Title
Occena vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 56350
Decision Date
Apr 2, 1981
Petitioners challenged 1973 Constitution's validity, Interim Batasang Pambansa's authority to propose amendments, and ratification process; SC upheld Constitution, dismissed petitions.
constitutional amendments
validity
suits

Case Summary (G.R. No. 56350)

Factual Background

Petitioners sought prohibition to prevent the holding of a plebiscite on amendments proposed by the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The three challenged resolutions proposed amendments on (1) limited land ownership by a natural-born citizen naturalized abroad, (2) the structure and provisions relating to the Presidency, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the National Assembly, and (3) an amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections. The resolutions were adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa on February 5 and 27, 1981. The Batasang Pambansa subsequently set April 7, 1981 as the date of the plebiscite. Vote tallies reported in the opinion were: Resolution No. 1, 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2, 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; Resolution No. 3, 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.

Procedural History

The two prohibition petitions were docketed respectively as G.R. Nos. 56350 and 56404 and were filed on March 6 and March 12, 1981. Respondents were ordered to answer within ten days; comments were filed. An amended petition was filed in the Occena case on March 24 adopting the theory that the 1935 Constitution had been restored. The cases were orally argued on March 26, 1981, with Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza appearing for respondents. The cases were submitted for decision following supplementation of the oral arguments. The Court issued a judgment dismissing the petitions for lack of merit, with a separate dissent by Justice Teehankee.

Issues Presented

The Court framed and disposed of three principal legal issues: (1) whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa possessed the constitutional authority to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution; (2) whether the proposed changes amounted to a revision or an amendment and, relatedly, the permissible breadth of proposals by a constituent body; and (3) what vote and what standard of submission to the people were required for the proposals to be valid — specifically, whether a majority vote sufficed and whether the period and manner of submission satisfied the constitutional requirement for plebiscitary ratification.

Petitioners' Contentions

Petitioners challenged the validity of the proposed amendments on several grounds. They asserted that the 1973 Constitution was not the fundamental law and that the 1935 Constitution had been restored. They argued that the proposals were so extensive as to constitute a revision or overhaul rather than an amendment, exceeding the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. They further contended that the procedures for submission were deficient, that the required voting threshold was unmet or uncertain, and that the thirty-nine days between approval and the scheduled plebiscite were inadequate to satisfy the constitutional requirement for fair and proper submission to the people.

Respondents' Contentions

Respondents maintained that the Interim Batasang Pambansa, when convened as a constituent body upon the special call of the President and Prime Minister, lawfully exercised the power to propose amendments vested by the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution and as clarified by the 1976 Amendments. They asserted that the body needed only a majority vote to propose amendments under Article XVII, Section 15, that the vote tallies demonstrated overwhelming approval in any event, that the plebiscite was scheduled within the ninety-day period required by Article XVI, Section 2, and that the proposed amendments had been sufficiently aired and discussed in the Interim Batasang Pambansa and the mass media so as to constitute fair submission.

Ruling of the Court

The Court dismissed the petitions for lack of merit and denied injunctive relief. The majority held that the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect as established by Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, and that the Court was bound to apply and uphold it. The Court found that the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments when convened as a constituent assembly was clear under the 1976 Amendments and Article XVII, Section 15. The majority concluded that a majority vote sufficed for proposing amendments when the assembly sat in its constituent capacity and that, in any event, the vote counts obtained for the three resolutions were ample. The Court further held that Article XVI, Section 2 required that a plebiscite be held not later than three months after approval; the April 7, 1981 plebiscite fell within the ninety-day period measured from the February approvals. Finally, the Court found that the proposed amendments had been discussed intensively in the Interim Batasang Pambansa and in the mass media and therefore the people had been adequately informed for purposes of fair submission.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The majority grounded its decision on several pillars. First, the Court reaffirmed the binding effect of its prior determination in Javellana, which declared the 1973 Constitution in force as of January 17, 1973, and emphasized the judiciary's dual role to check and to legitimate the acts of coordinate branches. Second, the Court relied on the 1976 Amendments provision that the Interim Batasang Pambansa “shall have the same powers” as the Interim National Assembly, save specific exceptions, and on Article XVII, Section 15 which authorized the Interim National Assembly, upon special call by the Prime Minister, to propose amendments by a majority vote. The Court reasoned that the procedural voting requirement for proposing amendments in a constituent capacity differs from the supermajority rule applicable to ordinary legislative acts and that constitutional practice and precedent permit a constituent body to propose even sweeping changes, leaving ultimate validation to the people by ratification. The Court cited Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections, L-32476, October 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 367, for the proposition that a constituent body may propose amendments up to and including a total overhaul, because ratification by the sovereign people is the conclusive test. On the question of fair submission, the Court applied Article XVI, Section 2's ninety-day rule and accepted as sufficient the fact that the matters had been widely debated in the Interim Batasang Pambansa and publicized in the mass media, invoking prior observations in Occena v. Commission on Elections, L-52265, 95 SCRA 755 that public discussion informed the people of advantages and disadvantages of proposed amendments.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Teehankee dissented and would have given due course to the petitions and granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the plebiscite. He rested his dissent on a trilogy of contentions. First, he reiterated his earlier views in Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976), Hidalgo v. Marcos, 80 SCRA 538 (1977), and De la Llana v. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525 (1977) tha

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