Title
NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. vs. Dabu
Case
G.R. No. 225142
Decision Date
Sep 13, 2017
Seafarer with diabetes declared unfit for duty; sought disability benefits. CA dismissed employer's appeal as untimely, affirming 10-day appeal period under Labor Code prevails over Rule 43.
disability benefits
dismissal
appeal

Case Summary (G.R. No. 225142)

Factual Background

Petitioner hired respondent to work as an oiler for nine months on board M/V Hojin, with a monthly basic salary of US$584.00, under a collective bargaining agreement referred to as “IBF JSU/AMOSUP-IMMAJ CBA” effective from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. Before deployment, respondent underwent a pre-employment medical examination on March 25, 2013, during which he disclosed that he had diabetes mellitus. The examining physician noted diabetes mellitus type 2, controlled with medications.

Respondent embarked on April 6, 2013 and performed his duties. On April 8, 2013, he experienced palpitations, pains all over the body, numbness of hands and legs, lack of sleep, and nervousness. On April 10, 2013, he consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who found an elevated blood sugar level and diabetes mellitus, and declared him unfit for sea duty. He was repatriated to Manila on April 12, 2013, where he was immediately referred to the company-designated physician at NGC Medical Specialist Clinic, Inc. The company physician required laboratory tests, which showed that respondent had diabetes mellitus that was poorly controlled. Respondent underwent multiple follow-up examinations because he continued to report palpitations, body pains, and easy fatigability. He was prescribed medications and was eventually placed on insulin treatment.

On July 18, 2013, the company-designated physician declared that respondent’s diabetes mellitus was not work-related. The treatment continued for a maximum period of 130 days. On August 22, 2013, the physician reiterated the conclusion that the diabetes mellitus was not work-related. Respondent nevertheless wrote petitioner requesting continuation of treatment, asserting that the sickness was work-related in light of his 23 years of working in petitioner’s various vessels.

Respondent later consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo of the Philippine Heart Center, who found that respondent suffered from diabetes mellitus requiring insulin, with Impediment Grade VII (41.80%), and declared respondent permanently unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity. Dr. Vicaldo also considered the illness work-aggravated/related. Respondent further consulted Dr. Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, an internal medicine specialist, whose findings were stated as consistent with those of Dr. Vicaldo.

Respondent sought disability benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees, but petitioner denied the claims. Respondent requested grievance proceedings under the CBA, yet the parties did not settle. Respondent then filed a notice to arbitrate with the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB required the parties to submit position papers.

NCMB Proceedings and the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Decision

On November 28, 2014, the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent disability compensation of US$60,000.00 (or its peso equivalent at the time of payment) plus 12% interest, and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. The PVA dismissed all other claims for lack of merit.

Petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, 2015. On February 24, 2015, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 seeking to set aside the PVA award and alleging serious errors in the voluntary arbitration decision. Petitioner also sought to enjoin enforcement of the award. Respondent filed a comment, petitioner filed a reply, and the parties submitted memoranda. On April 27, 2015, the NCMB-PVA issued a Writ of Execution, directing satisfaction of the judgment award. Petitioner complied without prejudice to the outcome of its appeal.

Court of Appeals First Decision, Amended Decision, and Resolution

On September 15, 2015, the Court of Appeals issued a decision granting petitioner’s petition and reversing and setting aside the NCMB-PVA decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing in part that the petition should be dismissed for being filed out of time. On March 3, 2016, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Decision recalling and setting aside its September 15, 2015 decision, and dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied it in a Resolution dated June 9, 2016, holding petitioner’s motion to be without merit.

The Parties’ Contentions and the Core Issue

Petitioner pursued review on certiorari contending that the Court of Appeals committed serious, reversible and gross error in law and in fact when it amended the judgment and dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. The controlling issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed petitioner’s Rule 43 petition for lack of jurisdiction due to late filing, in light of the statutory finality scheme under Art. 262-A of the Labor Code and the interpretive doctrine in PHILEC v. Court of Appeals.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reiterated the rule that Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award “shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.” The Court further referenced Section 6, Rule VII of the NCMB Procedural Guidelines, which likewise states that voluntary arbitration awards become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt.

While Rule 43, Section 4 generally provides a 15-day reglementary period to appeal decisions, the Court held that, in labor arbitration, the statutory ten-day period controls. It relied on PHILEC v. Court of Appeals, where the Court explained that the appeal of a Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision to the Court of Appeals must be filed within ten calendar days from receipt of the award. The Court treated the period as binding because it is expressed in the statute, and because failure to perfect the appeal within the statutory period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, leaving the Court of Appeals without authority to act once the award has lapsed into finality and executory status.

The Court also emphasized the interaction between statutory rights and procedural rules. It cited the doctrine that rules of court, promulgated under authority of law, cannot conflict with positive law, and that where there is conflict, the statute prevails. Applying this framework, the Court reasoned that if the PVA decision already became final and executory, any appellate action altering the substantive outcome would be null for lack of jurisdiction.

Having reviewed the timeline, the Court found that petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, 2015 and filed the Rule 43 petition on February 24, 2015, which the Court characterized as fifteen days after receipt. Because the petition was not filed within the ten-day period, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for being time-barred and properly treated the PVA award as immutable once it attained finality.

Application of Doctrines on Finality and Immutability of Judgments

The Court reinforced the doctrine that finality of judgment serves public policy and requires that litigations end on a definite date. It cited principles of immutability of final judgments, stating that a decision that has acquired finality becomes unalterable in any respect, even if a party alleges error in fact or law. It held that the award of finality affects vested rights, and it underlined that execution proceeds as a matter of right for the prevailing party.

The Court further observed that a denial of a petition on timeliness grounds is tantamount to a determination that ends litigation for purposes of finality. It thus rejected petitioner’s attempt to revive the merits after the statutory lapse into finality.

Consideration of Petitioner’s Arguments Regarding Alleged Lack of Knowledge

Petitioner argued that PHILEC should not apply because, at the time of filing, jurisprudence allegedly supported a 15-day appeal period under Rule 43; that petitioner had no actual or constructive notice of the new prescriptive period established by PHILEC due to the proximity between the promulgation of PHILEC on December 10, 2014 and the filing date; and that judicial notice should be taken of protracted publication processes.

The Court rejected these contentions. It reiterated that Art. 262-A expressly provides a ten-day finality period and that the ten-day period is a substantive statutory right that cannot be dim

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