G.R. No. 233577 - Leo A. Lastimosa vs. People

Case Summary (G.R. No. 233577)

Petitioners’ Claims and Unorthodox Theory

Petitioners, identifying themselves as taxpayers and former 1971 Constitutional Convention delegates, challenged the resolutions on the ground that the 1973 Constitution was not the fundamental law (advancing the theory that an earlier constitution should be considered in force), and raised constitutional objections to the process and substance of the proposed amendments.

Procedural Posture and Timeline

Two prohibition petitions were filed (March 6 and March 12, 1981). Respondents were required to answer within ten days. The cases were argued orally on March 26, 1981, with supplemental data submitted thereafter. The challenged resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa on February 5 and February 27, 1981; the plebiscite date was set for April 7, 1981.

Applicable Constitutional Framework

The Court applied the 1973 Constitution and the 1976 Amendments, citing relevant transitory provisions (Article XVII, Section 15) and the Article on Amendments (Article XVI, Section 2) governing plebiscite timing. The decision repeatedly invokes Javellana v. The Executive Secretary and other controlling precedents applying the 1973 Constitution as the fundamental law.

Majority Threshold Finding: 1973 Constitution Remains Fundamental Law

The Court reaffirmed Javellana’s controlling conclusion that the 1973 Constitution came into force on January 17, 1973, and that subsequent adjudication has recognized and applied it. The majority rejected petitioners’ premise that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law and held that the Supreme Court is bound to apply the Constitution as declared by its precedents.

Majority Holding: Authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to Propose Amendments

Relying on the 1976 Amendments and the Transitory Provisions, the Court held that the Interim Batasang Pambansa, when convened as a constituent assembly upon special call by the Prime Minister (President), possessed the power to propose constitutional amendments. That power derived from the vesting of the Interim National Assembly’s constituent authority in the Interim Batasang Pambansa under the 1976 Amendments.

Majority Holding: Scope of Changes (Amendment vs. Revision)

The majority rejected the argument that the challenged proposals amounted to a prohibited “revision” rather than permissible “amendment.” Citing Del Rosario and established doctrine, the Court held that a constituent body may propose extensive or even wholesale changes; the validity of whatever is proposed is ultimately for the people to decide in ratification. The distinction between amendment and revision is immaterial if the proposed change is subject to ratification.

Majority Holding: Vote Requirement When Sitting as Constituent Body

The Court determined that when the Interim Batasang Pambansa sits as a constituent assembly the applicable rule is a majority vote of its members to propose amendments, not the three-fourths legislative voting threshold. Even if the three-fourths legislative requirement were deemed applicable, the record showed the resolutions were adopted by overwhelming margins (e.g., 122–5; 147–5 with 1 abstention; 148–2 with 1 abstention), so no fatal defect in voting was shown.

Majority Holding: Timing of Plea for Proper Submission and the 90-Day Plebiscite Rule

Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that any amendment or revision be ratified in a plebiscite held not later than three months (90 days) after approval. The resolutions were approved on February 5 and 27, 1981, and the plebiscite was scheduled for April 7, 1981, which the Court found to be within the 90-day period mandated by the Constitution.

Majority Holding: Adequacy of Public Information (Fair Submission)

On the question whether the people had been sufficiently informed (the “proper submission” doctrine), the majority concluded that the proposed amendments had been “intensively and extensively discussed” in the Interim Batasang Pambansa and in the mass media; thus, it could not be plausibly maintained that the people were unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposals. The Court relied on precedent (including Occena v. Comelec) to find adequate public notice and discussion.

Disposition by the Majority

The petitions for prohibition were dismissed for lack of merit. No costs were imposed. The opinion was concurred in by the listed Justices; Justice Teehankee filed a separate dissent.

Dissenting Opinion – Preliminary Stance and Relief Sought

Justice Teehankee would have given due course to the petitions and granted a temporary restraining order to enjoin the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. His dissent rests on two principal lines of argument: (1) the asserted invalidity of the October 1976 amendments that produced the Interim Batasang Pambansa, and (2) the inadequate period and process for fair submission to the people.

