Nullada vs. Civil Registrar of Manila

Factual Background

Marlyn Monton Nullada alleged that she married Akira Ito in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan on July 29, 1997, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo and registered with the Local Civil Registry of Manila. The marriage produced a child, Shin Ito. The parties’ relationship deteriorated and, by mutual agreement, they obtained a divorce in Japan in 2009. The embassy issued a Divorce Certificate dated November 16, 2009, and the Head of Katsushika-ku issued an Acceptance Certificate; an English translation and excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code were also submitted to the Philippine courts.

Petition and Relief Sought

Marlyn Monton Nullada filed a Petition under Rule 108 in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, seeking recognition and registration in the Philippines of the Japanese divorce decree, cancellation of the entry of marriage in the Manila civil registry, and a declaration that she had capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Pretrial and Trial Proceedings in the RTC

The RTC found the petition in due form and issued an Order of Hearing with publication and service on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor of Manila. The OSG entered appearance for the Republic and deputized the City Prosecutor to assist in the hearings. Trial proceeded with testimony and documentary evidence offered by Marlyn Monton Nullada, including the Report of Marriage, authentication certificates, the Divorce Certificate from the Embassy of Japan, the Acceptance Certificate from Katsushika-ku (with English translation), excerpts of the Japanese Civil Code, and judicial affidavits. Mary Ann Chico, a registration officer of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, testified to present original civil registry copies. Akira Ito did not file an Answer despite summons by publication. The Republic offered no contrary evidence.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 21, 2016, the RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition. The court’s fallo read simply that the petition was denied and the parties were to be notified. The RTC grounded its denial on the policy of non-recognition of divorce embodied in Article 17 of the New Civil Code and construed Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code restrictively. The RTC concluded that because Marlyn Monton Nullada had agreed to and jointly filed for the divorce, she could not invoke paragraph 2 of Article 26 to obtain capacity to remarry.

Post‑Decision Motions and Recourse to the Supreme Court

Marlyn Monton Nullada filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on April 26, 2016. She then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, presenting a single pure question of law: whether Article 26, paragraph 2 applies only where the alien spouse sought the foreign divorce and not where the divorce was mutually agreed upon.

Jurisdictional Acceptance by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court accepted direct review under Rule 45 on the ground that the case raised a pure question of law concerning statutory interpretation. The Court applied the principle permitting direct recourse to resolve legal questions of statute application, citing Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar.

Governing Provision and Precedent

The Court focused on Article 26 of the Family Code, particularly its second paragraph providing that where a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The Court treated the present facts as substantially similar to those in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018), which the Court had decided after the filing of the present petition and which squarely addressed whether Article 26 applies where the Filipino spouse initiated or obtained the foreign divorce.

Supreme Court Ruling on the Core Issue

The Court held that the plain language of Article 26, paragraph 2 requires only that a divorce be validly obtained abroad and that the alien spouse be capacitated to remarry; it does not condition recognition on who initiated the foreign proceeding. The Court affirmed the reasoning in Manalo that whether the Filipino spouse initiated or was respondent in the foreign divorce is immaterial because the result is the same: the alien spouse is free to remarry under his or her national law while the Filipino spouse would otherwise remain bound. The nationality principle is not absolute and paragraph 2 is an exception to the general rule of non‑recognition of divorce.

Evidence of Foreign Law and Its Deficiency in the Record

Notwithstanding the foregoing substantive ruling, the Court emphasized t