Title
Nicolas y Sombilon vs. Romulo
Case
G.R. No. 175888
Decision Date
Feb 11, 2009
A U.S. Marine convicted of rape in the Philippines was transferred to U.S. custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement, sparking debates on its constitutionality and enforcement.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 175888)

Key Dates

Alleged offense: on or about November 1, 2005. VFA entry into force: February 10, 1998. RTC Makati conviction: December 4, 2006. Romulo–Kenney agreements: December 19 and 22, 2006. Physical transfer to U.S. custody: December 29, 2006. Court of Appeals decision (dismissing petition as moot): January 2, 2007. Supreme Court oral arguments: September 19, 2008. Supreme Court decision resolving these petitions: February 11, 2009.

Facts and Trial Disposition

L/Cpl. Daniel J. Smith was charged with rape under Article 266‑A of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. 8353) based on a sworn complaint by Suzette S. Nicolas alleging rape inside a vehicle in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Pursuant to the VFA, the United States authorities had custody of Smith during proceedings and complied with producing him for trial. After trial in RTC Makati, Smith was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, sentenced to reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties, and ordered temporarily committed to Makati City Jail pending arrangements for serving his sentence as provided by the VFA; the court also awarded compensatory and moral damages to the complainant.

Transfer to U.S. Custody and Romulo–Kenney Agreements

On December 29, 2006, Philippine agents transferred Smith from Makati City Jail to a U.S.‑controlled detention facility pursuant to two agreements signed December 19 and 22, 2006 (referred to as the Romulo–Kenney Agreements). Those instruments provided for Smith’s return to U.S. military custody and detention in a room within the U.S. Embassy compound, guarded by U.S. military personnel, with Philippine police and jail authorities to have access to ensure U.S. compliance.

Procedural Challenge and Core Legal Questions

Petitions were filed challenging the transfer and asserting (1) the VFA’s constitutionality and reciprocal legal status, (2) whether the Romulo–Kenney Agreements were consistent with the VFA, and (3) the implications of U.S. jurisprudence (notably Medellin v. Texas) on whether the VFA is enforceable as domestic law in the United States. Petitioners also argued constitutional objections invoking the Court’s rulemaking and equal protection powers as related to custody and detention.

Majority Holding on the Constitutionality of the VFA

The Court upholds the constitutionality of the VFA under the 1987 Constitution. It relies on prior decision Bayan v. Zamora and finds (a) the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and (b) it has been recognized by the United States as a binding international agreement. The Court treats the VFA as an implementing instrument of the RP–US Mutual Defense Treaty (1951), the latter having been ratified by both the Philippine and U.S. Senates (the majority cites U.S. Senate advice and consent on March 20, 1952). The Court reasons that, as an implementing agreement of a ratified mutual defense treaty, the VFA satisfies Article XVIII, Section 25’s requirement that agreements permitting foreign troops be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

Majority Analysis on Custody During Proceedings and Post‑Conviction Detention

The Court distinguishes custody during criminal proceedings from detention after conviction. It interprets VFA Article V, paragraph 6 to permit United States military authorities to hold custody of U.S. personnel from the commission of an offense until completion of judicial proceedings, subject to timely production for investigatory/judicial needs and a one‑year default rule. Conversely, the Court reads Article V, Section 10 to require that confinement or detention of U.S. personnel be “carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities” and explicitly states detention shall be “by Philippine authorities.” Consequently, while U.S. custody during trial complied with Article V(6), the post‑conviction transfer of Smith to detention “by” U.S. authorities at the U.S. Embassy conflicted with Article V(10).

Majority Ruling on the Romulo–Kenney Agreements

Applying the VFA text, the Court declares the Romulo–Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 not in accordance with the VFA because they provided for detention of a convicted U.S. personnel within U.S. Embassy facilities under U.S. control rather than detention by Philippine authorities in agreed facilities. The Court orders the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to negotiate immediately with U.S. representatives for an appropriate agreement providing for detention facilities under Philippine authorities in conformity with Article V, Section 10 of the VFA, and maintains the status quo pending further orders.

Majority Conclusion on Medellin v. Texas and the VFA’s Enforceability in U.S. Law

Addressing the Medellin decision (U.S. Supreme Court), the majority concludes the VFA is self‑executing as that term is applied in Medellin because the VFA was intended to carry out obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty and has been implemented (for example, the U.S. produced Smith during trial). The Court also holds the VFA was transmitted under the U.S. Case‑Zablocki Act and that the Mutual Defense Treaty itself was advised and consented to by the U.S. Senate in 1952; the majority relies on U.S. precedents (e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi) to treat executive agreements as “treaties” in international law and enforceable in the U.S. Accordingly, the Court finds Medellin does not nullify the VFA’s reciprocal enforceability or its validity as a basis for the visitation and jurisdictional arrangements in question.

Relief, Directives, and Procedural Disposition

The Court partly grants the petitions and modifies the Court of Appeals’ January 2, 2007 dismissal. It declares the Romulo–Kenney Agreements inconsistent with the VFA, orders negotiation for detention facilities under Philippine authorities per VFA Article V Sec. 10, and directs maintenance of the status quo pending further orders. The Court of Appeals is instructed to promptly resolve related matters pending before it (including contempt proceedings and Smith’s appeal). No costs were imposed.

Dissenting Views — Carpio and Puno (joined by others)

The dissenting opinions assert that Medellin materially alters the legal landscape by holding that treaties are not domestic enforceable law in the U.S. unless self‑executing or implemented by Congress. The dissenters contend the United States does not recognize the VFA as a treaty enforceable under U.S. domestic law but tre

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