; SC dismissed disbarment, citing improper but non-malicious language, warning against future impropriety.

Case Summary (A.C. No. 1594)

Factual Background

During the hearing of a motion in Civil Case No. 529, Atty. Cabarroguis argued that issues had become moot and academic and referred to the remaining matters before the trial court as including a claim for accounting and court approval of revocation so that Mrs. Ochida could not continue representing the heirs of Felipe Cordova in public. In that context, he added that, as opposing counsel put it, Mrs. Ochida was in Manila, and he asserted that she was a “fugitive from justice,” supported by his statement that there were five (5) pending warrants of arrest. Opposing counsel objected to the characterization as off-tangent and moved that it be stricken from the records, which the trial court granted, directing counsel to stick to the matters before the court and ordering the statement stricken.

Mrs. Ochida regarded the characterization as vilification or calumny. She then filed on October 8, 1975 in the lower court a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Cabarroguis, and the complaint was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

The Administrative Complaint and Respondent’s Defense

In his comment, Atty. Cabarroguis invoked the doctrine that relevant utterances of judges, lawyers, and witnesses made in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. He maintained that the statement was pertinent because he intended to underscore Mrs. Ochida’s alleged dilatory tactics. He further asserted that the factual basis was that Mrs. Ochida had been charged with estafa in five cases and that, as shown by a resolution dated November 26, 1975 of the special counsel of the Provincial Fiscal’s Office of Davao del Norte, her complaint against him for grave oral defamation in connection with the same statement had been dismissed. He also pointed to the dismissal of her civil damages complaint for P132,000 by the Court of First Instance of Davao in an order dated December 3, 1975 in Civil Case No. 710. He claimed that the criminal, civil, and administrative complaints were filed in bad faith and were meant to harass him.

In her reply, Mrs. Ochida insisted that the imputation was not relevant. She argued that it was inaccurate because she had posted the corresponding bail bonds and that she had appealed the order dismissing her complaint for damages.

The Governing Standards for Lawyer Conduct

The Supreme Court framed the question as whether Atty. Cabarroguis had committed gross misconduct warranting disciplinary action. It reiterated that a lawyer should treat the opposite party or suitor “with fairness and due consideration” and should avoid offensive personalities and improper speech against an opposing litigant under Paragraph 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The Court examined the phrase used and treated the characterization of Mrs. Ochida as “fugitive from justice” as abrasive and intemperate.

The Court observed that the expression “fugitive from justice,” as explained by reference to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, refers to one who, having committed or being accused of a crime in one jurisdiction, is absent from that jurisdiction to evade punishment. Applying that understanding, it held that a lawyer with a proper sense of decorum and propriety should have avoided such offensive language.

The Court’s Assessment and the Effect of Context

The Court also considered the circumstances of the utterance. It found it believable that Atty. Cabarroguis, irritated by opposing counsel’s alibis that Mrs. Ochida was “out of town” or in Manila, had been provoked into strong language against her. It acknowledged the general principle that lawyers should be afforded some latitude in comment or remark in the furtherance of the causes they represent. It cited Dorado vs. Pilar (104 Phil., 743, 748) for the proposition that, for the fidelity of their clients, lawyers may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase.

On that basis, the Court concluded that, although the statement was improper and should not have been used, it did not amount to gross misconduct under the circumstances presented. The Court relied on the same line of reasoning from Dorado vs. Pilar and further cited Deles vs. Aragona Jr., Administrative Case No. 598, March 28, 1969 (27 SCRA 633) regarding the need for restraint in language and the consequences of repetition.

Disposition

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