Dissenting Rationale – Invalidity of 1976 Amendments and Source of Constituent Power

Justice Teehankee reiterated his prior positions (Sanidad, Hidalgo, De la Llana) that the October 1976 amendments—by which the Interim Batasang Pambansa replaced the Interim National Assembly—were invalid because the amending process must conform strictly to the Constitution; the constituent power to propose amendments was not vested in the President/Prime Minister alone. Under the doctrine in Tolentino, the Court must ensure that proposed amendments originate from the constitutionally designated agency; if the October 1976 amendments are inv

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 233577)

Parties and Case Caption

Two prohibition proceedings were consolidated in the record: G.R. No. 56350 (Samuel C. Occena v. Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, National Treasurer, Director of Printing) and G.R. No. 56404 (Ramon A. Gonzales et al. v. National Treasurer and Commission on Elections).
Petitioners included Samuel C. Occena (a member of the Philippine Bar and former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention) and Ramon A. Gonzales together with Manuel B. Imbong, Jo Aurea Marcos-Imbong, Ray Allan T. Drilon, Nelson B. Malana and Gil M. Tabios in the second filing.
Respondents included the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit, the National Treasurer, and the Director of Printing, depending on the petition.

Nature of the Action

The petitions were prohibition proceedings challenging the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions (Resolution Nos. 28, 104 and 106 (1981)) proposing constitutional amendments.
Petitioners sued as taxpayers and advanced the unorthodox assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, challenging the Javellana ruling that had declared the 1973 Constitution in force.
The petitions attacked alleged constitutional infirmities of the proposed amendments and the process by which they were proposed and scheduled for plebiscite.

Procedural History

The suits for prohibition were filed on March 6, 1981 (Occena) and March 12, 1981 (Gonzales and co-petitioners).
Respondents were required to answer on March 10 and 13 respectively, with answers due within ten days from notice; there was a comment filed by respondents.
An amended petition in Occena (dated March 24) adopted the theory of petitioner Gonzales that the 1935 Constitution was once again in force and effect.
Both cases were set for hearing and argued orally on March 26, 1981 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents; pertinent data were submitted in amplification and the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
The Court rendered a decision on April 2, 1981 dismissing the petitions for lack of merit.

Issues Presented

Whether the 1973 Constitution remains the fundamental law and is applicable for adjudication of the petitions.
Whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the authority to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution and, if so, the scope of that authority.
Whether the proposed changes constituted permissible amendments or an impermissible revision (a total overhaul) of the Constitution.
What vote is required in the Interim Batasang Pambansa when sitting as a constituent body to propose amendments (majority vs. three-fourths).
What standard must be satisfied for a proper submission of proposed amendments to the people, including the temporal requirement for the plebiscite and the requirement that the people be adequately informed.

Holding / Disposition

The petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court affirmed the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution, relying on the Javellana decision that declared the 1973 Constitution in force and effect as of January 17, 1973.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body upon special call by the President and Prime Minister, has the authority to propose amendments.
When sitting as a constituent body to propose amendments, the Interim Batasang Pambansa may act by majority vote; the three-fourths legislative-vote requirement does not apply to its constituent function.
Even assuming the three-fourths legislative requirement applied, the voting tallies for the three challenged resolutions exceeded that threshold.
The plebiscite was set within the 90-day period prescribed by Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution, and the Court found that the people had been adequately informed of the proposed amendments.
No costs were awarded. The majority opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Fernando; Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera concurred. Justice Teehankee dissented in a separate opinion. Justice Abad Santos was on official leave.

Reasoning — Validity and Applicability of the 1973 Constitution

The Court held that it is "much too late" to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution and relied on the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, where the Court (six to four) concluded that there was "no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
That Javellana pronouncement made manifest that as of January 17, 1973 the present Constitution came into force and effect; the majority's statement resolved doubts and made the 1973 Constitution the fundamental law.
The Court emphasized the dual aspect of judicial review (positive and negative), noting that judicial affirmation of validity is as much a legitimate exercise as invalidation, and that dismissal of such suits