Title
Nool vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 116635
Decision Date
Jul 24, 1997
Plaintiffs claimed ownership of foreclosed lands, alleging a repurchase agreement with defendant Anacleto. Courts ruled the sale void due to lack of title, nullifying repurchase rights, and ordered restitution of P30,000 with rent payments.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 116635)

Factual Background

The parties disputed title to two parcels of land in San Manuel, Isabela, one of which had an area of one hectare formerly owned by Victorino Nool under TCT No. T-74950 and the other of three point zero eight eight zero hectares formerly owned by Francisco Nool under TCT No. T-100945. Petitioners alleged that they had bought these parcels from Victorino and Francisco, had mortgaged them to the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure a loan, and that foreclosure and consolidation in DBP followed for nonpayment. Petitioners asserted that, within the period of redemption, they and private respondent Anacleto Nool agreed that he would redeem the foreclosed land from DBP and would buy the parcels for P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was paid to Conchita, with a balance of P14,000.00 to remain unpaid; petitioners further alleged a contemporaneous covenant that the lands would be returned to them when they had the money.

Documentary Evidence and Title Transfers

The record showed that DBP foreclosed the mortgage, issued affidavits of non-redemption establishing the one-year redemption period from March 16, 1982 to March 15, 1983, and obtained new certificates of title on May 23, 1983. DBP negotiated a sale of the parcels to private respondent Anacleto Nool by a Deed of Conditional Sale dated April 1, 1985, and Transfer Certificates of Title were thereafter issued to him on February 8, 1988. Exhibits C and D were undenied private writings executed on November 30, 1984; Exhibit C was characterized by petitioners as a receipt of agreement evidencing sale, and Exhibit D as a written agreement that petitioners could repurchase the lands later.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, declared Exhibit C to be an option to sell that was not binding and validly withdrawn for want of consideration, ordered petitioners to return P30,000.00 with legal interest, ordered petitioners to deliver peaceful possession of two hectares and to pay reasonable rents at P5,000.00 per annum or P2,500.00 per cropping from judicial demand until delivery, and awarded costs. The court found the principal contract of sale and the ancillary repurchase instrument to be void or inoperative.

Court of Appeals Disposition

The Court of Appeals, Second Division, affirmed the trial court in toto. It agreed that the purported sale was void because petitioners did not have title to transfer at the time of the purported sale and that Exhibit D, being dependent on Exhibit C, was likewise void; alternatively, the Court of Appeals treated Exhibit D, if independent, as an accepted unilateral promise to sell unsupported by consideration distinct from the price and therefore not binding under Article 1479.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioners raised three principal assignments of error: that the Court of Appeals misapplied the legal import of Exhibit C by deeming it nonbinding for want of consideration; that the court ignored petitioners’ actual possession, cultivation and exclusive appropriation of harvests to validate a contractual right; and that the courts erred by ordering restitution of P30,000.00 and rents instead of allowing petitioners to re-acquire the four hectares upon payment of P100,000.00 as shown in Exhibit D.

Petitioners’ Contentions

Petitioners contended that Exhibit C constituted a valid sale and Exhibit D reserved a right of repurchase enforceable under Article 1370 of the Civil Code, asserting that the clear terms of the instruments should control. They argued that their possession and cultivation demonstrated recognition of the agreement and that ordering restitution and rents was unjust because private respondents owed the P14,000.00 balance.

Respondents’ Contentions

Private respondents maintained that they had purchased the parcels from DBP, not from petitioners, and that they acted in good faith after discovering that petitioners no longer owned the property at the time of the alleged sale. They asserted that Exhibit C was null because the sellers had no title to transfer and that Exhibit D was either dependent on the void sale or, if independent, was an unenforceable promise to sell unsupported by distinct consideration. They denied any trust relationship and relied on statutory and jurisprudential grounds to uphold their title and to resist estoppel arguments.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the contract of sale in Exhibit C was inoperative because petitioners lacked the right to transfer title at the time of the purported sale and that Exhibit D was likewise void insofar as it presupposed a valid sale; alternatively, Exhibit D was an accepted unilateral promise to sell lacking distinct consideration and therefore not binding under Article 1479. The Court ordered petitioners to return P30,000.00 with interest from the time of judicial demand in the counterclaim, to deliver peaceful possession of two hectares and to pay reasonable rents, as previously adjudged.

Legal Reasoning — Validity of Exhibits C and D

The Court reasoned that a person can sell only what the seller owns or is authorized to sell and that a buyer acquires no better title than the seller had, citing Article 1505 and the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. The Court observed that the Civil Code contemplates sales where the seller may acquire rights after perfection in some instances, but found that in this case delivery of ownership was impossible because DBP had already become absolute owner and had sold to private respondents. The Court applied by analogy Article 1409 item five (those which contemplate an impossible service) and Article 1422 to conclude that the principal sale was inoperative and that a repurchase right dependent on it could not stand. The Court further explained that a right of repurchase must be reserved in the same instrument of sale to constitute conventional redemption under Article 1601; where an instrument granting repurchase is executed after an absolute sale, it is a new contract and not a true reserved right.

Legal Reasoning — Independence of Repurchase Instrument

The Court considered the alternative that Exhibit D might be independent of Exhibit C and found that Exhibit D, if treated as a unilateral promise, failed to meet the requisites of an accepted unilateral promise binding the promisor because it lacked consideration separate from the price, as required by Article 1479. The Court relied on the doctrine established in Diamante v. Court of Appeals and earlier authorities that an agreement to repurchase executed after sale becomes a promise to sell and must satisfy the statutory requirement of distinct consideration.

Legal Reasoning — Estoppel and Public Policy

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