Title
Nolasco vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 122250
Decision Date
Jul 21, 1997
Election winner Blanco disqualified for vote-buying; Vice-Mayor Nolasco succeeds as mayor, upholding electoral integrity and succession law.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-4445)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

May 8, 1995: local elections held. May 9, 1995: Alarilla filed petition to disqualify Blanco with COMELEC. May 15, 1995: COMELEC First Division granted ex parte motion to suspend Blanco’s proclamation. August 15, 1995: COMELEC First Division resolved to disqualify Blanco. October 23, 1995: COMELEC en banc denied motions for reconsideration and affirmed the First Division. Blanco and Nolasco filed separate certiorari petitions with the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court reviewed COMELEC’s actions and the evidence and rendered a decision addressing both Blanco’s challenge to the procedure and Nolasco’s claim to succession.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

1987 Constitution (Article IX-C, sec. 2) — COMELEC’s plenary authority to enforce and administer election laws. Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), particularly Section 68 (grounds for disqualification) and Section 261 (prohibitions on vote-buying). R.A. No. 6646 (Sec. 6 on effect of disqualification case; Sec. 28 on prosecution of vote-buying). COMELEC Rules of Procedure (summary hearing provision, Rule 4). COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 (procedure for referral to Law Department). Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), Section 44 on succession; Implementing Rules Art. 83. Controlling jurisprudence cited: Labo v. COMELEC (doctrine on non-proclamation of second placer), Lozano v. Yorac, Reyes v. COMELEC, Lacson v. COMELEC, People v. San Juan.

Allegations in the Disqualification Petition

Alarilla’s petition alleged: (1) intelligence and police search warrants executed at Blanco’s residence uncovered unlicensed firearms and six arrested men purportedly forming Blanco’s “private army”; (2) visible sighting of a Galil assault rifle in a locked room; (3) while awaiting a second warrant, Blanco’s wife and brother were allowed to remove ten large plastic bags, each containing shoe boxes with pay envelopes, each envelope purportedly containing P1,000, totaling P10,000,000; (4) envelopes were labeled for teachers and bore inscriptions (“VOTE!!! TINOY”), and MTB (Movement for Tinoy Blanco Volunteers) cards were used to control disbursement and ensure voting compliance (perforated IDs to recover the “balance” after voting); (5) incidents of “flying voters” and impersonations; (6) alleged bribery of Comelec registrar and other schemes to ensure victory; (7) claims that money and armed presence constituted vote-buying, terrorism, and campaign spending beyond lawful limits — all asserted as grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68, BP 881.

COMELEC First Division’s Interim Action and Rationale

COMELEC First Division granted Alarilla’s ex parte motion to suspend Blanco’s proclamation, finding a probable commission of election offenses and that the evidence supporting disqualification was strong. The Commission directed canvassing to be completed but ordered suspension of proclamation should Blanco obtain the winning number of votes until petitions were resolved. COMELEC relied on statutory authority (R.A. No. 6646 Sec. 6) permitting suspension of proclamation when evidence of guilt is strong.

Blanco’s Procedural and Substantive Challenges to COMELEC

Blanco argued that: (1) suspension of proclamation was issued without notice or hearing and thus violated due process; (2) COMELEC departed from COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 (which provides for referral to the Law Department in certain post-election complaints) and thereby denied equal protection by treating him differently; (3) disposition of his disqualification by summary proceedings violated the requirement for a full-dress hearing for serious election offenses like vote-buying and terrorism; (4) the evidence failed to establish the minimum quantum required to create a disputable presumption of massive vote-buying; and (5) the Commission erred in directing proclamation of the second placer, contrary to the Labo doctrine and its progeny.

COMELEC’s Hearing and Evidentiary Determinations

Following the suspension, Blanco filed a motion to lift, answered the petition, and participated in hearings. Parties filed position papers and replies. The First Division found the evidentiary showing by Alarilla sufficiently strong: detailed affidavits (including a detailed affidavit by Romeo Burgos), admissions by individuals found to have received money, MTB identification cards and envelopes marked “VOTE!!! TINOY,” police blotters recounting apprehension of alleged flying voters, and criminal complaints filed with the municipal court. The First Division concluded that offers, promises, and deliveries of money (and accompaniments of armed intimidation) satisfied the elements of the electoral offense and statutory bases for disqualification. The en banc COMELEC affirmed that factual finding (with one dissent).

Supreme Court’s Analysis: Due Process and COMELEC Procedure

The Supreme Court held that suspension of proclamation did not deprive Blanco of due process. It emphasized that R.A. No. 6646 Sec. 6 and COMELEC procedural rules require that the evidence of guilt be strong to justify suspension and that the suspension is provisional in nature. The Court stressed that due process requires an opportunity to be heard, not necessarily a prior hearing, and found Blanco had opportunities to be heard: motions, answers, hearings, position papers, and replies. The Court also held that COMELEC had authority under the 1987 Constitution and relevant statutes to assume direct jurisdiction over disqualification matters and was not strictly bound to Resolution No. 2050; such procedural delegations did not oust COMELEC’s power to act directly when it deemed appropriate. The Court further reaffirmed that petitions for disqualification may be heard summarily under COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure, distinguishing the administrative (electoral-disqualification) aspect from the criminal aspect of vote-buying.

Supreme Court’s Analysis: Review of COMELEC’s Factual Findings on Vote-Buying

The Court reviewed COMELEC’s factual findings and concluded there was substantial evidence to support the finding of vote-buying: detailed witness affidavits corroborated by physical items (MTB cards, labeled envelopes), admissions by individuals who received money, apprehension of alleged flying voters with envelopes, and documentary evidence (police blotter, inventory receipts). The Court rejected attacks based on hearsay and strict evidentiary rules, noting summary administrative proceedings permit relaxed evidentiary formalities. It reiterated the narrow scope of judicial review over COMELEC factual determinations — reversal requires a showing of grave abuse of discretion or arbitrariness. The Court concluded COMELEC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary.

Succession Issue: Nolasco’s Claim to the Mayoralty

Nolasco, as vice-mayor, intervened to assert that, if Blanco were finally disqualified, he (Nolasco) should become mayor. The Supreme Court sustained this claim under R.A. No. 7160 Sec. 44 and implementing Art. 83, which provide that when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of mayor, the vice mayor shall become mayor ipso facto. The Court applied the established rule that the second placer cannot be proclaimed winner in lieu of a disqualified first placer (the Labo doctrine), and that succession is governed by the Local Government Code’s explicit succession scheme. Because Blanco was disqualified, the office was deemed to suffer a permanent vacancy in the sense of failure to qualify, and Nolasco, the duly elected vice-mayor, succeeded to the mayoralty.

Holding and Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC en banc resolution disqualifying Florentino P. Blanco for violating provisions related to vote-buying and related election offenses. The Court modified the disposition by adjudging Edgardo C. Nolasco as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in view of Blanco’s disqualification. No costs were imposed.

Concurring and Dissenting Views (Justice Bellosillo)

Justice Bellosillo concurred in the application of the succession rule (that the vice mayor succeeds upon permanent vacan

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