Title
NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.
Case
G.R. No. 175799
Decision Date
Nov 28, 2011
Lepanto sought to void loan and hedging contracts with Rothschild, alleging they were gambling agreements under Philippine law. Rothschild contested jurisdiction and cause of action, but courts ruled service proper, jurisdiction acquired, and cause sufficiently stated, remanding for trial.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 175799)

Factual Background

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed a complaint seeking a declaration that certain loan and hedging contracts with NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited were void under Article 2018 for being wagers and for damages. Service of summons was effected by respondents’ counsel personally delivering the summons and complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney and routing service through the Department of Foreign Affairs. Petitioner later advised the Court that it had changed its corporate name to Investec Australia Limited and submitted Australian Securities & Investment Commission documents evidencing the change.

Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss by Order dated December 9, 2005. The court held that service through the Department of Foreign Affairs was proper because petitioner had neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney to accept summons. The trial court also ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action and dismissed other objections as defenses to be tried on the merits. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied on March 6, 2006, at which time the court also disallowed petitioner’s motions for leave to take deposition and to serve interrogatories.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

Petitioner sought relief by filing a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94382. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a decision dated September 8, 2006, holding that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss was an interlocutory order generally not subject to Certiorari, and that review should await an appeal from final judgment after trial. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration by Resolution dated December 12, 2006.

Issues Presented

Petitioner argued that the denial of its Motion to Dismiss could properly be the subject of a petition for Certiorari and that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to find lack of jurisdiction over petitioner and by erroneously finding that the complaint stated a cause of action. Respondent contended that the petition should be dismissed because the petitioner was not the real party in interest and because the petition lacked proper verification and a certificate of non-forum shopping, and maintained that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly ruled.

Real Party in Interest

Respondent maintained that NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited no longer existed under that name at the time the petition was filed. Petitioner produced documentary proof that it had changed its name to Investec Australia Limited. The Supreme Court accepted this evidence as satisfactory and declined to dismiss the petition for lack of a real party in interest. The Court reiterated the principle in Philips Export B.V. v. Court of Appeals concerning the importance of a corporate name, but held that adequate identification of the plaintiff under a former name would forestall dismissal where the identity of the party was established. The Court recalled the definition of a real party in interest under Rule 3, Section 2.

Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari

The Court reaffirmed the general rule that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory and not ordinarily subject to Certiorari, which corrects jurisdictional errors and not mere errors of judgment. The Court noted the narrow exception for orders tainted by grave abuse of discretion, which it defined as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The resolution of the petition therefore rested on whether the trial court’s denial was tainted by such grave abuse.

Issues Properly Resolved at Trial

The Court held that petitioner’s defenses alleging absence of a cause of action, estoppel, and in pari delicto are evidentiary in nature and are not proper grounds for dismissal under Section 1, Rule 16. The Court explained that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action requires a complaint that on its face shows no possible claim; legal conclusions and conclusions of law cannot be assumed true for purposes of a demurrer. The Court relied on Tan v. Court of Appeals and related jurisprudence to state that courts may consider documents incorporated into the complaint and that where resolution of a demurrer requires probing the merits, the matter must await trial.

Jurisdiction over the Person

Petitioner argued that service through the DFA and consular channels was improper and that the trial court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction. The Court observed that the 1997 Rules provided a broader Section 12, Rule 14 for service on foreign private juridical entities that had transacted business in the Philippines, but that the summons in this case was effected under Section 15, Rule 14 governing extraterritorial service. The Court explained that extraterritorial service under Section 15, Rule 14 applied only in in rem or quasi in rem actions where the court already had jurisdiction over the res, citing Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation and Domagas v. Jensen. The Court concluded that the complaint seeking declaration of nullity and damages was an action in personam and that extraterritorial service could not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant absent voluntary appearance.

Voluntary Appearance and Waiver of Objection to Jurisdiction

The Court addressed whether petitioner’s participation in discovery amounted to voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner relied on La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals to argue that a defendant may raise jurisdictional objections while asserting defenses and seeking relief. The Co

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